













Bernd Marin



Welfare in an Idle Society?

Reinventing Retirement, Work, Wealth, Health, and Welfare



Welfare in an Idle Society?

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**A Primer on Re-Designing Social Security
to Cope with Global Ageing and
21st Century Pension Future:
Austria as a Case in Point**

Bernd Marin

ASHGATE

O ctej 2013

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Endorsements

“With his *Welfare in an Idle Society?* Bernd Marin has set a ‘gold standard’. Congratulations! Nobody who will give new thoughts to re-designing Social Security can go past this encyclopaedic opus.”

Bert Rürup

“Bernd Marin’s monumental, erudite and radical reformulation of the management of older age could not be more timely. Population ageing has already underlined the inadequacy of traditional approaches; the current crisis puts them under an even harsher light. Marin’s profound and detailed analysis leads him to a new synthesis and new solutions which all specialists and policymakers will need to be aware of.”

David Coleman

“An extraordinary book that fascinates by its depth of thought, relevance and multidisciplinary approach. A must-read for anybody interested in pensions ... and highly readable for the broader audience.”

Robert Holzmann

“Bernd Marin’s new book is a likely instant classic and certainly a milestone in the art of designing a pension system for ageing European societies ... Marin’s eloquently presented reform proposal seems unbeatable, economic and political contexts permitting, as an efficient and equitable solution. For both academics and policy practitioners, this makes for delightfully enlightening reading.”

Claus Offe

“A most ambitious undertaking – covering the philosophy, implementation, pitfalls and case studies of pension systems and disability insurance, with particular attention to gender equality. Marin’s book illuminates these issues, which take on added salience in an era of population ageing.”

Estelle James

Welfare in an Idle Society?

“The intergenerational contract is challenged not only by the ageing of populations, but also by the huge public debts inherited from the Great Recession. This book greatly helps us understand how to reform social security in order to make it sustainable. A great read.”

Tito Boeri

“Intellectually capacious, theoretically incisive, empirically rich and policy relevant, this book puts Austria in a broad comparative perspective. A *tour de force*.”

Peter J. Katzenstein

“Bernd Marin builds a passionate argument for the renewal of social security in the twenty-first century on comprehensive documentation and clear theoretical insight: a rare achievement that is certain to revive and transform the weary discussion on the welfare state.”

Abram de Swaan

“Marin provides a brilliant analysis and covers new ideas about invalidity pensions and women’s work and pensions. A book that should be read by everybody who is interested in this topic.”

Friedrich Schneider

“A remarkable, fascinating book! Lots of ideas that take account of demography. A must-read for anyone dealing with welfare and social security.”

Sergei Scherbov

“Marin’s book excels in important respects: given the urgent need for strategic decisions, it is timely, comprehensive, courageous and written with an eye on the underlying socio-political problems.”

Helmut Kramer

“This outstanding book is a great source for anybody interested in the Welfare system and its implications for societies and individuals.”

Rocio Fernández-Ballesteros

“A monumental compendium, written with panache, vast horizon, and deep commitment to fairness ... an indispensable work of reference. This primer should be required reading for all policy makers. Above all, the argument for NDC is convincing.”

Gunther Tichy

“An impressive reference book on the need for welfare state restructuring ... Marin skilfully outlines the contours of a sustainable social policy system. A unique strength of the volume is the attention paid to the complex gender issues that underlie optimal pension design.”

Janet C. Gornick

“This comprehensive and interdisciplinary book discusses how ageing necessitates a re-balancing of the welfare system that can provide sustainable social security in the future. It is highly recommended reading for economists, other social scientists and policy makers alike.”

Christian Keuschnigg

“That there is a looming pensions crisis in almost every advanced society is widely known. But the details of the crisis and, even more, fair and sustainable ways out of it, are hardly understood at all. In this bold and original contribution Bernd Marin adds greatly to our understanding and thinks deeply about likely solutions.”

Colin Crouch

“With admirable scope and thoroughness, this book identifies and addresses the key economic and political issues of work and retirement in an employ-

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ment-oriented, equal-opportunity national welfare state embedded in the global economy. This book is a must-read for welfare state scholars and practitioners.”

Edward Palmer

“This is an excellent overview of some of the most challenging problems facing aging societies. The scope of the book is admirably broad and the analysis is insightful.”

Dennis J. Snower

“An extremely well documented source book on the social and economic conditions of the life course in contemporary society. Marin’s book helps to invent solutions. It shows a way out of intellectual and political stagnation to new concepts of social order and human fulfilment in a phase of fundamental transitions.”

Leopold Rosenmayr

“This looks like an encyclopaedia on pensions, but in reality it is a *tractatus philosophicus* on the future of our welfare society written by a globalized humanist with a powerful thinking and writing.”

Karl Aiginger

“In this excellent book, Bernd Marin offers an in-depth analysis of welfare sustainability ... in a comprehensive comparative European framework of political economy, sociological theory and empirical evidence.”

Andreas Kruse

“This book combines intensive in-depth analysis of leading examples of countries responding to the challenge of an ageing society along with an impressive sweep of conceptual and empirical analysis comparing countries across the whole of Europe.”

Richard Rose

“A really comprehensive forward-looking study. Bernd Marin not only presents a superb analysis but also entertains new ideas that offer unprecedented possibilities, e.g. NDC. These require the modernization of institutions, which makes rethinking of many concepts and methods developed in the 20th century inevitable. A great book.”

Marek Góra

“*Welfare in an Idle Society?* defies the common opinion that pensions are a highly technical and rather boring subject, and it challenges half-truths about ‘acquired rights’, derived benefits for women and invalidity allowances. The book is a powerful instrument in overcoming pension illiteracy and effectively helping policy makers.”

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“Bernd Marin provides a thorough analysis of the welfare state and makes interesting suggestions for reforms based on solutions beyond the traditional boundaries of the welfare state and the unbridled free market.”

Ernst Fehr

“This major new contribution to the global debate on pensions should be required reading for all scholars, students and policy makers interested in the future of welfare and employment.”

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Joakim Palme

“Anyone who is considering reforms to social security or disability insurance systems should read Marin’s book.”

David Wise

“A formidable combination of factual mastery and intellectual imagination. What Marin has done will renew the terms of the debate on pensions and welfare for developed societies.”

Martin Kohli

“This book makes an essential contribution to re-thinking issues of health and welfare at a time of fundamental demographic and occupational change.”

Anthony Giddens

“A milestone contribution to the urgent task of rethinking and redesigning social security – from now on a standard reference.”

Stein Ringen

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