




Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2016

Social Inclusion Monitor Europe














Daniel Schraad-Tischler and Christof Schiller

EU Social Justice Index 2016




Social Justice Index


- I Poverty prevention
- II Equitable education
- III Labor market access
- IV Social cohesion and non-discrimination
- V Health
- VI Intergenerational justice




Annotation: Scores on a scale from 1 to 10. Higher Scores = better performance. For further information see "Methodology" (chapter 3). Source: Own calculations.




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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I. Key findings, in brief


1. Social justice in the EU – participation opportunities have improved in the majority of EU member states, but are still a long way behind precrisis levels

Social justice has improved slightly in the majority of EU member states compared with last year's Social Justice Index (SJI 2015). It appears that, after years of decline, the majority of countries reached their lowest point between 2012 and 2014. Whether the improvement is a genuine, stable turnaround or just a slight temporary easing will only become apparent in future reports. At least the downward trend observed since 2008 in terms of equal participation opportunities has halted in the majority of member states. However, even seven years after the global economic crisis first hit, participation opportunities in the vast majority of EU states – with a few exceptions – are still noticeably worse than before the crisis. Only five of the 28 EU countries – the Czech Republic, Germany, Luxembourg, the UK, and Poland – are showing moderate improvements in terms of participation opportunities, compared with the situation before the economic and financial crisis.

The slight improvement observed for the majority of EU member states compared with last year's report is due primarily to an upward trend on the labor market. Of the euro crisis countries, Ireland in particular has found its way back onto a stable path. The labor market situation here has eased considerably, although the country is still a long way behind precrisis levels. In Italy too, the reforms of Renzi's government are starting to have a positive impact.

Nevertheless, it is not yet possible to talk of a real trend reversal in the area of social justice, especially for some other crisis-hit countries of southern Europe. For instance, although the Spanish economy also appears to be stabilizing, social justice levels in both Spain and Greece remain shockingly low. Greece brings up the rear in the comparison. The gap between Greece (28th place) and Romania (27th) and Bulgaria (26th) has actually widened again, since both Romania and Bulgaria have seen their index scores improve thanks to a fall in poverty rates, while Greece is standing still.

FIGURE 1 EU Social Justice Index (weighted)




Source: Own calculations.

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FIGURE 2 Social Justice Index – Dimensions and Indicators

Social Justice Index



Source: Own representation.

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2. Extent of poverty and social exclusion continues to be worrying – social divide between northern and southern Europe is still vast

The Nordic countries – Sweden, Finland, and Denmark – have held onto their lead positions. Compared with the situation in 2007/08, even these countries have seen overall losses in terms of social justice. However, compared with the much more drastic developments in southern Europe, they are still in a very comfortable position. Nevertheless, it is striking that Finland, which comes second overall, has worsened recently, whereas Sweden and Denmark have seen a slight improvement compared with last year.

The extended top group of countries includes the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany. The Czech Republic scores well for its very low poverty rate and above-average results for health and comes fourth overall. Austria (sixth) also has a high level of social inclusion overall – despite certain deficits in a few areas (especially education). Germany has managed to hold onto seventh place, largely thanks to its labor market situation, which continues to be very good, but has problems in the area of intergenerational justice. Income inequality and the risk of poverty and social exclusion remain high in Germany.

The gap between the top-ranked countries of northern Europe and the crisis-hit countries of southern Europe has barely changed since last year. The social divide between northern and southern Europe is still immense. This is largely because of the poverty figures in Greece and Spain, which are still alarming: these two countries have barely managed to reduce the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion compared with last year. The proportion of people in this category is 28.6 percent in Spain and as high as 35.7 percent in Greece. The relevant percentage for children and young people is even higher (see below for further details).

In general, when it comes to fighting poverty, to issues of nondiscrimination regarding minorities and at-risk social groups and to intergenerational justice, the EU has not made any significant progress. Inequality in disposable income has increased again over the reporting period (EU average 2015: Gini coefficient of 31, 2014: 30.9), and the proportion of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion across the EU is still very alarming – despite a slight reduction. Nearly a quarter of all EU citizens (23.7%) are currently at risk of poverty or social exclusion. In terms of the total EU population, this corresponds to around 118.8 million people.


Another concerning finding is that a growing number of people in full-time employment are at risk of poverty. In the EU as a whole, this proportion rose from 7 percent in 2009 to 7.8 percent in 2015. Germany is also affected by this trend: in 2015, 7.1 percent of people in Germany with a full-time job were at risk of poverty – 2 percentage points more than in 2009 (5.1 percent). This points to a growing low-wage sector and a dualization of the labor market – a trend that is visible in a large number of EU states. However, it remains to be seen whether the legal minimum wage introduced at the start of 2015 will be able to halt or mitigate this trend in Germany.

As well as the segmentation in the labor markets that can be observed in many EU countries, high youth unemployment remains a structural problem. Although some successes in reducing youth unemployment are starting to become visible (EU average 2015: 20.4%, 2014: 22.2%), youth unemployment is still far above precrisis levels (EU average 2008: 15.6%). The integration of refugees into the labor market has also not yet been successful in many places. Pioneering countries in terms of participation opportunities, like the Nordic countries Sweden and Finland, also do poorly in this respect.

3. Children and young people are the main losers of recent years – the gap between old and young is still huge

In the vast majority of EU member states, opportunities for children and young people have worsened since 2007/08 – in some cases considerably.¹ In no EU country are the participation opportunities for young people any better now than

FIGURE 3 Child and Youth Opportunity



Source: Own calculations.

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1 Four key indicators were used for the partial index presented here: the number of children and young people under the age of 18 at risk of poverty or social exclusion; the influence of socioeconomic background on educational success, the proportion of early school-leavers and the NEET rate (all young people not in employment or some form of education or training). See the Methodology chapter for more details.

in the 2008 report. Overall, the sub-index for child and youth opportunities reflects very clearly the national differences in the overall Social Justice Index. Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, and Denmark do best. Although the negative trend of recent years appears to have stopped for the time being in this partial index in many EU member states, there are still some states where it has worsened again compared with last year's report. The situation in the crisis-hit southern European countries of Italy, Greece, and Spain, and in Bulgaria and Romania in south-east Europe, remains very critical.

The poverty risk among children and young people in most of the crisis-hit southern European states has either fallen only slightly or, in some cases, has actually risen compared with last year. In Spain, 34.4 percent of children and young people are still at risk of poverty and social exclusion (2014: 35.8%; 2013: 32.6%). In Portugal the figure is 29.6 percent (2014: 31.4%; 2013: 31.7%). In Italy, 33.5 percent of children and young people are affected (2013: 32%). In Greece the figure is an alarming 37.8 percent (previous year 36.7%; 2013: 38.1%), and the proportion of children affected by severe material deprivation has more than doubled, from 9.7 percent in 2007 to 25.7 percent today. In Hungary, the figures are also still worrying, despite a recent clearly positive trend: 36.1 percent of children are at risk of poverty and social exclusion (although this figure was as high as 41.8 percent the previous year). In Romania (46.8%) and Bulgaria (43.7%) the rate also continues to be very high, although here too there is a downward trend. The UK's poor performance is also striking: 30.3 percent of people under the age of 18 are at risk of poverty and social exclusion.

In terms of the EU average, 26.9 percent of all children and young people are currently at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This is more than in 2008 (26.4%). However, it is difficult to interpret such averages for the EU because of the differences in population sizes between the individual EU states. Looking instead exclusively at the rise in the poverty and exclusion risk in the four crisis-hit countries of Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Italy, a much bigger increase is visible: the rise in these four countries alone between 2008 and 2015 was more than four percentage points – from 29.1 percent in 2008 to 33.8 percent. Translated into absolute figures, this means that in these four countries, more than one million (1.09 million) more children and young people are affected by poverty and social exclusion than in 2008.

It is particularly worrying that the gap between the generations has widened considerably since the crisis began. While the proportion of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion has risen since 2008, the proportion of old people at risk of poverty or social exclusion has fallen: from 23.3 percent to 17.4 percent (2015). This is due in part to the fact that in most countries pensions and benefits for older people did not shrink as much as incomes for the younger population during the crisis, if at all.

The proportion of children and young people suffering from severe material deprivation is also considerably higher, in terms of the EU average, than the equivalent proportion of older people. The difference is four percentage points (9.5%, compared with 5.5%). Material deprivation means that affected people have to suffer serious privations and can no longer afford the basic necessities of daily life (e.g., adequate heating or a telephone).

A similar north–south divide to that seen in the poverty distribution is also found in the proportion of young people aged between 20 and 24 who are not engaged in education, work, or vocational training. This NEET rate (NEET stands for “Not in Education, Employment, or Training”) is still very high, with an EU average of 17.3 percent. This indicator clearly reflects problems in the transition between the education system and the labor market. Young people who are completely outside the labor market and education system are in a very precarious situation that severely restricts their future prospects. Although this indicator has fallen slightly compared with last year’s report (18.0%), in 2008 it was “only” 15.0 percent. The situation in the southern European countries of Italy, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, and Spain is still particularly problematic – despite the fact that they too have seen a recent downward trend. In Spain, more than a fifth (22.2%) of young people fall into the NEET category. In Italy, which brings up the rear for this indicator, the figure is nearly a third (31.1%). The youth unemployment rates in these countries are even higher: in Spain and Greece, youth unemployment is still nearly 50 percent (Greece: 49.8%; Spain: 48.3%), and even in Italy the rate is still almost twice as high as in 2008, at 40.3 percent, despite a slight decline compared with the previous year. In contrast with the southern European countries, the lowest NEET rates are to be found in the Netherlands (7.2%), Luxembourg (8.8%), and Germany (9.3%). Germany is one of the few countries that have managed to achieve a substantial improvement over 2008.

The distribution of results for the indicator “socioeconomic background and student performance” is less consistent (in terms of the north–south divide usually observed). Countries like Finland and Estonia have traditionally done particularly well here because their education systems give children from socially disadvantaged backgrounds similar opportunities to children from more privileged backgrounds. Remarkably, Cyprus and Italy also do well in terms of this indicator. However, the quality of education in Finland and Estonia is higher when measured in terms of students’ PISA results. These two countries thus show that equality can go hand in hand with quality in the education system. The largest deficits in terms of the link between social background and learning success are found in Hungary, France, Bulgaria, and Slovakia.

There are also significant discrepancies in the number of early school-leavers. While Croatia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Poland, and Lithuania have an early school-leavers rate of under 6 percent, the findings for Malta and Spain are still at nearly 20 percent. Nevertheless, the long-term trend here is positive. With an EU-wide rate of 11.0 percent, the EU’s 2020 target is at least no longer too far off.

4. Rising debt, aging populations, stagnating future investments – Europe needs to pay much more attention to the opportunities of children and young people

Overall, the international comparison shows that the EU and its member states need to make special efforts to achieve sustainable improvements in the area of opportunities for children and young people in particular. Intergenerational justice has barely improved at all within the EU. In addition to the aforementioned divide between young and old in terms of the poverty and exclusion risk, the continuing extremely high levels of youth unemployment, and the NEET rates, rising debt levels are also exacerbating injustice between the generations.

Neither are EU member states making much progress in tackling the high levels of national debt, despite the strong political focus on budget consolidation. Germany is the only country to show strong progress at this level. Here, total debt fell by ten percentage points from 81 percent of GDP in 2010 to 71 percent in 2015. Average national debt within the EU has increased from 62.6 percent in 2008 to 87.4 percent. The national debt levels of the crisis-hit countries of southern Europe – Portugal, Italy, and Greece – are now between 128 percent (Portugal) and 178 percent (Greece) of GDP, even though budget deficits have been reduced as a result of harsh austerity measures. In Cyprus, national debt more than doubled between 2008 (44%) and 2015 (108%). The fiscal burden on today's young people and on future generations in these countries is thus immense. At the same time, average EU investments in research and development have not increased since last year's report.

Demographic change will further increase the pressure on the financial viability of social security systems in many EU countries. In this situation, the challenge is to make the pensions system fit for the future, while not losing sight of intergenerational justice. Poverty safeguards and intergenerational justice must be key pillars of future pension reforms. However, pension reforms as carried out in Germany, for instance, during the last reporting period, come at the expense of the younger generations and do not offer sufficient protection against old-age poverty. For this reason, Germany is one of the countries in which intergenerational justice has declined the most in recent years.

5. Social policy with investment promotes sustainable growth

A forward-looking social policy involving investment is an important condition for sustainable economic growth. It cushions the negative impacts of economic cycles. When devised intelligently, it improves the matching process between supply and demand on the labor market, and the negative consequences of aging processes on economic growth can be alleviated. A number of studies (OECD 2015, Ostry et al. 2014) have recently confirmed that growing inequality has a negative impact on long-term economic growth. For this reason, an integrated long-term strategy is needed that takes into account the potential positive-sum relationship between a high level of social justice and economic prosperity. It is therefore

important – as the EU Commission has announced – to attach greater value to social indicators in the context of macroeconomic coordination processes at the European level.

Overall, there is a need for a multidimensional approach in order to ensure greater equality of opportunities in Europe.² There is certainly no one-size-fits-all solution for all problems. And in view of the very different welfare state systems and views in the individual EU member states, national governments will have to find context-sensitive solutions. However, the dimensions of the Social Justice Index can certainly be used as a general guide to help identify concrete needs for reform in particularly important areas. The following aspects are particularly significant for promoting social justice and inclusive growth in the EU:

- **Poverty prevention:** Tackling child poverty must be given top priority in the EU and in its member states. In particular, the northern European states have shown that it is perfectly possible to tackle child poverty effectively if socially disadvantaged groups receive targeted support through a functioning tax and transfer system. However, preventing child poverty is not just a matter of financial support (e.g., through housing benefit, child benefit, or relevant tax allowances for families), but also highly dependent on taking the right approach in other areas – particularly education and the labor market.
- **Equitable education:** Investment in high-quality early-childhood education is a key instrument for ensuring equal opportunities. In addition, many studies show that integrative school systems in which pupils learn alongside one another for a long period of time, and are not split between different types of school after just a few years, are the better alternative with regard to individual learning success and educational equality. Another effective means of ensuring greater quality and justice in the education system can consist of deliberately employing highly qualified teachers in schools in disadvantaged areas and enabling children with educational needs to receive individual support. In general, it is important to minimize the negative impact of a child's socioeconomic background on their learning success by giving socially disadvantaged families targeted support so that they can invest in good education, for instance by lowering the fees for day care centers and all-day schools.
- **Labor market access:** Creating incentives for high employment and enhancing upward mobility from nonstandard to regular forms of employment are key challenges for almost all EU countries. Governments are well advised to invest in targeted qualification measures for low-skilled and young people, who often find themselves in nonstandard forms of employment. This is all the more important as low-skilled individuals are often also affected by long-term unemployment, which is one of the key drivers of poverty. The fact that there are still around 11 million people in the EU who have been unemployed for over a year requires decisive political action. Between 2007 and 2015 the number of long-term unemployed doubled, accounting for about half of the total number of unemployed. With regard to youth unemployment, which is a massive problem not only in the European crisis states, governments must seek to improve vocational training, reduce the number of early school leav-

² Cf. also Schraad-Tischler 2015.

ers, and improve the transition from the education system to the labor market. Often, there is a strong mismatch between labor market demands and the qualifications provided by the education system. Balancing supply and demand on the labor market by providing sufficient mobility of the labor force according to the needs of potential employers is therefore very important. The EU's recently launched "Youth Employment Initiative" together with the so-called "Youth Guarantee" is certainly a step in the right direction. In this regard, the EU and its member states also need a much more efficient means of reducing the gap between vacant positions (which still exist) and the very high number of unemployed people – not only within a country but across EU countries. A strong cross-border approach (e.g., through the effective cooperation of national employment agencies) is needed. Reducing bureaucracy regarding the mutual recognition of qualifications and creating easier ways to transfer social security entitlements to another country is important as well in order to increase labor mobility. Finally, next to the particularly vulnerable groups of low-skilled individuals and young people, inequalities in access to the labor market also often exist for women, people with a migrant background, and elderly people. Measures that enable parents to combine parenting and work, legal provisions that preclude discrimination, efforts to enforce the principle of equal pay for equal work, as well as creating incentives for lifelong learning are useful instruments to address such inequalities.

- **Social cohesion and non-discrimination:** Strong economic and social inequalities not only impede sustainable growth, they also have very negative implications for social cohesion. Effective anti-discrimination legislation (and its implementation) is thus one crucial element in reducing inequality of opportunity. Countries such as Ireland, Sweden, and the Netherlands are role models in terms of their anti-discrimination policies. Sound integration and immigration policies are also imperative to addressing the common challenge of demographic change. Most EU countries are increasingly economically dependent on immigration to rebalance the negative economic effects of societal aging. Policies fostering the integration of migrants should therefore ensure equal access to the labor market and education, opportunities for family reunion and political participation, the right of long-term residence, as well as effective pathways to nationality. If policies are designed well and EU countries act on the basis of solidarity, the current "refugee crisis" can – in the longer run – also turn into a chance for Europe. Finally, the problem of social segregation in cities (for instance in France) is often not only confined to people with an immigrant background, but to socially disadvantaged people more generally. Discriminatory urban zoning laws and practices that make certain neighborhoods increasingly unaffordable for less well-off people should therefore be revised. In this context, governments could also consider establishing specific rent control regulations and social housing programs.
- **Health:** Poor health conditions and health-related inequalities generate high social and economic costs. It is therefore important that healthcare policies aim at providing high-quality healthcare for the largest possible share of the population and at the lowest possible cost. These objectives are best achieved in countries such as Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Belgium. Governments must strengthen preventive health measures and conditions of access. Doing so can save a lot of money and improve the state of individual health in a society. The

latter aspect is important because opportunities for societal and economic participation may be constrained not only through structural injustices in a country's health care system, but also as a result of individuals' states of health.


- **Intergenerational justice:** Improving opportunities for families through investments in child-care infrastructure, reducing the level of public debt, and increasing the share of renewable energy are important policy measures in terms of greater intergenerational justice. As highlighted above, governments need to pay more attention to the interests of younger generations while pursuing policies that are equally sound for the young and old alike. Generally, the Nordic countries stand out in this regard. When it comes to pro-young and family-friendly policies, the provision of daycare and preschool facilities as well as generous parental-leave schemes is still exemplary in these countries. Their successful approach to combining parenting and the labor market can thus serve as an inspiration for policy reforms in other countries.

Generally, it is important to note that the different dimensions of social justice are strongly interrelated: weak educational opportunities translate into weaker opportunities on the labor market and – as a consequence – into weaker opportunities to achieve higher incomes. There is a danger of a self-reinforcing process and vicious cycle. This is why the EU member states as well as the European institutions need to adopt a holistic view regarding the causes of social injustice, its impacts, and potential political interventions. With regard to the latter aspect, it is interesting to see that it is indeed sound policymaking that matters for achieving greater social justice – and not only economic prosperity. This is underlined by the distribution of countries in the following two graphs (p. 17).

A closer look reveals that countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia achieve a comparably high degree of social justice, despite only having average economic performance levels. These countries illustrate the fact that social policy plays a critical role in achieving social justice. Estonia's good performance is primarily driven by the areas of education and intergenerational justice, while the Czech Republic excels in poverty prevention. By contrast, a country like Ireland has a high GDP per capita but only performs below average in the Social Justice Index.

FIGURE 4 Social Justice 2016 and GDP per Capita 2015

Unit: SJI Score / GDP per capita, PPP




Source: Own calculations.

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FIGURE 5 Social Justice 2008 and GDP per Capita 2007

Unit: SJI Score / GDP per capita, PPP



Source: Own calculations.

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II. Dimensions of social justice: empirical findings 2016

1. Poverty prevention


The most recent Eurostat data suggests that the Czech Republic, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands still are the most successful countries in terms of preventing poverty, where “only” 14.0 to 16.8 percent of the population is at risk of poverty and social exclusion. Compared with other EU member states, these countries show the lowest share of individuals either at risk of relative income poverty or affected by material deprivation (i.e., cannot afford the basic necessities of daily life). By contrast, in the three worst-performing countries in this regard – Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria – the share ranges from 35.7 to 41.3 percent.

In Greece, the risk of poverty and social exclusion could not be reduced since the 2015 Social Justice Index but stands at a stubborn high 35.7 percent. This fact underscores the ongoing dramatic state of social affairs in the country. In Spain, where far-reaching structural reforms have yielded improvements in some economic indicators, the percentage of those at risk of poverty and social exclusion remains according to the most recent available Eurostat data at a very high level (2015: 28.6%; 2014: 29.2%; 2013: 27.3). The country experts for Spain assess the latest developments as follows: “Those at a higher risk of marginalization include immigrants, unemployed youth and elderly people with minimal pensions. Particularly serious is the child-poverty rate of nearly 30%, according to different reports published by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights or the Spanish statistical authority (INE). Women (in particular those in precarious employment and heading a single-parent family) are more vulnerable than men. Finally, the share of employed people living under the poverty threshold is also very high – at 12.3%, this represents the third-worst case in the EU (average is 9%). Two back-to-back recessions (2008–2009 and 2010–2013) further impoverished vulnerable households and broadened the gap between the poorest and wealthiest sectors of the population. ... The combined impact of economic difficulties (rising unemployment rates along with cuts in salaries and benefits) and austerity measures (affecting health care, education, social services and disabled-person support programs) have exacerbated marginalization. The National Action Plan on Social Inclusion for the 2013–2016 period has clearly proved insufficient, and privately run social organizations have been unable to fill the service-provision gap.”³

The same is true for Estonia, which has shown an increase in the risk of poverty and social exclusion from 23.5 percent (2013) to 24.2 percent, since the last Social

3 Molina, Ferret, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 6 Poverty Prevention



Source: Own calculations.

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Justice Index survey (2014: 26%). In particular, the massive increase of old-age poverty is a huge problem in Estonia. Today more than one third (37%; 2013: 28%) of persons aged 65 or over are currently at the risk of old-age poverty. And the risk of poverty and social exclusion remains a persistent problem in Ireland where, despite improvements in this regard, the percentage remains relatively high at 27.6 percent. Ireland stands out as the country with the highest share of persons living in quasi-jobless households (2014: 21.1%). Hopes remain that the signs of economic stabilization observed to some extent in the EU's crisis-ridden countries will lead to a reduced rate of those at risk of poverty.

Developments in Poland show, by contrast, the most positive trend in this regard. The risk of poverty across the population has been falling continually from 34.4 percent in 2007 to its current rate of 23.4 percent. Poland stands out as an exception among EU states in this regard.

In sharp contrast to Poland and somewhat surprisingly given its excellent labor market performance, Germany has not been able to significantly reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion in recent years. Some 20 percent of the total population remain at risk of poverty or social exclusion (2013: 20.3%).

FIGURE 7 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Total Population

Unit: Percent




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015).

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FIGURE 8 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Children (0-17)

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015).

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Of particular concern is the fact that the risk of poverty among children and youth is so much higher than that for the total population in the EU. While the EU's average for the risk of poverty and social exclusion for the total population is 23.7 percent, the EU-wide average for the risk of poverty and social exclusion among children and youth already stands at an alarming 26.9 percent. In most southern European crisis countries, poverty among youth could not be reduced significantly. In Spain, the share of children and youth at risk of poverty and social exclusion stands at 34.4 percent, in Italy at 33.5 percent. In Greece, this figure is at 37.8 percent, and in Portugal 29.6 percent.

In some of the countries with the lowest rates for this indicator – Finland, Denmark and Slovenia – we also see a slight negative trend since the economic and

financial crisis, with figures ranging from 14.9 percent in Finland (2009: 14%) and 15.7 percent in Denmark (2009: 14%) to 16.6 percent in Slovenia (2009: 15.1%). Despite its excellent labor market performance since the crisis, Germany has also seen no major reduction of child poverty in recent years: the rate decreased from 20.4 percent in 2009 to 18.5 percent. As is the case in many other EU states, there are, however, profound regional differences with regard to poverty rates for children in Germany. Children in single-parent households are disproportionately affected by poverty and social exclusion.

Also worth noting is the fact that stark generational imbalances – an issue addressed in the last SJI edition – have worsened: figures for the risk of poverty and social exclusion among the 65+ generation are once again far lower than those for children and youth.

FIGURE 9 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Seniors (65+)

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015).

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Whereas an average of 17.4 percent of senior citizens EU-wide are at risk of poverty and social exclusion, 26.9 percent of children and youth across the EU are at risk. This can be accounted for in part by the fact that throughout the crisis, pensions in most countries have not shrunk as much as incomes among younger generations. This can be seen most clearly in the case of Spain, where the share of children and youth at risk of poverty and social exclusion is 2.5 times higher than that of senior citizens. On this latter point, Spain is even doing relatively well in comparative terms; the country is at rank 8 with 13.7 percent. In several countries, therefore, intra-familial redistribution and cross-generational support again play an increasingly important role in the overall national welfare mix.

FIGURE 10 Severe Material Deprivation, Total Population

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014, 2015).

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If we look exclusively at the aspect of relative income poverty among senior citizens, Spain features a rate (12.3%) lower than countries such as Sweden (18.2%), Germany (16.5%) and Finland (13.8%). This example demonstrates how the figures for risk of poverty and social exclusion – an EU headline indicator – are comprised of several indicators. It therefore makes sense to look more closely at the specific items comprising this composite indicator in order to gain a differentiated picture of the state of poverty in individual countries. It is particularly important to look at the aspect of severe material deprivation, which refers to the share of persons who cannot afford the basic goods and activities of daily life.

Notably, this problem is by far less pronounced in the wealthy countries of northern Europe. In Sweden, Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Denmark, the share of those subjected to severe material deprivation ranges from 0.7 percent to 3.7 percent. Over the past few years, these figures have remained rather stable in these countries. Estonia has managed to halve material deprivation particularly among children and youth in recent years. The country is now part of a middle group consisting of France, Germany, the Czech Republic, Belgium, and Slovenia, which shows a somewhat higher range of 4.5 percent to 5.8 percent. More recently, the UK, but also Spain have managed to keep the share of those suffering from severe material deprivation below 7 percent.

It is striking that with regard to this key social indicator, Greece continues to lose ground. Since the onset of the crisis, the share of those affected by severe material deprivation in the country has nearly doubled and stands currently at a 22.2 percent.

There is, however, some encouraging news in Bulgaria on this issue, as the share of those subject to severe material deprivation has fallen considerably. However, with a share of 34.2 percent (2014: 33.1%), the southeast European country recently has again seen a slight increase and ranks clearly at the bottom on this indicator.

A look at the rate of severe material deprivation for children and youth (i.e., 0–17 years of age) reveals similar findings and trends. Sweden, Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands, and Estonia are among the top performers here. Austria, Denmark, Slovenia, Germany, and France follow at ranks 6 to 10. Overall – and similar to the at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion indicator – the rate of severe material deprivation is higher among children and youth than it is among the total population. While on average the rate of severe material deprivation for children and youth has further decreased in the EU, this is clearly not the case in every country. In Greece, for example, the rate among children and youth increased again to a horrifying 25.7 percent this year. Romania and Bulgaria fare even worse on this issue, despite some notable improvements in the past few years.

The average EU-wide rate of severe material deprivation among children and youth is significantly higher than the corresponding rate among senior citizens (9.5% and 5.5%, respectively). In the Nordic countries, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, material deprivation among senior citizens is rare with rates ranging between 0.1 percent and 1.2 percent. Material deprivation among senior citizens is, however, a huge issue in such countries as Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria, which show a range of 15.2 percent to 40.9 percent. As noted already,

FIGURE 11 Severe Material Deprivation, Children (0-17)

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014, 2015).

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the situation among children and youth is far worse. In Spain, more than four times as many children and youth as senior citizens face material deprivation. This demonstrates once again how Spain's older citizens have suffered less under the impact of the crisis and the government's austerity measures than have younger citizens.

Overall, we see no radical improvements across the EU with regard to poverty prevention. Almost one-fourth of the total EU population continues to face the risk of poverty or social exclusion (= 118.8 million people). Neither EU leaders nor policymakers in individual EU member states should accept the fact that the generational gap continues to widen and that the number of children living in poverty in southern Europe's crisis states remains at extremely high levels.

FIGURE 12 Severe Material Deprivation, Seniors (65+)

Unit: Percent




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014, 2015).

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FIGURE 13 Population Living in Quasi-jobless Households

Unit: Percent




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015).

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2. Equitable education

In the area of access to education, there are a few changes in comparison to the previous year's study, in part because updated data is available. Moreover, it has to be noted that we included additional data on the share of persons having less than upper secondary educational attainment (see new indicator "Less Than Upper Secondary Attainment"). The northern European states of Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, as well as Lithuania, Estonia, and Croatia perform very well in terms of granting equal access to education. Due to considerable improvements since 2011, Poland also joined the ranks of top-performing countries.

FIGURE 14 **Equitable Education**

Source: Own calculations.

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However, it should be noted that significant differences in individual indicators exist across each of these countries. Students' socioeconomic background has the lowest degree of influence over learning success in Finland and Estonia. Cyprus, Italy, and Sweden also perform relatively well in this regard. Yet Finland and Estonia not only ensure that the conditions of access to education are quite fair, but also demonstrate equity of instruction quality within the education system as measured by students' proficiency levels.

Country experts highlight several strengths of Estonia's education system, including "the small number of low achievers and low school-level variance in student achievement. Enrollment rates at various education levels, including lifelong learning courses, are above the international average. Moreover, Estonia has al-

ready reached some of the EU's Education and Training 2020 (ET 2020) headline targets, and is close to the target level in other areas.”⁴ In Finland, we see a similar state of affairs: “Built on the principle of lifelong learning, education policy in Finland promotes and maintains a high standard of education. All people by law must have equal access to high-quality education and training, basic education is free and municipalities are responsible for providing educational services to all local children. ... The Education and Research Development Plan, revised every four years by the government, is the key document governing education and research policy in Finland, and directs the implementation of education- and re-

FIGURE 15 Socioeconomic Background and Student Performance

Unit: Standardized Measure



Source: OECD PISA (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2012; e: 2012).

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
4 Toots, Sikk, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

search-policy goals as stated in the government program. From 2011 to 2016, the plan will focus on the alleviation of poverty, inequality and exclusion.”⁵

With respect to public expenditure on early-childhood education, Denmark sits at the top of the EU-wide comparison. In contrast, Romania, the UK, Ireland, and Greece spend the least on pre-school education. However, despite Denmark’s very good position in the overall ranking, the country is not successful in every respect. For example, the country experts note that in the most recent PISA surveys, “immigrant students score markedly lower than Danish students, a problem particu-

FIGURE 16 Pre-primary Education Expenditure

Unit: Percent of GDP



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006; b: 2004, 2007, 2008; c: 2004, 2011; d: 2004, 2011, 2012; e: 2004, 2011, 2012, 2013)

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
5 Anckar, Kuitto, Oberst, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

larly pronounced among boys. However, second-generation students do relatively better than first-generation students.”⁶

Croatia stands out with the EU’s lowest rate of early school-leavers, but nevertheless shows some weaknesses with regard to the quality of educational outcomes. Especially in the area of vocational training, the country experts see significant room for improvement: “As in other former Yugoslavian countries, vocational education is very weak, and there is a high degree of mismatch between what is taught and the demands of employers. Thus, vocational education is not an as-

FIGURE 17 Early School Leavers

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).


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6 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

sured route to a job.”⁷ Lithuania stands out with the EU’s lowest share of low-educated persons. However, as in the case of Croatia, the country experts highlight the need for further improvement in the area of vocational education and with regard to the quality of education system as such. They note: “The reputation of vocational education and training in Lithuania must be improved, as only 28.4% of all secondary-education students are enrolled in this type of training. ... Adult participation rates in lifelong learning programs are also comparatively low. Moreover, Lithuania needs to increase the quality of its education programs. In the 2009 and 2012 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) reports,

FIGURE 18 Less Than Upper Secondary Attainment

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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7 Petak, Bartlett, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

which evaluate student performance in the areas of reading, mathematics, and science, Lithuania was ranked below the OECD average. Furthermore, the country must address mismatches between graduates' skills and labor market needs, as the country's youth unemployment rate of about 22% in 2013 was partly associated with young people's insufficient skills and lack of practical experience."⁸

Germany performs significantly better on this measure, a fact underscored by having the EU's lowest youth unemployment rate (see also the next chapter on labor market access). However, a key problem in Germany remains the still-strong correlation between students' social backgrounds and success in school: "Educational opportunities are particularly constrained for immigrants and children from low-income families. In comparison to other highly developed nations, German education structures also seem federalized and segmented. The most recent PISA results from 2012, however, show significant improvements (OECD 2013), reflecting possibly a catalytic effect of the 'PISA shock' in the early 2000s. Germany now ranks above the OECD average in mathematics, reading and science, and has made considerable progress on education equity over the last decade."⁹ The worst performers with regard to the influence of socioeconomic background on students' educational success are Hungary, France, Bulgaria, and Slovakia.

In recent years, Poland has been one of the top gainers in the area of education: "The first Tusk government launched a number of education reforms that have gradually become effective, and have significantly increased the quality of education in the country. Although education expenditure in Poland is significantly lower than the average expenditure in the European Union more broadly, Polish students now achieve relatively good results at schools. The main aim of the Tusk government's reforms was to reduce the system's lack of synchronization with the labor markets. Reforms have led to a greater emphasis in the curriculum on mathematics, science and technology; a strengthening of vocational education; attempts to attract more students to economically relevant areas; measures to improve the quality of research and teaching at universities; and the adoption of a national strategy for lifelong learning."¹⁰ It remains to be seen if the new Polish government of Beata Szydło will continue on this relatively successful path.

By contrast, Slovakia and Hungary have seen the greatest deterioration of their education performance since 2008. The country experts for Slovakia conclude in the new SGI report that "the quality of education and training in Slovakia has suffered both from low levels of spending and a lack of structural reforms. Spending levels on education are among the European Union's lowest, and have fallen as a percentage of GDP since 2009. Because vocational education is underdeveloped and universities focus on non-technical education, Slovakia faces a shortage of skilled workers needed for its industry-oriented economy. A new act addressing vocational education and training went into effect in 2015, which is to foster the transition from a school-based supply-driven system of vocational education to a demand-driven system based on work-based learning, inter alia by introducing tax incentives for enterprises providing practical training in certified training facilities. Less progress has been made with the development of more career-ori-

8 Nakrošis, Vilpišauskas, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

9 Rüb, Heinemann, Ulbricht, and Zohlnhöfer (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

10 Matthes, Markowski, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

ented bachelor programs.”¹¹ In the case of Hungary, the country experts highlight the following developments in the education field: “The third Orbán government has continued the strategy of full control of education parallel with the drastic budget cuts in this field. Municipalities have been deprived of their functions in primary and secondary education. ... In late August 2015, 225 school directors were replaced, a move prompting parent-organized public demonstrations in protest of the lack of professional expertise among the new directors who are Fidesz-loyalists. Some schools must operate without gas and/or electricity at times because KLIK has failed to pay bills consistently.”¹²

Romania, Portugal, and Malta demonstrate the greatest need for reform. Malta has one of the highest dropout rates in the European Union, at 19.8 percent. Its rate of investment in early-childhood education is below the average, and the country is only in the middle of the pack with regard to the influence of socio-economic background on students’ learning outcomes. For Portugal too, country experts see significant problems in the area of education, exacerbated in large part by the stringent austerity politics of recent years: “With regard to quality, the austerity measures and cuts have had an adverse impact on the already poor overall quality of education in Portugal, with schools and universities seeing their budgets slashed. Schools have lost teachers, with those leaving being selected not on the basis of merit, but rather on the basis of their contract terms. Universities have also seen a brain drain, with many professors going abroad, as a result of lower budgets and reductions in wages. Similarly, access has been affected both on the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, the cuts have sustained existing bottlenecks (e.g., in pre-schooling). The demand side has been constrained by the recession – a result of increasing unemployment and lower family incomes – as well as austerity, which has resulted in higher tuition fees and more limited financial aid for poorer students. While the number of university graduates has increased, Portugal remains far below the OECD average. Likewise, the high-school dropout rate is very high. Post-bailout, the pattern of austerity and cuts in education remains. In the 2015 budget, the Ministry of Education suffered the largest budget cuts of any ministry, with a spending decrease of 11% as compared to 2014 imposed on primary and secondary education.”¹³

3. Labor market access


The labor market situation has again improved somewhat in the majority of EU countries. The EU-wide average employment rate now stands at 65.6 percent (2015), as compared to 64.8 percent the previous year. However, in this regard the EU is still very far from reaching its self-imposed goal of a 75 percent employment rate. Moreover, the rate remains below its pre-crisis level (2008: 65.7%). A similar finding appears in an examination of unemployment rates. The situation here has again recently improved somewhat. The EU average now stands at 9.6 percent, as compared to 10.4 percent a year previously. However, the 2008 level was just 7.1 percent.

11 Kneuer, Malová, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

12 Ágh, Dieringer, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

13 Bruneau, Jalali, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 19 Labor Market Access



Source: Own calculations.

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
Though for most countries the worst seems to be past, this is not true for all member states. The labor market situation in the Netherlands, Finland and France, for example, has clearly deteriorated further compared to the pre-crisis level and even when compared to the previous year's survey. In general, vast differences are evident between individual member states regarding opportunities to access the labor market. This becomes particularly clear in a closer examination of the individual indicators. Overall and across all indicators, Denmark, Germany, Austria, the UK, and Sweden show the most successful labor market performance. However, within this group of top performers only Germany and the UK were able to improve on their respective pre-crisis labor market performance. Bringing up the rear are Cyprus, Slovakia, Croatia, Spain, and Greece. These countries have not been able to re-establish even their comparatively poor pre-crisis labor market performance levels.

With an employment rate of 74 percent, Germany has now risen on this measure almost to the level of the top-placed Sweden, which with 75.5 percent is the only country that has fulfilled the EU 2020 goal. Germany also shows the EU's lowest general unemployment and youth unemployment rates. In these areas, the country was again able to improve further relative to the previous year. Moreover, the employment rate among older people has risen particularly strongly in Germany as compared to the year before. Women's labor market integration rate has also improved further.

A slight improvement relative to the last SJI is evident in the "in-work poverty" indicator, which remains a major challenge in Germany as in the EU in general. In addition, the share of low-wage earners among Germany's low-skilled workers is

FIGURE 20 Employment Rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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the EU's largest. This is a sign that the transition from atypical forms of employment to normal working conditions needs to be improved. The significantly weaker job opportunities afforded to people not born in Germany represent a further weak point, despite recent modest improvements. Other countries that otherwise achieve good scores overall, such as the Netherlands, face even more pressing problems in this area. The Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland, and Denmark also show mounting challenges on this point.


The UK has seen a constant improvement of its labor market performance since 2014. No other country in our sample offers better job opportunities for low-skilled workers, i.e., the UK's unemployment rate for low-skilled workers of 7.3 percent is considerably lower than the EU's average, which stands at 16.1 percent. While the UK clearly has been able to return to its good pre-crisis labor market performance level, some problems still need to be tackled. The country experts highlight the following points: "after labor-market flexibility was increased through deregulation and the lowering of secondary-wage costs, the unemployment rate fell significantly from 8.3% at the end of 2012 to now 5.2% in September 2015 – which means a current seven year low. ... The UK labor market continues to attract substantial numbers of economic migrants. However, the increase in employment has come at the cost of weakness in real wages. Furthermore, wages have only recently returned to their pre-crisis levels, partly because of a moderating effect of immigration. An increase in the national minimum wage to the level of the so-called living wage has been announced, which is expected to reduce sharply the de facto subsidy to employers provided by tax credits. There has also been criticism of other facets of labor market flexibility. For example, the topic of zero-hour contracts gained substantial attention during the general election, though more recent research has indicated that a sizeable proportion of people employed on zero-hour contracts are happy with their contracts (Brinkley, 2013). Although the rate of youth unemployment fell to 13.3% for September 2015, it is still more than double the general rate of unemployment and higher than the other dominant economies of the EU. Consequently, the sustainable integration of young people into the UK labor market could yet be improved."¹⁴

A closer look at the Nordic countries reveals interesting differences in the evolution of labor market opportunities in recent years, in particular concerning young people. Denmark and Sweden, for example, have again stabilized at a very good level, even if they have not yet fully reached their pre-crisis values. However, the trajectories of Denmark and Sweden after the crisis differ to a considerable degree. In the case of Denmark and its flexicurity model, the SGI country experts note that the model "is not a safe-guard against business cycle fluctuations, including a drop in employment caused by a fall in aggregate demand. Thus, the question is whether its main performance characteristics (i.e., high turnover, etc.) have been maintained. Indeed, a high level of turnover still characterizes the Danish labor market, implying that many are affected by unemployment, but most unemployment spells remain short. Consequently, the burden of unemployment is shared by a larger group and although there has been an increase in long-term unemployment, it is not dramatic when seen in relation to the fall in employment. The transition rate from unemployment into employment is thus the highest in the EU, which facilitates the labor market entry of youth. It should also be mentioned that wage formation has adapted to the new economic situation. The deteriora-

¹⁴ Busch, Begg, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 21 Older Employment Rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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tion in wage competition during the boom period prior to the crisis has, to a large extent, been eliminated. The main challenge in the Danish labor market remains among groups with low qualifications. Since minimum wages are relatively high, it is difficult for individuals with weak qualifications to find stable jobs.”¹⁵

In contrast to Denmark, Sweden faces challenges concerning both youth unemployment and the integration of migrants. The country experts explain: “The current labor market statistics indicate that Sweden today does not differ in any significant way from comparable capitalist economies. If anything, unemployment among youth and immigrants is higher than in other comparable countries. ... The

15 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

strength of unions in part explains the relatively modest reform in labor market rules related to dismissal, minimum wage, and apprentice arrangements, which would entail some workers earning a lower salary. But this statement does apply only to insiders on the labor market because employment protection legislation for precarious work does decline significantly. As in other European countries, in Sweden a dualization of the labor market is taking place, albeit at a slower speed than, for example, in Germany. Whether related to culture or differences in training and work experience, immigrants to Sweden have for a long time experienced severe problems in entering the labor market. Sweden shares this problem with a large number of countries but it has proven to be inept at addressing this aspect of integration. The large number of unemployed immigrants erodes integration policies to a great extent and this will be a major challenge for policymakers in the future.”¹⁶ The employment ratio of foreign-born workers to native-born workers in Sweden is one of the lowest within the EU (2015: 0.82).

Another Nordic country, Finland – despite generally still-good overall performance – has seen a deterioration of its labor market performance since the crisis. The SGI country experts highlight a number of structural weaknesses in Finland: “Comparatively, present achievements in stemming long-term unemployment, youth unemployment and low-skilled unemployment are not satisfactory. The high level of youth unemployment is a particular cause for concern.”¹⁷ In fact, the youth unemployment rate stands at 22.4 percent in Finland. The overall unemployment rate has risen to 9.6 percent, while the unemployment rate among the low-skilled stands at 12.3 percent – 4.2 percentage points more than in 2008.

Like Finland, France has also seen a constant decline of its labor market performance since the crisis. The SGI country experts summarize the French labor market malaise as follows: “Unemployment has been rising since 2008. A particular problem is notoriously high youth unemployment. Similarly, (particularly young) French citizens with immigrant backgrounds face tremendous difficulties integrating into the labor market and the employment rate of workers over 55 years is one of the lowest in the OECD (45.6% in 2013 compared to an OECD average of 54.9% and an EU target of 50%). The high level of youth unemployment is linked to the French job-training system, which relies heavily on public schools; yet diplomas from such training are not really accepted in the industry at large, which hinders a potential worker’s transition from school to a job. As for senior workers, a retirement age of 60 (which, after Sarkozy’s reform of the pension system, will increase to 62) and various early retirement schemes have led to the present situation. Heavy labor market regulation is another issue, as well as the high cost of labor. There is a dual labor market: on the one side, a highly regulated and protected sector (including five million public employment positions, one of the highest figures in Europe), and on the other, a sector characterized by precarity, limited job protection, and insecurity. The rigidity of the former sector has triggered the development of the latter. Today, most new contracts are of a limited duration.”¹⁸


16 Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

17 Anckar, Kuitto, Oberst, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

18 Mény, Uterwedde, and Zohlnhöfer (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 22 Unemployment Rate

Unit: Percent




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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The problems in the crisis-battered southern European countries, however, remain at a completely different level. In Greece, the employment rate is 50.8 percent, the unemployment rate is 25.1 percent, the youth unemployment rate is 49.8 percent, and the ratio of the employment ratio of females relative to that of men stands at 0.72. To some extent, the worst also appears to be past here. For example, the youth unemployment rate has fallen by some eight percentage points relative to 2013. However, the overall situation remains disastrous. Long-term unemployment, one of the primary drivers of poverty and social exclusion, has decreased slightly, but remains high and stands at 18.3 percent. This is a five-fold increase in comparison to 2008. In addition, the employment rate among older people has fallen, standing now at only 34.3 percent. Thus, Greece is clearly bringing up the rear in this regard.

FIGURE 23 Youth Unemployment Rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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Spain has shown some improvement in certain indicators. The overall unemployment rate has fallen to 22.2 percent, down from 26.2 percent in 2013, and the youth unemployment rate too has declined somewhat more than seven percentage points to 48.3 percent. For young people, the labor market situation thus remains more than critical. The same is true for the low-skilled – among this group, the unemployment rate is 28.9 percent, which is still more than twice as high as at the beginning of the crisis. In addition, the risk of in-work poverty in Spain has increased to 10.3 percent. Moreover, with regard to people involuntarily in temporary employment, Spain sits with Cyprus at the bottom of the cross-country comparison, with more than 90 percent of people holding a temporary contract indicating that they are in this form of employment because they cannot find a permanent position. By comparison, this rate is just 9.5 percent in Austria, the top-placed country on this measure.

FIGURE 24 Long-term Unemployment Rate

Unit: Percent of Labor Force




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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Italy and Slovakia have not been able to return to even their comparably low pre-crisis labor market performance levels, either. In Croatia, a sharp increase in unemployment among the low-skilled population after the crisis is particularly striking, while the overall unemployment level remains at the very high level of 16.5 percent. In considering the negative developments of recent years, the SGI expert renders the judgment that “various institutional and policy shortcomings continue to affect labor market performance. The severance payment regime hinders labor mobility and discourages the use of open-ended contracts. The multi-layered social benefits system and generous early retirement options create disincentives to work. The wage-setting regime is not conducive to aligning wage dynamics to macroeconomic conditions. In particular, little has been done to facilitate job creation. From a comparative perspective, it is the low rate of job creation rather than a high rate of job destruction that underlies the weak labor market

FIGURE 25 Low-skilled Unemployment Rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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
performance in Croatia.”¹⁹ Summarizing the main challenges in Slovakian labor market policies, the country experts note: “Active labor-market policies have contributed to the decline in youth unemployment, but have been insufficient to bring down long-term unemployment, as well as unemployment among Roma and the low-skilled. The Roma minority remains largely excluded from the labor market, and there are strong regional differences in unemployment rates. The employment rates for women remain below EU average.”²⁰ Despite some recent improvements, Slovakia stands out for being the country with the highest unemployment rate (34.4%) of low-skilled workers aged between 25 and 64 years in the EU.

19 Petak, Bartlett, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

20 Kneuer, Malová, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 26 Involuntary Temporary Employment Rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 1999, 2003, 2008; b: 1999, 2003, 2009, 2010; c: 1999, 2009, 2013; d: 1999, 2009, 2014; e: 1999, 2009, 2015)


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In Italy too – despite visible reform efforts made by the Renzi government – youth unemployment (40.3%) and long-term unemployment (7.1%) rates remain high, while conditions to foster employment opportunities for women (and younger people) remain underdeveloped. However, it must be hoped that the reforms will have the intended effect to at least cure some of the ills of the Italian labor market in the coming years. In their latest report, the SGI country experts come to the following conclusion: “Starting with some more limited but immediate measures to make the hiring of youth easier, the government launched a systematic revision of the labor code aimed at encouraging firms to adopt more flexible but also stable labor contracts. The law, informally called Jobs Act, has given the government broad discretion to define specific labor market norms and has been accompanied by fiscal measures that should make the hiring of new workers more convenient

for firms. During the period under review, the government has gradually expanded the scope of this law and encouraged a new type of labor contract. This new labor contract increases employers' ability to hire and fire, while also encouraging a shift from precarious to long-term contracts. It has been received very favorably and 2015 data on new contracts indicates that it has been a significant success. The new and more inclusive social insurance benefit for employees ('nuova prestazione di assicurazione sociale per l'impiego') is part of the so-called Jobs Act and is a first step toward creating a national unemployment insurance."²¹

FIGURE 27 In-work Poverty Rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015).

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
21 Cotta, Maruhn, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

4. Social cohesion and non-discrimination

Sweden, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, and Denmark sit at the top of the cross-EU comparison in the area of social cohesion and nondiscrimination, followed by Germany, Slovenia, and Austria. Romania, Croatia, and Bulgaria bring up the rear. Hungary and Greece too show scores of under five points on this issue.

The poor performance of the four southeast European countries – Hungary, Romania, Croatia, and Bulgaria – is in part due to their significant difficulties in preventing discrimination against certain societal groups. In Romania, for example, the country experts note that “stark vulnerabilities remain a reality for the

FIGURE 28 Social Cohesion and Non-discrimination



Source: Own calculations.

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country's Roma minority, whose members experience poor access to education and economic mobility, accentuated by discrimination domestically but also more broadly in Europe. Of growing concern is the influx of refugees and migrants from Africa and the Near East. President Iohannis has been outspoken about Romania's preference for voluntary quotas, despite the European Commission's efforts to mandate required intake. The issue is far from resolved and in addition to the concerns migrant accommodation raises in regards to their shelter, support and employment, the discrimination which has beset the Roma also threatens to marginalize refugee and migrant peoples arriving from abroad."²²

FIGURE 29 Non-discrimination (SGI)

Unit: Standardized Measure



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (data from a: SGI 2009; b: SGI 2011; c: SGI 2014; d: SGI 2015; e: SGI 2016).

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22 Wagner and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

The experts reach a similar judgment in the case of Hungary: “Although only 30% of Hungarian view the country’s economic situation as ‘good,’ the government’s manipulative strategy has depicted migrants as the root of the country’s economic woes even though most migrants have left Hungary. Many real problems of social inclusion remain unaddressed. The inclusion of Roma is a key problem here that requires local and sectoral measures embedded within an overall framework strategy that has yet to be developed.”²³ Discrimination against certain minorities also remains a serious social problem in Croatia and Bulgaria.

By contrast, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Sweden have served as success stories and models for other countries with regard to effective nondiscrimination policy: “The Netherlands is party to all the important international agreements against discrimination. A nondiscrimination clause addressing religion, life philosophy, political convictions, race, sex and ‘any other grounds for discrimination’ is contained in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution. An individual can invoke Article 1 in relation to acts carried out by the government, private institutions or another individual. The constitutional framework has been specified by several acts that also refer to the EC directives on equal treatment. ...”²⁴

In Ireland, the country experts stress the role of the so-called Equality Authority as a positive and well-functioning institutional example of anti-discrimination policy: “There are strong anti-discrimination laws on the Irish statute books. The Employment Equality Act, 1998 and the Equal Status Act, 2000 outlaw discrimination on grounds of gender, marital status, family status, age, intellectual or physical disability, race, sexual orientation, religious belief or membership in the Traveller Community in employment, vocational training, advertising, collective agreements, the provision of goods and services, and other opportunities to which the public generally has access. The Equality Authority is an independent body set up under the Employment Equality Act, 1998 to monitor discrimination. An independent equality tribunal was established under the same act to offer an accessible and impartial forum to remedy unlawful discrimination. These agencies have been active in recent years and successful in prosecuting cases on behalf of parties who felt they had been discriminated against. In 2012, a referendum was passed to amend the constitution to explicitly recognize the rights of children and generally provide enhanced protection to children. In May 2015, a referendum legalizing same-sex marriage was passed by a vote of 62% in favor, 38% against. The Thirty-Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Marriage Equality) Act was signed into law on 29 August 2015.”²⁵

Sweden achieves results at a similarly high level, although the country experts here point to a growing ethnic heterogeneity that has been expressed in problems with integration policy (see more on this below): “During the period of review, ethnic segmentation in several suburbs of metropolitan areas in Sweden has increased. This societal fracturing remains an unsolved political challenge in contemporary Sweden. With the increased immigration in 2015 and 2016 there is an imminent risk that these challenges will be exacerbated.”²⁶ According to the country experts, the “Swedish model” is undergoing some change: “If Sweden

23 Ágh, Dieringer, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

24 Hoppe, Woldendorp, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

25 Walsh, Mitchell, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

26 Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

could previously boast an egalitarian and inclusive society, there is less justification to do so today. Reflecting on the 2014 general elections, Bo Rothstein concludes that ‘the days of Swedish exceptionalism are over.’²⁷ “Not only does Sweden now have a strong anti-immigration party in its parliament, core data on Sweden’s welfare state are moving toward levels found among comparable, average-performing countries. It remains to be seen whether the current red-green government will be able to reverse this development.”²⁸ Overall, however, Sweden remains one of the most egalitarian societies in the EU and OECD.

Finland’s slight deterioration in this area is interesting, as it, too, has been an example of extremely successful anti-discrimination policy for years. In discussing this decline, the country experts point in large part to the influence of the True Finns political party: “Rights of ethnic and religious minorities are as a rule well protected in Finland, and the criminal code provides penalties for anyone who incites violence on racial, national, ethnic or religious grounds. The rights of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland are widely respected, with Swedish recognized as an official national language. However, reforms to public administration at the local level, which are still pending, may violate some of the rights of the Swedish-speaking population. In addition, some segments of the population, primarily represented by the so-called Finns Party, have turned hostile toward Finland’s Swedish-speaking population. The Åland Islands, whose inhabitants speak Swedish, have historically maintained an extensive autonomy and a home-rule parliament as well as one permanent seat in the national legislature. Finland has often been seen as a forerunner concerning its efforts to maintain an effective minority-protection policy. Still, although cases of discrimination are rather few, ethnic minorities and asylum seekers report occasional police discrimination. According to the Youth Barometer 2014 survey, 55% of young people have experienced discrimination at some point in their life, and an immigrant background additionally increases the risk of encountering discrimination. Roma individuals, who make up a small proportion of the population, are marginalized, and the Finns Party, now a government party, encourages discrimination against ethnic minorities and asylum seekers.”²⁹

One aspect of successful anti-discrimination policy is the prevention of discrimination on the basis of gender. In many EU states, discrimination against women in particular continues to be an issue – whether with regard to the principle of equal pay for equal work or the question of women’s representation in leadership positions or political offices. If one considers the share of national parliamentary seats by gender as a rough proxy indicator for this issue, it is notable that no EU state has as many women as there are men serving as parliamentary deputies. The situation in Hungary is the worst in this regard. Here, only 10 percent of deputies are women. Malta, Romania, and Cyprus perform similarly badly on this measure, each with a share of under 15 percent. The most balanced ratio can be found in Sweden, where 44 of 100 deputies are women. In Finland and Spain, the share is over 40 percent.


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Anckar, Kuitto, Oberst, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 30 Gender Equality in Parliaments

Unit: Percent



Source: World Bank Gender Statistics Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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Overall, the Nordic countries still do the best job in relative terms in preventing social exclusion. However, it is interesting that the lowest level of income inequality has for some time no longer been found in the north European countries, but rather in Slovakia and Slovenia. Sweden follows in third place and Denmark in ninth place. The level of income inequality in these countries is in this regard significantly higher than in 2007. Germany sits at 14th place, and has shown a slight decrease in income inequality as compared to the previous year. However, the EU's highest levels of income inequality are evident in Bulgaria, Romania, and Lithuania.

FIGURE 31 Gini Coefficient

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015).

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In the area of integration policy too, the north European countries show certain weaknesses that tarnish otherwise very good performances overall across the issue of social inclusion. However, policy in these states is by no means inactive: Sweden has made diverse efforts in the area of immigration and integration, and like many other EU countries, today faces enormous challenges as a result of the current dramatic refugee situation: “The country has received a large number of refugees from Iraq and Syria and, in 1992, from former Yugoslavia. Indeed, there are individual local authorities (Södertälje) that have received more immigrants from Iraq than has the entire United States. In the European setting Sweden, together with Germany, stands out as one of the most immigration-friendly countries. As is the case across Europe, the war in Syria has triggered huge immigration to Sweden. The Migration Board previously predicted that Sweden would

receive between 80,000 and 105,000 refugees. The current estimate for 2015 and 2016 is that Sweden will receive between 160,000 and 190,000 refugees per annum from Syria and other Middle East countries. Today, Sweden (still) offers permanent residency for unaccompanied children and for Syrian families with children. These provisions, however, are highly disputed in contemporary public discourse and in the parliament. The increasing immigration represents a major challenge, unprecedented in size and scope, to Swedish integration policy. These policies cover a wide range of measures, from language training to supportive labor market and housing policies. Most of the policies are implemented locally. Given the extensive autonomy of Swedish local governments, the instruments vary regionally. There are now political signals that local autonomy should no longer prevent individual local authorities from being requested by central government to receive asylum seekers.”³⁰

Generally, the country experts find that it is difficult to “argue that integration policy in Sweden has been successful. In terms of both educational attainment and employment, immigrants in Sweden find it much more difficult to integrate than immigrants in comparable countries. This is not to say that there is a lack of political or economic commitment to integration policy. To the contrary, integration policy remains a very important policy sector and related political activities are far reaching. The activities of the ombudsman and the minister for immigration and equality ensure that immigration issues have a high public salience. Sweden’s lack of success in integrating immigrants, despite strong efforts otherwise, thus indicates that the problem lies in the design and implementation of its integration policies. It is possible that the same obstacles facing young people as they try to make their way into the labor market also discriminates against immigrants. There is some good news, however. Studies show that second generation immigrants, particularly girls, perform well in secondary and tertiary education. However, for immigrants with low education, entry into a labor market with high standards seems more or less blocked.”³¹

In Denmark’s case, the country experts come to similar conclusions with regard to current developments and challenges in the area of integration policy: “On 1 January 2014 there were about 626,000 immigrants and descendants of immigrants living in Denmark, or 11.1% of the population, of which the 8.5% are immigrants (58% of this group are from non-western countries). After the tightening of immigration policies introduced by the liberal-conservative government in 2002, immigration from non-Western countries fell, but net immigration from Western countries rose. More recently there have been increases from both groups.


The employment rate of immigrants and their descendants (ages 16 to 64) is low, though it had been increasing from the mid-1980s until the onset of the financial crises. There is a substantial employment gap, taking into account the age distribution, immigrants from non-western countries have an employment rate which is 38% lower than that of ethnic Danes (for descendants the gap is 18%). The gap is particularly higher for women (43%) than for men (33%). For immigrants from western countries the gap is about 20% (for descendants about 11%). The gaps in employment rates should also be seen in light of the fact that employment rates

30 Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

31 Ibid.

FIGURE 32 Integration Policy (SGI)

Unit: Standardized Measure



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (data from a: SGI 2009; b: SGI 2011; c: SGI 2014; d: SGI 2015; e: SGI 2016).

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in Denmark are high for both men and women, and there are high qualification requirements to find a job and high minimum wages.

Concerning educational achievements, immigrants and their descendants – especially girls – are making progress. In 2013, for the age group 30 to 39 about 47% of men and 64% of women had completed a labor market qualifying education. The corresponding numbers for ethnic Danes are 72% and 80%. For those 22 years old 49% of male and 61% of female non-western descendants are in education, which is only two and three percentage points below the corresponding rates for ethnic Danes.

The 24-year-old rule for family reunification introduced in 2004 has allowed fewer immigrants and their descendants to bring spouses to Denmark from abroad. The percentage fell from 61% in 2001 to 31% in 2008. Instead, immigrants increasingly marry other immigrants already living in Denmark as well as native Danes.

Since these reforms have gone into effect there have been improvements. Indeed, an increasing number of immigrants say they feel more integrated and have more Danish friends, and fewer say they experience discrimination. In addition, many more immigrants speak Danish than ever before.

Denmark has recently received many refugees and asylum-seekers from Syria, Iraq and other countries, which has affected political and public debates regarding immigrants. Immigration was an important issue in the electoral debate in June 2015, with most parties wanting to limit immigration. However, the great influx of asylum-seekers that followed over that summer forced the government to adopt a more realistic policy. Although Denmark does not take part in the EU's asylum policy it offered to take some asylum-seekers beyond those that arrived in Denmark as a contribution to a European solution. The tone in the debate is very much set by the Danish People's Party, which became the second biggest party in the June elections. The government now wants to increase integration efforts and tighten access to the social safety net."³²

Countries such as Belgium and France have significantly bigger problems. In discussing the situation in Belgium, the country experts emphasize that "Belgium has a contradictory attitude to immigration. On the one hand, it has traditionally been quite welcoming to political refugees and has had a relatively lenient policy toward 'economic' migrants. The Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism was formed to address potential discrimination issues. On the other hand, Belgium has never properly invested in education in ways that would enable immigrants and their children to integrate easily in the economic sphere. This has led to high unemployment rates among immigrants, who are largely concentrated in urban areas (particularly Brussels). Deep education and employment rate gaps between Belgian nationals and residents of non-European origin thus persist. The combination of these two trends has produced increasing opposition to immigration and strengthened latent racism within the population at large. It has also produced a deep feeling of alienation among some quite large groups of second- and third-generation immigrants, both in socioeconomic terms (as they feel excluded from social mobility) and in cultural/religious terms (not being recognized as full-fledged citizens, being Muslim). The previous and the current government have sought to tighten immigration policy, but the current immigration crisis (following the protracted civil war in Syria) has de facto undermined this attempt. The minister in charge of this portfolio seems quite able to manage the immediate logistic consequences of this crisis, but its long-term effects are difficult to foresee from a budgetary perspective as well as from that of immigration and social-security policies and potential populist reactions."³³

32 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

33 Castanheira, Rihoux, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.


Similar problems are evident in France: “The integration of the so-called second (in fact, often the third) generation of immigrants, especially coming from Maghreb countries, is difficult for many reasons: education system failures; community concentration in urban/suburban ghettos; high unemployment; cultural identity issues, and so on. Add to this the challenges of illegal immigrants, many of whom moved to France more than 10 or 15 years ago yet have no regular job and thus do not contribute to the pension system. Although they have access to health care and their children can attend schools, the situation is often dramatic and inextricable as for many, it is impossible to fulfill the requirements for a residence permit. Immigrants must demonstrate that they have the required documents, such as tax records, employment contracts and housing contracts, while at the same time they are essentially forced into the labor and housing black market. Potential employers and landlords will not document that they employ or house illegal aliens, as this is a crime. Under such conditions, integration is difficult, if not impossible. Immigration from Eastern Europe, the southern Balkans and, more recently, from the Middle East has become a very sensitive subject exploited by the National Front. The reluctance of the French socialist government to put in place a serious migration policy has been challenged by German Chancellor Merkel’s sudden decision to open the doors to migrants from Syria, forcing the government to revise its veiled but deliberate policy of restricting entry (low level of asylum admissions, cumbersome and discouraging bureaucratic processes). The number of refugees that have come to France since the summer of 2015 is substantially smaller than in neighboring Germany. The national office on refugees (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides, Ofpra) reported that close to 80,000 refugees came to France in 2015, an increase of 27% from 2014. Integration remains at the heart of French political discourse, but actual policies set up to achieve this aim are notoriously insufficient.”³⁴

Finally, as another indicator for social cohesion and nondiscrimination, we consider the so-called NEET rate, which refers to the share of youth that are neither in education nor employed, nor in training. This indicator sheds light on a key aspect of social exclusion among young people. Here, as might be expected, the crisis-battered southern European states are the countries with the greatest problems. With a NEET rate of 31.1 percent, Italy brings up an unhappy rear in this regard. Although slightly declining, the NEET rates in Greece and Croatia, too, are still extremely high with 26.1 percent and 24.2 percent respectively. By contrast, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden take the first five places in the comparison, showing the lowest NEET rates. In Germany, this rate even fell by more than three percentage points between 2008 and 2015.

34 Mény, Uterwedde, and Zohlnhöfer (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 33 NEET Rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).


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5. Health

In the area of health, Sweden, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands hold the top three places. The Czech Republic, Belgium, Malta, Denmark, and France also belong to the expanded top group. By contrast, conditions have deteriorated once again in Greece, which is three places from the bottom in the cross-EU comparison.

In most EU countries, the quality of health care is high. However, with regard to both quality and inclusivity in health care systems (equality of access), there are quite significant variations within the European Union. The greatest deficits are still to be found in Latvia and Romania. Country experts offer the following

FIGURE 34 Health



Source: Own calculations.

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judgment in their most recent SGI report on Romania, which is also reflected in the quantitative indicators utilized here: “Romania has a public health-insurance system. Despite its claim to universal coverage, only 86% of the population was insured in 2014. This coverage deficit has been highlighted by the deadly fire in Bucharest in October 2015, as it turned out that many victims were not insured. The quality and equity of Romania’s public-health system has been undermined by inadequate funding: Romania has the lowest health-budget allocation of any EU member state. Moreover, after a gradual increase from 3.5% of GDP in 2002 to 4.8% in 2010, health-care spending declined again to 4.2% in 2014 and 4% in 2015 budget despite rising health-care demand. As the result of this underfunding and inefficient rules, the de facto availability of many medical services is severely limited, thereby leading to widespread bribe-giving by patients even for basic

services as well as to significant inequities in medical-care access. Moreover, the low wages in the health sector have favored the out-migration of doctor and other medical staff. Health Minister Nicolae Banicioiu warned that doctors' migration to other parts of Europe might leave Romania with a severe shortage within three years. In reaction, the Ponta government adopted a 25% increase to health system staff salaries beginning on 1 October 2015.

A major reform project in 2015 has been the introduction of health insurance cards in mid-2015. A new regulation states that only medical emergencies will be treated in the absence of a health card, otherwise patients unable to present proper identification will be required to pay out-of-pocket for the services they receive. The measure seeks to modernize the health-care system by synchronizing medical information among health-care providers. However, the distribution of the new cards suffered from problems, with thousands of Romanians queuing up at Health Insurance Houses to request cards they were supposed to have received by mail. Marginalized groups such as the Roma and newly arriving refugees are at risk if unable or unwilling to acquire the newly required documentation, and thus are left to pay out-of-pocket for essential medical services.”³⁵

In Latvia too, problems of quality and equity in the health sector remain significant: “In 2011, Latvia adopted a new Public Health Strategy for the 2011–2017 period, placing a high policy priority on primary care, essential medicines, outpatient services, integrated emergency services, and serving the poor via a new social safety net. The economic crisis resulted in a decrease in financial resources made available for health care and created new impetus for structural reforms aimed at reducing costs, for example, by shifting from hospital to outpatient care. Attempts to tie individual access to health services and income tax payments stalled at the political level. As of 2014, a ‘diagnosis-related group’ system is being introduced to improve the financing of health care services.

Public expenditure on health care was equal to 3.7% of GDP in 2011. Latvia has one of the highest private, out-of-pocket health care expenditure rates among EU member states. Patients' private expenditure on health care constituted 40% of total health care financing in 2011. Additional financial allocations to the health system in 2014 were aimed at reducing patients' out-of-pocket expenses, reducing patient waiting times, and raising the salaries of the system's lowest wage earners. Total expenditure on health care amounted to 6.6% of GDP in 2011, under the EU average for public health care expenditure.

Health outcomes for Latvia continue to lag behind those of most EU member states, and dissatisfaction with the system remains high. Mortality rates for men, women, and infants are higher than in most other EU countries. According to European Commission survey data, 66% of citizens evaluate their overall quality of health care as bad (2011) and 65% believe that the quality of care in Latvia is worse than in other EU countries (2010).

Latvia performs poorly in the Euro Health Consumer Index. In 2012, Latvia ranked 31st out of 34 countries and dropped another place to 32nd in the 2013 index. The health care system is based on a residence principle. Residents have free access

35 Wagner, Stan, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

to a family physician, who approves state-paid further treatment. This system results in long queues. Health care benefits are available at state- and municipality-owned institutions as well as private inpatient and outpatient facilities. The large co-payment required to access services restricts access for low-income groups. The implementation of the Social Safety Net Strategy 2009–2011 sought to address this by introducing a compensation mechanism for low-income groups. Low-income and other at-risk patients receive full exemptions from co-payments and pharmaceuticals charges. In total, 61,000 outpatient visits and 3,800 inpatient visits were covered for low-income and other at-risk patients under the program. However, lower-income patients not qualifying for assistance continue to face steep co-payments and pharmaceutical charges, limiting access to care.

Financial constraints focus public funding on the provision of emergency care, while creating long waiting times for non-emergency care.

Private polyclinics and physician practices offer their services for higher prices, making them unaffordable for low-income groups.

In terms of cost efficiency, the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, in its evaluation of allocative efficiency in Latvia's health sector, concluded that:

- the share of resources allocated to health care is inadequate
- the allocation of resources among different providers is improving – shifting from expensive hospital care to less costly ambulatory care, while also increasing the priority given to primary care. Inpatient care expenditures were reduced from 50% of total health care expenditures in 2008 to below 35% in 2011
- the share of resources allocated to different types of services is not efficient, as evidenced by long waiting lists, a lack of attention to chronic conditions, and a lack of focus on preventable lifestyle diseases.”³⁶


Greece's further deterioration must be regarded and judged in the context of the ongoing crisis: “After the crisis erupted, public spending on health care was subjected to cuts similar to those effected in other welfare policies. Moreover, the restructuring of Greek public debt in February 2012 negatively affected the finances of health insurance funds, which held some of that debt. After 2010, the economic crisis became a severe crisis for health insurance funds. Moreover, as Eurostat data shows, in 2012 government expenditure on health care (excluding the expenditure of social security funds) was roughly equal to household out-of-pocket expenditure on health care. This speaks volumes to two perennial problems of Greek health care policy: first, the volume of transactions between patients and doctors which goes unrecorded and is not taxed; and second, the differential in health care access based on the purchasing power of households.

Up until the onset of the crisis, mismanagement and corruption in state-run health insurance funds and public hospitals had led to runaway public expenditure on medical supplies and medicines. It is telling that public health insurance fund

36 Terauda, Auers, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 35 Health System Accessibility and Range

Unit: Standardized Measure



Source: Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).


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expenditure on medicines sprang from 0.9% of the GDP in 2000 to 1.8% in 2010 (EU-27: 0.8% in 2000, 1.1% in 2010).

Since 2010, pharmaceutical companies and suppliers of necessary goods and services to public hospitals have delayed making deliveries to such organizations. Additionally, the job motivation of doctors serving in public hospitals suffered from wage cuts imposed across the public sector. All this injured the capacity of the public health care system to meet demand for health care services. Some of this demand was met in various Greek cities by makeshift 'social clinics' providing services to patients free of charge. Such clinics were staffed by volunteer medical doctors and nurses and hosted by municipal authorities.

FIGURE 36 Health System Outcomes

Unit: Standardized Measure



Source: Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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There is a very unequal distribution of 131 public hospitals across the territory of Greece, resulting from a patronage-ridden selection process where hospitals should be built. The number of doctors in the country is also quite high (in 2011 there were 4.4 doctors per 1,000 residents, in contrast to 3.8 for every 1,000 residents in Germany). However, there is a lack of nurses, while ministry-level mismanagement of health services combined with the reluctance of doctors to serve in hospitals located away from Greece's largest cities have resulted in a highly uneven distribution of medical personnel. Moreover, major budget cutbacks for public hospitals have left some hospitals without enough medicines and medical supplies. In summary, the quality and inclusiveness of health care deteriorated over the last five years, but cost efficiency improved substantial-

ly.”³⁷ One consequence of these developments has been a deterioration within the indicator of “Self-reported unmet need for medical help.” Between 2007 and 2014, the number of people who say they are unable to obtain needed medical care as a result of financial constraints, long waiting lists, or geographical distances has risen from 5.4 percent to 10.9 percent. This is the most significant such increase within the entire European Union. In absolute terms, only Estonia (11.3%) and Latvia (12.5%) are still behind Greece on this measure.

Despite these significant problems, Greece still has the sixth-best score on healthy life expectancy. People in Greece can expect an average of 64.5 healthy life (or disability-free) years. Only Sweden, Malta, Ireland, Cyprus, and Spain perform better

FIGURE 37 Self-reported Unmet Medical Needs

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2011, 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014).


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37 Sotiropoulos, Featherstone, and Karadag (2015), available at www.sgi-network.org.

in this respect. Germany's poor outcome on this measure is somewhat surprising. Here the average number of healthy life years is just 56.5, well below the EU average (rank 25 on this measure). The Netherlands and Denmark, each with a value of just above 60 years, also fall into the lower half with respect to this indicator. This suggests that for the number of expected healthy life years, it is not only the quality of and conditions of access to health care that are relevant, but also individual behavior in the sense of healthy or unhealthy lifestyles. In the case of Denmark, which has one of the most inclusive health care systems in the European Union, the country experts point out that "there has been a marked decline in smoking in Denmark in recent years, but obesity rates have increased. The social gradient in health remains strong."³⁸

FIGURE 38 Healthy Life Expectancy

Unit: Years



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2011, 2012; d: 2012, 2013; e: 2014).

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38 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Italy is among the countries to have deteriorated relatively significantly in recent years. Strong regional differences have had an effect on this outcome, but the SGI country experts highlight the first promising efforts to address regional heterogeneity of health care quality and inclusiveness: “On average, the services provided achieve medium to high standards of quality (a recent Bloomberg analysis ranked the Italian system among the most efficient in the world), but, due to significant differences in local infrastructures, cultural factors, and the political and managerial proficiency of local administrations, the quality of public health care is not nationally uniform. In spite of similar levels of per capita expenditure, services are generally better in northern and central Italy than in southern Italy. In some areas of the south, corruption, clientelism and administrative inefficiency have driven up health care costs. In these regions, lower quality levels and typically longer waiting lists mean that wealthier individuals will often turn to private-sector medical care. Regional disparities also lead to a significant amount of health tourism heading north. Early moves in the direction of fiscal federalism are now stimulating efforts to change this situation through the introduction of a system of national quality standards (correlated with resources), which should be implemented across regions.”³⁹

6. Intergenerational justice


In the area of intergenerational justice, the Nordic and Baltic states in particular show themselves as best-situated to do justice to the issue’s complex and multi-dimensional challenges. Slovenia too is ranked among the top six. By contrast, the southern European countries Malta, Cyprus, Italy, and Greece bring up the rear in the cross-EU comparison. Portugal has been able to improve somewhat compared to last year’s edition and finds itself now on rank 21 (last year: 24). The same applies to Ireland, which comes in slightly ahead of Portugal on rank 20. Germany, which today sits in 13th place, has declined relatively significantly compared to the situation two years ago and now performs near the EU average.

Despite significant demographic pressures, the top-placing Nordic countries have best succeeded in keeping the interests of the younger generations in view while pursuing policies that are sound for the young and old alike. In this regard, these countries continue to serve as a model for other EU states in the area of family policy. Sweden, for instance, “has been politically and economically committed to strong family policy for the past 50 years. Major features of Sweden’s policy have been the separation of spouses’ income and individual taxation, the expansion of public and private day care centers and a very generous parental leave program provided to both women and men, which has created much better possibilities to combine a professional career with parenthood. The parental leave program is expected to be expanded further, adding another month which can only be used by the father (a so-called ‘daddy-month’), thus incentivizing fathers to take more time off to engage in the care of their children.

The basic structure of family policy remains in place, but some small changes have taken place. The former government launched a program which served to

³⁹ Cotta, Maruhn, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 39 Intergenerational Justice



Source: Own calculations.

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
provide an alternative to the parental leave program. The program offers a subsidy ('vårdnadsbidrag') to parents who prefer to stay at home with children rather than place them in day care centers. The program empowered parents to decide for themselves how to best organize their family with pre-school age children. The current government is critical of the program, however, arguing that since men tend to have higher income than women it effectively confines the mother to stay at home and look after the children. Because local governments provide the program, an overall evaluation of it is difficult. Some data, however, suggest that only a small percentage of Swedish parents is using the subsidy. Hence, it appears the overall majority is still using the broad supply of public as well as private childcare facilities.

The red-green government is set to abolish the program. Overall, the basic difference between the Social Democratic and Green, on the one hand, and that of the non-socialist 'Alliance' parties, on the other, is that the former emphasize gender equality whereas the latter emphasize freedom of choice. However, due to the stalemate in parliament since the 2014 elections, it remains to be seen if the red-green government is able to implement such a policy change."⁴⁰

Denmark, Estonia and Finland likewise stand out in terms of their family-oriented policies – although France's family policies also receive high marks from the SGI country experts.

FIGURE 40 Family Policy (SGI)

Unit: Standardized Measure



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (data from a: SGI 2009; b: SGI 2011; c: SGI 2014; d: SGI 2015; e: SGI 2016).

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40 Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Italy, by contrast, appears more problematic from the perspective of family policy: “Italian society has traditionally relied very much upon its very strong family institutions. The family (often in its extended version) remains even today a major provider of welfare for its weakest components – children, young couples with precarious jobs and elders. Within the family, significant amounts of economic redistribution take place, and important services are provided, such as the care of preschool age children by grandparents. Partly because of this reliance, state support for families has generally been weak. Apart from relatively generous rules on maternity leave (paid for by social insurance) and limited tax deductions for children, the state has not offered much. Public day care facilities for preschool children are available on a limited scale and vary significantly across regions. Private firms and public offices have only recently started offering similar services, with some support from the state.

The lack of more significant policies has contributed to the limited participation of women in the workforce and a low overall employment rate, while also contributing to a very low birth rate (except in the immigrant population).

Proposals recurrently advanced to introduce important changes to tax policies with respect to families have never materialized, including the ‘*quoziente familiare*,’ which would have divided taxable income by the number of family members. The crisis has left little space for such initiatives, which would strain the state’s budget. As a result, only limited subsidies for families with children in the lowest income brackets have been introduced. Because of the economic crisis, the levels of children living in poverty are above average.


New and innovative Scandinavian-style concepts (such as parental leave) that go beyond maternity allowance are not widely implemented. The whole child-care sector, and indeed the state of the public debate over the ability of women to combine work and children, lags behind that in the wealthier and more progressive European countries. The decreasing transfers of financial resources to regions and municipalities during previous and Renzi governments mean that many institutions and projects working in family support have run out of money and may have to cut back services significantly. Men would also benefit from an extension of state support for families, as they would be better able to assist in their children’s development.”⁴¹

The Nordic states’ ability to serve as a model for other countries not only in family policy, but also with regard to the design of pension policies, is underlined particularly by Finland and Denmark. In recent years, these countries have carried out successful reforms aimed both at securing the financial sustainability of their pension systems and ensuring a high degree of social security and intergenerational justice within these systems. In Finland, “a major reform of the pension system in 2005 aimed at increasing pension-policy flexibility and creating more incentives for workers to stay in employment later in life. In 2011, a guarantee pension was introduced. The guarantee pension provides a benefit of €746 ... (2015) for persons without any other pension entitlements. While these reforms were successful, a further major reform is now scheduled for 2017. In September 2014, the social partners agreed on a further gradual raise of the lowest retirement

41 Cotta, Maruhn, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 41 Pension Policy (SGI)

Unit: Standardized Measure



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (data from a: SGI 2009; b: SGI 2011; c: SGI 2014; d: SGI 2015; e: SGI 2016).

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age to 65, with adjustments for future cohorts based on changes in life expectancies (with exceptions for those pursuing long careers of strenuous and wearing work, who will be able to retire at 63), flexible part-time retirement, and amendments to the accumulation rate. The reform ensures the financial sustainability of the pension systems and will provide incentives for longer working careers. At the time of writing, the pension reform was still going through parliament. At present, Finland ranks in the middle in the EU in terms of average exit age from the labor force, but the effective retirement age is expected to reach its target level of 62.4 years in 2025 as a result of the 2017 reforms.”⁴² Denmark too has done much in recent years to protect the future sustainability of its pension system:

42 Anckar, Kuitto, Oberst, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

“The pension policy in Denmark is well-diversified in accordance with the World Bank’s three-pillar conceptual framework. Concerning the first pillar, Denmark has public pensions in the form of a universal base pension with a means tested supplement. For the second pillar, labor market pensions are negotiated in the labor market but mandatory for the individual. Moreover, the contribution rate has been increased over the years and is now 12% or more for most employees. As for the third pillar, it is comprised of both tax-subsidized pension arrangements (tied until retirement) offered by insurance companies, pension funds and banks as well as other forms of savings (for most households in the form of housing wealth). The combination of the different pillars of the pension scheme creates a pension system that both protects against low income for the elderly (distributional objective) and ensures that most have a pension which is reasonable in relation to the income earned when the pensioner was active in the labor market (high replacement rates). The Danish pension scheme ranks first in the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index. The division of work between the public and private pension systems, however, has its problems. The means testing of public pension supplements has the effect that the net gain from additional pension savings or later retirements can be rather low (high effective marginal tax rates) for a broad segment of income earners. Moreover, the system is very complicated.

Statutory ages in the pension system (in public pensions for early retirement and age limits for payment of funds from pension schemes) are established by legislation. Recent reforms – the 2006 welfare reform and the 2011 retirement reform – will increase these ages considerably to cope with the aging population. The first elements of these reforms include a discrete increase in the early retirement age from 60 to 62 years over the period 2014–2017, shortening the early retirement period from five to three years over the years 2018–2019 and 2022–2023 (implying an early retirement age of 64 in 2023), and increasing the pension age from 65 to 67 years over the period 2019–2022. The second element is an indexation of the early retirement age and pension age to the development in life expectancy at the age of 60, in order to limit the expected pension period to 14.5 years (17.5 including early retirement) over the long term (currently between 18.5 and 23.5 years).⁴³

By contrast, the biggest problems with regard to sustainable and intergenerationally just pension policies are evident in Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, and Romania. “In Romania, low fertility rates combined with the massive out-migration of working-age citizens have contributed to a rapidly aging population. Forecasts for 2050 predict that 43% of the population will be over the age of 65 – a dramatic increase from the comparable figure of 27% in 2011. These demographic pressures threaten to undermine the pension system’s sustainability, even more so as the actual retirement age continued to decline in 2015 despite an increase in the official retirement age in 2014. Poverty among pensioners remains a problem as well. The situation is particularly dire in the agricultural sector, where workers of the former agricultural cooperatives were left with very low pensions following the dissolution of these cooperatives after 1990. As a result, many retirees live below or near the poverty limit, and many more rely on support from relatives to supplement their pensions. In part due to their lower pension-eligibility age, women typically have considerably lower pensions than men, and therefore have double the poverty-risk rates. The year 2015 has seen limited government ac-

43 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

tion to address these problems. Instead, the government reintroduced ‘special’ pension rights for some categories of workers facing hazardous or other special working conditions. In doing so, it weakened the link between contributions and pensions and created additional fiscal obligations that have an adverse impact on the long-term sustainability of the pension system.”⁴⁴

As for Portugal, the country experts also point to the ambivalent effects of crisis-related austerity policies: “The pension program has been one of the most closely scrutinized aspects of government policy since the 2011 bailout, and has been one of the main areas in which the government has sought to reduce public expenditure. To that end, a number of cuts and modifications were enacted, and remained in place during the assessment period. It may be noted that the pension system in Greece is also receiving intense scrutiny.

The government has sought to bolster the pension system’s fiscal sustainability. To that end, the retirement age was increased from 65 to 66 years beginning in 2014, to remain there through 2015. From 2015 on, the retirement age was slated to increase every year depending on the evolution of average life expectancy. Thus, it is expected to increase by two months in 2016. However, the decrease in the country’s population as both birth and immigration rates fall puts additional pressure on the social-security system. Indeed, pension policy was a central issue in the election campaign for the October 2015 legislative elections,”⁴⁵ although it is as yet far from undoing all the cuts of the bailout period.

Germany is also an interesting case. The decline in the Federal Republic’s score with regard to intergenerational justice, and here especially with regard to pension policy, is among the European Union’s largest compared to the Social Justice Index 2014. In this regard, the SGI experts come to the following conclusion: “In 2014, the current government reversed the previous pension reform agenda. Subsequent reforms have been hotly disputed with critics claiming they would undermine the long-term sustainability of the pensions system. First, the government reduced the retirement age by two years for workers who have contributed to the pension system for at least 45 years. Second, it provided a catch up for housewives with children born before 1992 relative to those with children born after 1992. An additional pension point will be added to the former group, which now can claim two points (instead of one), while the latter group can claim three. Finally, pensions for people with disabilities were improved. The calculation will now include two additional years of (fictive) contributions. The cost of these reforms is estimated to be €160 billion by 2030. Public subsidies for the pension fund will increase from €400 million to €2 billion by 2022.

For 2015 to 2016, pension payments are forecasted to increase by an astonishingly high rate of 5.03% in the east of Germany and 4.35% in the west of Germany. This is the largest increase in pension payments since 1993, and is due to increasing wages and high employment rates. However, increasing health care contribution rates and long-term care insurance costs will reduce the level of net pension increases. While pension contribution rates will remain stable over the short term, future financial imbalances in the pay-as-you-go system will likely lead to increasing pension contribution rates and/or increasing federal subsidies.”⁴⁶


44 Wagner, Stan, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

45 Bruneau, Jalali, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

46 Rüb, Heinemann, Ulbricht, and Zohlnhöfer (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 42 Old Age Dependency Ratio

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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Both in Germany and elsewhere, the dependency ratio is an indication of the strength of demographic pressure. The five demographically “oldest” countries are Sweden, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Italy. Sweden’s and Finland’s performance in this respect is all the more surprising, as it manages to score very highly in terms of intergenerational justice despite the strong demographic pressure. This is a sign that the right social-policy steps have been taken in recent years.

Sweden and Denmark also perform well in the realm of financial sustainability, a further aspect of intergenerationally just policy. Sweden’s public debt ratio of “only” 44.1 percent of GDP takes eighth place in cross-EU comparison. Denmark scores only slightly worse with a ratio of 45.6 percent (rank 9). However, Estonia again performs best on this measure, with debt totaling 10.1 percent of GDP. In

FIGURE 43 Government Debt

Unit: Percent to GDP



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database April 2016 (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2012, 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015).

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this regard, Estonia holds a rather solitary position at the top of the ranking. Only 11 countries have debt ratios of less than 60 percent of their GDP, thus fulfilling the Maastricht criterion addressing this issue.

Following a strong increase in debt during the course of the crisis, only a few countries have returned to a clearly positive trend. Germany is among these countries, as it was able to reduce its public debt to 71 percent of GDP (2010: 81%). Ireland too has reduced its debt very significantly from 107.5 percent of GDP in the previous year to “only” 95.2 percent in 2015. The country experts even note that “this figure is now projected to fall to 90% in 2017. Moreover, this projection does not take into account the gain that is expected to be realized through the sale of the government’s stake in the banks taken into state ownership during the cri-

sis. Ireland's fiscal situation is now considered to be sustainable. Experience over the past three years has confounded the pessimists. It is likely that the country's adjustment will come to be regarded as an example of successful 'expansionary austerity.' Leaving aside the ever-present possibility of adverse external shocks, the main risk now facing the Irish economy is that the government's recent increasingly expansionary budgets will lead to overheating as the slack in the economy is used up and internal inflationary pressures intensify."⁴⁷

Portugal also undertook some efforts to reduce its public debt level. The ratio went down from the all-time peak in 2014 (130.2%) to now 128.8 percent – although this remains an alarmingly high level.

Generally, national debt has again risen or at least remained at its previously high levels in some of the most crisis-struck EU member states. For instance, Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio is now at 132.6 percent (2010: 115.4%), and Greece, too, has not yet managed to reduce its public debt of 178.4 percent in relation to the country's GDP. Moreover, countries such as France and Belgium have seen their debt levels rising significantly over the last years: France's public debt now amounts to 96.8 percent of annual economic output, while Belgium fares even worse with a debt ratio of 106.3 percent.


Thus, despite the strong policy focus on budget consolidation, the budgetary situation viewed as an average across the European Union has not yet improved. The average debt level on a cross-EU basis is at 62.6 percent of GDP in 2008 to a current level of 87.4 percent. In Cyprus, debt levels more than doubled between 2008 (44.6%) and 2015 (108.7%). The same applies to Croatia (2015: 87.7%; 2008: 38.9%). The fiscal burden for future generations especially in the southern European countries, but also in some of the EU's founding members, such as France and Belgium, is thus immense.

By contrast, the average level of investments in the future has stagnated across the European Union, at least on the basis of the important indicator of expenditure on research and development. Only three countries – Finland, Sweden, and Denmark – manage to achieve the EU-2020 goal of an investment ratio of 3 percent of GDP. At 3.17 percent, Finland is the best performer in cross-EU comparison. By contrast, with investment ratios of under 0.7 percent, countries such as Latvia, Cyprus, and Romania lie at the tail end of the ranking. In Romania, investment has even declined again in comparison to the previous years to just 0.38 percent. Country experts draw a sobering conclusion here, but also point to new initiatives launched by the Ponta government: "Years of mismanagement and underinvestment in the sciences and industries which drive research development have resulted in a brain-drain of innovators, educators and entrepreneurs. For the 2014–2020 programming period only 15% of the EU funds available to Romania are allocated to R&I. The Ponta government sought to reverse this trend by launching the National Research-Development and Innovation Plan 2015–2020. The plan aims at increasing spending on R&D to 1% of GDP by 2020 and calls for new national and international projects. The plan concentrates on industries and areas of expertise likely to attract investment from domestic and international sources. It aspires to attract 2% of GDP worth of investment by 2020 which, in

47 Walsh, Mitchell, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 44 Research and Development Spending

Unit: Percent of GDP




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2007, 2009; c: 2012; d: 2012, 2013; e: 2014).

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turn, could lead to a GDP growth of 3%. Worth noting are two key projects which have elevated Romania's R&I status internationally in the hope of attracting investment and professionals seeking to conduct research. The first is the Magurele scientific laser project, a fundamental research project under the umbrella of the budding national nuclear physics research sector. The second project to have garnered international attention is Romania's commitment to participate in the European Space Agency's (ESA) development of the International Space Station (ISS) and the Ariane 6 rocket program."⁴⁸

48 Wagner, Stan, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 45 Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Unit: Tons in CO₂ Equivalents


Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2005; b: 2008; c: 2011; d: 2012; e: 2013).

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In addition to the Nordic and Baltic countries' generally future-oriented family, pension, and budget policies, their strong performance with regard to intergenerational justice also derives from a relatively good record in the area of environmental sustainability. For example, Sweden has far and away the EU's highest share of renewable energy sources in its overall energy consumption (52.6%). Finland and Latvia follow at second place, each with a renewable energy share of 38.7 percent. Austria also places well with 33.1 percent. The EU average is 19 percent. This demonstrates how far behind countries such as Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom remain. These four countries, with renewable energy shares between 7 percent (UK) and 4.5 percent (Luxembourg), lie at the bottom end of the comparison.

FIGURE 46 Renewable Energy (Consumption)

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014).

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In terms of greenhouse gas emissions, the northern European countries of Sweden and Lithuania serve as models for the remainder of the EU member states. Ireland, Estonia, and Luxembourg show the most significant deficits in this regard.

III. Methodology

“Social justice” is a central constitutive element of the legitimacy and stability of any political community.⁴⁹ Yet defining what social justice means and how best to achieve it is often subject to considerable controversy. The conceptual boundaries of social justice are continually in flux because the idea is a result of culturally and historically dependent value systems. Nevertheless, a modern concept of social justice that refers to the aim of realizing equal opportunities and life chances provides us a conceptual ideal able to garner the consensus needed for a sustainable social market economy. This paradigm suggests that establishing social justice depends less on compensating for exclusion than it does on investing in inclusion. Instead of an “equalizing” distributive justice or a simply formal equality of life chances in which the rules of the game and codes of procedure are applied equally, this concept of justice is concerned with guaranteeing each individual genuinely equal opportunities for self-realization through the targeted investment in the development of individual “capabilities.”⁵⁰

Thus, within the scope of his or her own personal freedom, every individual should be empowered to pursue a self-determined course of life, and to participate in society more broadly. Specific social backgrounds, such as membership in a particular social group or demographic category would not, according to this concept of social justice, be allowed to negatively affect one’s opportunities to succeed in life.⁵¹ By focusing on opportunities for self-realization, such a concept avoids the blind spots of an efficient market-driven, simply formal procedural justice on the one hand and a compensatory distributional justice on the other, and thus ultimately establishes a bridge between rival political ideologies.⁵²

Government policies of redistribution function as an instrument of social justice and are conceived in terms of an investment rather than compensation. Within the conceptual framework of economic and social participation, redistributing re-

49 This chapter and several other conceptual and methodological parts of this study contain elements of the previous publications “Social Justice in the OECD: How Do the Member States Compare” (Schraad-Tischler 2011) and “Social Justice in the EU: A Cross-national Comparison” (Schraad-Tischler and Kroll 2014).

50 See Sen (1993; 2009); Merkel (2001; 2007); Merkel and Giebler (2009), pp. 192–194.

51 See Rawls (1971); on the underlying principles of “equal opportunity” see Roemer (1998: 1), who distinguishes between a “level-the-playing-field principle” and a “nondiscrimination principle”: “An instance of the first principle is that compensatory education be provided for children from disadvantaged social backgrounds, so that a larger proportion of them will acquire skills required to compete, later on, for jobs against persons with more advantaged childhoods. An instance of the second principle is that race or sex, as such, should not count for or against a person’s eligibility for a position, when race or sex is an irrelevant attribute insofar as the performance of the duties of the position is concerned.” The concept of social justice applied in the present report covers both principles. It is important to note that the concept of social justice employed here emphasizes less the principle of equality per se than it does the principle of individual freedom, which can be exercised only when the state and a society establish the most level playing field possible for the pursuit of life chances. See in this regard Merkel and Giebler (2009: 193–195).

52 See Vehrkamp (2007), p. 11.

sources within a community are a legitimate, if not essential, means of empowering all to take advantage of the opportunities around them. In this sense, social justice can be understood as a guiding principle for a participatory society that activates and enables its members. A sustainable social market economy able to combine the principles of market efficiency with those of social justice requires the state to take on a role that goes beyond that of a “night watchman.” It requires a strong state led by actors who understand the need for social equity as a means of ensuring participation opportunities.

The Social Justice Index presented here is informed by this paradigm and encompasses those areas of policy that are particularly important for developing individual capabilities and opportunities for participation in society. In addition to the fundamental issue of preventing poverty, the Social Justice Index explores areas related to an inclusive education system, labor market access, social cohesion, health, and intergenerational justice.

In so doing, the Social Justice Index dovetails with current EU efforts to monitor social affairs in the member states as mandated in the ten-year strategy issued by the European Commission in 2010, “Europe 2020: A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth” (hereafter referred to as the Europe 2020 strategy). This includes those initiatives associated with the European Commission’s Social Protection Performance Monitor⁵³ and its recent recommendation to institute a Social Scoreboard that keeps track of key employment and social indicators. As part of the European Semester, these instruments, which are applied through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), are designed to chart progress made in expanding social inclusion within member states. The EU itself collects vast quantities of various data relevant to issues of social inclusion, all of which are open to public access through Eurostat, the EU’s statistical office.

While these efforts to institute regular reporting on key aspects of social inclusion in each member state are certainly worthwhile, there has not been – until now – an instrument that links features of social justice with specific indicators to deliver a conceptually cohesive and empirically meaningful statement on the state of social justice in each member state. The Social Justice Index presented here is designed to fill this gap and measure on a regular basis the progress made and the ground lost on issues of social justice in each EU member state. Together with the “Reform Barometer,” which is also under development by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the Social Justice Index will help promote the social dimension of the Europe 2020 strategy by providing evidence-based analyses. In combination, these two tools will comprise a new instrument, the Social Inclusion Monitor Europe (SIM). Focused on the principle of participatory justice, the SIM will be used to assess and formulate concrete recommendations for policy reforms in individual member states and the EU as a whole.

This kind of instrument is necessary if the EU is to develop a truly integrated strategy for economic progress and social justice. To date, no such strategy exists, despite current EU efforts to foster reporting on social indicators. The Europe 2020 strategy clearly puts forth a social dimension in which key indicators, such as risk of poverty, employment rate, or early school-leaving rates, are considered.

53 See e.g. the annual report of the Social Protection Committee (2014): *Social Europe: Many Ways, One Objective*.

Nonetheless, the overriding goal of this strategy is to promote economic growth. Europe 2020's language is clear in stating the need to ensure that such growth be sustainable and conducive to social cohesion, and therefore in keeping with the goals of inclusive growth. This language represents a major step forward in contrast to a concept of growth focused exclusively on economic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP). However, a conceptually cohesive strategy explicitly targeting social justice across the EU has yet to be formulated. In recent years, issues such as economic recovery and fiscal consolidation through debt reduction and austerity measures have headlined agendas in European policy circles. Reporting on social indicators has been conducted in parallel to these discussions, though much of these efforts have gone unnoticed by the broader public. Raising awareness among the public of developments in social justice are instrumental to creating genuine political leverage capable of affecting change. Regular benchmarking in the form of a clearly communicable ranking can be of great help in this matter. The Social Justice Index ought to function as an illustrative example of how this can be achieved.

The following section explains the methodology underlying the Social Justice Index and its features. The index is based on quantitative and qualitative data collected by the Bertelsmann Stiftung within the framework of its SGI project (www.sgi-network.org). The SGI survey (fifth edition published in August 2016), which draws on 140 indicators, provides a systematic comparison of sustainable governance in 41 OECD and EU member states. Individual SGI indicators have been selected and aggregated for use in the Social Justice Index following a tested procedure for measuring social justice.⁵⁴

Clearly, no set of indicators can be expected to fully represent the complexity of social reality on the ground. Creating an index involves, by definition, the condensation of vast amounts of information. It also demands, at times, that pragmatic decisions be made when selecting indicators, given the limitations set by the availability of comparable data. In-depth case studies of specific countries are therefore required in order to provide a thicker description of the state of affairs in each policy area while at the same time ensuring that findings are properly contextualized.

Concept and indicators of the Social Justice Index

Drawing upon Wolfgang Merkel's conceptual and empirical groundwork, we can differentiate several dimensions for measuring the construct of social justice.⁵⁵ The Social Justice Index is composed of the following six dimensions: poverty prevention, access to education, labor market inclusion, social cohesion and non-discrimination, health, as well as intergenerational justice.

⁵⁴ The approach and procedure used here is derived from Merkel (2001; 2007) and Merkel and Giebler (2009).

⁵⁵ The methods of measuring social justice applied here are derived from those applied by Merkel (2001; 2007) and the approach and argument provided by Merkel and Giebler (2009). In contrast to Merkel and Giebler (2009), the index comprises six instead of seven dimensions to be measured. In addition, the weighting process and indicator set have been modified and supplemented. We are indebted to Dr. Margit Kraus (Calculus Consult) for providing important advice and feedback on statistical and technical issues, imputing missing values, and constructing Excel sheets for the aggregation of scores.

As a cross-national survey, the Social Justice Index comprises 28 quantitative and eight qualitative indicators, each associated with one of the six dimensions of social justice.⁵⁶ The data for the quantitative SGI indicators used in the Social Justice Index are derived primarily from Eurostat and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The qualitative indicators reflect the evaluations provided by more than 100 experts responding to the SGI's survey of the state of affairs in various policy areas throughout the OECD and EU (see www.sgi-network.org). For these indicators, the rating scale ranges from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). In order to ensure compatibility between the quantitative and qualitative indicators, all raw values for the quantitative indicators undergo linear transformation to give them a range of 1 to 10 as well.⁵⁷

According to Merkel and Giebler (2009), the first three dimensions of poverty prevention, access to education, and labor market access carry the most conceptual value, which is why they are each weighted more heavily in creating the index. For the purposes of comparison, in addition to the weighted Social Justice Index, a non-weighted ranking was created in which the six dimensions were treated equally.⁵⁸ The findings discussed here derive from the weighted Social Justice Index.

The effective prevention of poverty plays a key role in measuring social justice. Under conditions of poverty, social participation and a self-determined life are possible only with great difficulty. The prevention of poverty and social exclusion is in a certain sense a *sine qua non* for social justice, and thereby takes precedence to the other dimensions from the perspective of justice theory. For this reason, the dimension of poverty prevention is weighted most strongly – in this case, given triple weight – in the overall ranking.

In line with the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU Social Justice Index uses the headline indicator “people at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion” to monitor poverty prevention. According to Eurostat, this indicator corresponds to the sum of persons who are “at risk of poverty, severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity.”⁵⁹ At-risk-of-poverty is defined as those persons with an equivalized disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 percent of the national median equivalized disposable income (after social transfers). Material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables. Severely materially deprived persons live in conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources. This means they cannot afford (and are therefore deprived of) at least four of the following nine items: the ability 1) to pay rent or utility bills, 2) to keep their home adequately warm, 3) to face unexpected expenses, 4) to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, 5) to take a week of vacation away from home, 6) to afford a car, 7) a washing machine, 8) a color TV, or 9) a telephone. People living in households with very low work intensity are those aged 0–59 living in households where the adults (aged 18–59) worked less than 20 percent of their total work potential

56 A full list and description of individual indicators is provided in the appendix.

57 The period under review for the Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016 survey extends from November 2014 to November 2015 (www.sgi-network.org). The raw data for the Social Justice Index is provided in the appendix. In order to ensure comparability over time, we use the SGI's method of fixed minimum and maximum values for each indicator. See Schraad-Tischler, and Seelkopf (2014).

58 See Table 1 in the appendix, p. 152.


59 Definitions taken from Eurostat's website at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/t2020_50_esmsip.htm.

during the past year. Persons are only counted once even if they are present in several sub-indicators.⁶⁰

Comprised of several sub-indicators, the conceptual reach of this headline indicator extends far beyond a simple measure of relative income poverty. Indeed, the inclusion of severe material deprivation points to the problem of measuring non-monetary poverty in highly developed industrial countries. In order to conduct an in-depth empirical analysis, we have included the relevant sub-indicators of this particular headline indicator in the respective chapter on poverty prevention. In addition, age groups particularly at risk of poverty are accorded special attention, which is why poverty rates for children (0–17 years of age) and the elderly (65 years or over) are also considered in the analysis.

FIGURE 47 Social Justice Index – Dimensions and Indicators

Social Justice Index



Source: Own representation.

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60 Ibid.

Equal access to good-quality education is another essential factor in providing equitable capabilities and opportunities for advancement (vertical mobility). Social, political, and economic participation depends in large part on this public good. To this end, the state must take care that genuinely equal educational opportunities are available to every child. Social or cultural background must not be allowed to adversely affect educational success. The importance of such conditions is emphasized in the Social Justice Index by doubly weighting the access to education dimension. The dimension considers efforts to provide early-childhood education, the role of socioeconomic background in students' economic success (drawing on the latest PISA data as a basis), the rate of early school-leavers, the rate of people with less than upper secondary attainment in the age group of 25 to 64 years and, finally, a qualitative expert assessment of educational policies, focusing particularly on the provision of high-quality education and equitable access opportunities.

Assuring equity in education opportunities is primarily an ethical imperative, since weak access to education and social poverty generate a vicious circle in which those lacking education access are denied opportunities for social betterment, and the socially disadvantaged are denied access to education. Breaking this vicious circle is a matter of solidarity and key to maintaining the social fabric of society. At the same time, it makes good economic sense to nourish and apply the talents and abilities of everyone in society, as much as is possible.

The labor market's degree of inclusiveness is likewise of considerable importance to social justice, as an individual's status is defined in large part by his or her participation in the workforce. Exclusion from the labor market substantially limits individual opportunities for self-realization, contributes to an increase in the risk of poverty, and can even lead to serious health stresses: "So long as gainful employment remains the primary means by which not only income, but also status, self-respect and social inclusion are distributed in developed societies, inclusion in the labor market must be a high priority for a just society" (Merkel and Giebler 2009: 198). This dimension is therefore also counted doubly in the overall ranking. In order to do even rudimentary justice to the complexity of this dimension, four indicators apiece were used in the representation of employment and unemployment. Alongside the overall employment rate, the specific rates for 55- to 64-year-old workers, for foreign-born workers as compared to natives, and for women as compared to men are considered. In addition, the labor market inclusion dimension examines the overall unemployment rate, and is supplemented by the long-term unemployment rate and the degree of labor market exclusion experienced both by young and by low-skilled workers. Finally, two further indicators addressing the problem of precarious employment are included in this dimension: in-work poverty and the percentage of those persons involuntarily employed on a temporary basis.

The dimension of social cohesion and nondiscrimination examines the extent to which trends toward social polarization, exclusion, and the discrimination of specific groups are successfully countered. This dimension is factored into the Social Justice Index with a normal weight. Income disparities, measured in terms of the Gini coefficient, are taken into account here as a potentially important factor of social polarization. However, from a social justice theory perspective, the issue of income inequality carries less conceptual salience relative to the first three di-

mensions of justice – namely poverty prevention, access to education, and labor market inclusion.⁶¹ To capture progress made in terms of gender equality, the number of seats in national legislatures held by women compared to the number of seats held by men is also considered. This dimension includes three qualitative indicators, each based on expert assessments. One of these indicators assesses how effectively social policies preclude social exclusion and decoupling from society, a second examines how effectively the state protects against discrimination based on gender, physical ability, ethnic origin, social status, political views, or religion, and a third evaluates how effectively policies support the integration of migrants into society. The latter question covers integration-related policies comprising a wide array of cultural, education, and social policies insofar as they affect the status of migrants or migrant communities in society. Finally, the so-called NEET rate, which refers to the number of young persons aged 20 to 24 who are not in education, employment, or training and therefore face limited opportunities of economic and societal participation, is also factored into this dimension.

The fifth dimension of the Social Justice Index covers questions of equity in the area of health. In 2008, the World Health Organization's Commission on Social Determinants of Health pointed to dramatic differences in health within and between countries that are closely linked with degrees of social disadvantage: "These inequities in health, avoidable health inequalities, arise because of the circumstances in which people grow, live, work, and age, and the systems put in place to deal with illness. The conditions in which people live and die are, in turn, shaped by political, social, and economic forces. Social and economic policies have a determining impact on whether a child can grow and develop to its full potential and live a flourishing life, or whether its life will be blighted."⁶² Given these considerations, an assessment of social justice must also take into account the issue of health. However, identifying meaningful indicators for which data is available for all EU states is not an easy task. Nevertheless, there are some indicators giving us at least a basic impression of differing degrees of fairness, inclusiveness, and quality between the EU countries' health systems. We use four quantitative indicators and one qualitative indicator. The qualitative indicator from our SGI survey assesses to what extent policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care. The rationale behind the question is that public health care policies should aim at providing high-quality health care for the largest possible share of the population, at the lowest possible costs. Of the three criteria – quality, inclusiveness, and cost efficiency – quality and inclusiveness are given priority over cost efficiency. Two quantitative indicators are drawn from the European Health Consumer Index (EHCI): the first captures the outcome performance of each country's health system; the second addresses the question of accessibility and range of services. Finally, we also use the indicators "healthy life expectancy at birth" and "self-reported unmet need for medical help" as provided by Eurostat. As inequalities in health can be seen as being strongly determined by misguided developments in other areas, such as poverty prevention, education, or the labor market, the health dimension is factored into the index with a normal weight.

61 See Merkel and Giebler (2009), pp. 199–200.

62 Cf. www.who.int/social_determinants/thecommission/finalreport/en/index.html.

The sixth dimension of the Social Justice Index approaches the issue of intergenerational justice. The issue at stake here is the need for contemporary generations to lead lives they value without compromising the ability of future generations to do the same. This dimension, which is factored into the index with a simple weight, is comprised of three components. The first component addresses policy support for both younger and older generations. The former is captured through the SGI's qualitative "family policy" indicator, the latter through the "pension policy" indicator, which is also qualitative. In order to reflect each country's specific demographic challenge, the old-age dependency ratio is also considered here. The second component focuses on the idea of environmental sustainability and measures this on the one hand with the help of a qualitative indicator for environmental and resource protection policy, on the other through two quantitative indicators: greenhouse gas emissions in CO₂ equivalents per capita and the share of energy from renewable resources in gross final energy consumption. The third component, which is concerned with economic and fiscal sustainability, is comprised of two quantitative indicators. The first of which highlights public spending on research and innovation as an investment in future prosperity, and the second points to national debt levels as a mortgage to be paid by future generations.

Child and youth opportunity index

Social justice for children and youth is key to ensuring a sustainable society. It is without doubt ethically and morally right to provide all children and youth the greatest possible spectrum of participation opportunities. Every child, indeed every member of society, should be in a position to make the most of their lives in the context of their individual potential and personal freedoms. Whether a child is born into poverty or wealth should play no role, for example, in their educational opportunity. Societies must therefore invest in the capabilities and potential inherent to individuals in order to expand opportunities for self-realization and decouple access to such opportunities from an individual's socioeconomic background. This is an ethical-moral imperative.


But there are also several economic reasons to promote equal access to opportunities for children and youth. The positive effects of a level playing field on job prospects, income levels, and even health have been clearly documented in evidence-based studies. And the positive impact these benefits have on financing social safety nets or facilitating a country's innovation and productivity levels are obvious.

In order to compare across the EU the extent to which participation opportunities for children and youth are ensured, we created a Child and Youth Opportunity Index that draws on data from the Social Justice Index. Simple and transparent in design, this subindex is comprised of four key indicators that are particularly relevant to issues associated with children and youth participation opportunities.

- The first indicator, the EU headline indicator “at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion” for children and youth up to 17 years of age, is taken from the Social Justice Index’s poverty prevention dimension. This indicator is comprised of three further indicators: income poverty, severe material deprivation, and people living in quasi-jobless households.
- The second and third indicators are taken from the equitable education dimension: socioeconomic impact on educational performance and the number of early school-leavers.
- The fourth indicator, which tracks the so-called NEET rate, is from the labor market access dimension. This indicator, which measures the number of young people who are neither in the labor force nor education or training, highlights problems in education-to-work transitions. Young people who are not participating in either education or the labor market face a highly precarious situation with narrowing future opportunities.

Following the Social Justice Index’s normative model, the poverty prevention indicator used in this subindex is weighted more strongly than the other three. Comprised of three indicators, the poverty prevention indicator accounts for 50 percent of the total calculation, whereas the other three indicators together account for the remaining 50 percent.

IV. Twenty-eight country profiles



Austria's overall performance on the Social Justice Index (SJI) has been relatively stable since our original survey in 2008. With a score of 6.67, the country ranks 6th among the 28 EU member states. Austria ranks among the top ten on four of the six dimensions in this study. With regard to our special focus on children and youth, the country's score on this subindex of 6.39 places it 9th.

While Austria's overall performance on the SJI exceeds the EU average, it has excelled most at ensuring broadly inclusive access to its labor market. With a score of 7.23, the country ranks 3rd on this dimension, behind Denmark and Germany. Austria has the lowest incidence of involuntary temporary employment. A comparatively small 9.5 percent (2015) of working-age Austrians are in temporary work because they could not find a permanent position. In comparison, the rate in Germany, which ranks 2nd place on this measure, is 21.7 percent and the EU average is 62.3 percent. Austria also features one of the lowest rates of youth unem-

ployment, placing 2nd (this time trailing only behind Germany). A comparatively low 10.6 percent of youth are unemployed. The country also has the second lowest long-term unemployment rate in the EU (1.7%).

In total, 5.8 percent of the working-age population are unemployed, four (3.8) percentage points lower than the EU average (9.6%). The SGI country report notes: “One factor contributing to these rather successful labor-market outcomes is the social partnership between the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB) and the Austrian Economic Chambers. Many labor-market policies in Austria are effectuated through the Public Employment Service, another institution key to the country’s employment successes. The Austrian dual system of vocational education, in which young people receive on-the-job vocational training while still attending school, has also been successful, and is increasingly drawing international attention.”⁶³


Austria’s performance is mixed in the fifth dimension of the SJI, health. Showing a low percentage (0.1%) of self-reported unmet medical needs, the country ranks 1st. This comparatively low rate suggests that Austrians are generally able to access health care services when needed. The Austrian government received a score of 7 out of 10 from the SGI country experts for its health policies, the second-highest score awarded on this measure. “A mix of public and private health insurance provides for good coverage and outcomes across the country, though costs are a concern.”⁶⁴ “In recent years, cooperation between the insurance-providers’ federation, the Federal Ministry of Health, and individual states seems to have succeeded in arresting the explosive rise in health care costs.”⁶⁵ Even so, the average Austrian can expect just 57.7 healthy life years, which is 4 years less than the EU average and nearly 16 years less than the average Swede.

Though the country does much to ensure social justice, it nonetheless faces specific challenges. It places 23rd with regard to the impact of socioeconomic factors on the PISA results of students. This poor rank pulls down the country’s otherwise above-average placement on our equitable education dimension. More importantly, it highlights a missed opportunity to sufficiently integrate children and youth at the margins of Austrian society: those from immigrant and poorer households. A similar unjust impact of background can also be seen in the education and labor market outcomes of immigrants. Austria ranks among the bottom third in the EU for the highly unequal employment outcomes achieved by foreign-born workers as well as education level attained by foreign-born students, again highlighting failures to integrate marginalized segments of society.

63 Pelinka, Winter-Ebmer, and Zohlnhöfer (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.



Belgium's SJI score of 6.18 places it 11th among the countries of the EU. Its performance has remained generally stable since 2008, the first SJI assessment year. The country ranks among the top ten on two of the six dimensions in our study. It places 5th in the health dimension and 9th in the social cohesion and nondiscrimination dimension. Regarding our 2016 subindex on children and youth, Belgium ranks 12th with a score of 5.83.

Belgium ranks highest in our health dimension, with a score of 7.56. According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), Belgian health policy has succeeded in achieving short wait times as well as a high range and reach of health services, ranking the country 1st in the EU. Also, the EHCI places the country 10th for its health system outcomes. This is particularly praiseworthy as the health outcomes for Belgians have significantly improved since 2008. In addition, Belgium has the ninth-highest healthy life expectancy. On average, Belgians can expect 64.9 healthy life years, which exceeds the EU average by more than three years. The Belgian government received a score of 7 out of 10 from the SGI country experts for its health policies. The SGI researchers find health care "coverage is broad and inclusive," that the system is efficient and health services "quite affordable, thanks to generous subsidies."⁶⁶ They note, however, that "costs have been contained by reducing wages and hospital costs in ways that do not seem viable in the long run, particularly given the aging population."⁶⁷ "Another issue is that Belgium insufficiently emphasizes prevention, and spends more than similar coun-

⁶⁶ Castanheira, Rihoux, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁶⁷ Ibid.


tries on subsidized drugs, which generates a structural increase in health policy costs and hampers long-run sustainability within the health care system.”⁶⁸

Among the 28 EU countries, Belgium ranks among the top ten for its policies strengthening social cohesion and combating discrimination. It scores 6.51 in this dimension. A proxy for gender equality in society, the Belgian national parliament has the 4th-highest proportion of seats held by women in the EU. In addition, the country experts awarded the government a score of 7 out of 10 for its nondiscrimination policies, and the country’s Gini coefficient places it 6th. Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has not significantly shifted since 2007.

The Belgian government does face numerous policy challenges. Of most concern are the 14.9 percent (2015) of Belgians living in households with very low work intensity. This situation has slightly worsened since 2007 and is currently more than double the percentage of quasi-jobless households in Luxembourg (5.7%). Moreover, Belgium, like many other EU countries, has been witnessing a growing gap between the generations in recent years. The number of children and youth threatened by poverty or social exclusion has increased over the last years (from 20.5% in 2009 to 23.3%). However, the risk of poverty or social exclusion among senior citizens declined from 23.1 percent in 2009 to 16.2 percent.

The country also places among the bottom third on several measures of intergenerational justice related to environmental protection and public debt. A low 8 percent of Belgian gross energy consumption comes from renewable sources. While this rate has more than doubled since 2007, it still falls far short of many EU countries. The EU average (16.0%) is eight percentage points higher, and countries such as Austria, Latvia and Sweden exceed 30 percent renewables in their energy mix. The Belgium economy also emitted 10.4 tons of greenhouse gases per capita (rank 22). In addition, general gross government debt, which reached 106.3 percent of GDP in 2015 and exceeds the already high EU average (87.4%) by almost 20 percentage points, is of considerable concern. Both this high level of public debt and the lack of progressive environmental policies tarnishes the Belgian government’s otherwise decent reputation regarding its policy work on intergenerational justice and threatens to saddle future generations with the excesses incurred today.

68 Ibid.



Bulgaria's overall performance on the SJI places it among the EU countries most urgently in need of policy reforms. With a score of 4.03, the country ranks 26th. On three of the six dimensions in our study, Bulgaria is among the bottom five. Most worrying, the country places last in the area of poverty prevention as well as social cohesion and nondiscrimination. With regard to our focus on children and youth, Bulgaria's score on this subindex of 2.82 ranks it 27th. On all four indicators of this subindex, it places in the bottom third.


Bulgaria has one of the lowest rates of government debt in the EU. With a general government gross debt in 2015 of 26.9 percent of GDP, a rate that has climbed in recent years, Bulgaria has a debt level that remains well below the EU average of 87.4 percent. "The second Borrisov government significantly curbed the deficit by improving tax collection, especially with respect to VAT and excise taxes, and by containing the growth in public spending. It succeeded in bringing down the planned deficit for 2015 close to 3%."⁶⁹ However, government expenditures are insufficient in some key areas: "Bulgaria numbers among the lowest spenders on research, development and innovation in the European Union. Successive governments ... have largely relied on foreign direct investment and European Union funds to generate economic growth. ... Subsidies for innovative start-up enterprises are available almost exclusively through European Union structural funds."⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Ganev, Popova, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

While the Bulgarian government faces a number of major policy challenges, none is greater than keeping its population out of poverty. Despite declining poverty levels over the last years, a still alarming 41.3 percent (2015) of Bulgarians are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the highest rate in the EU. This rate is over 25 percentage points higher than that seen in the Czech Republic, which ranks 1st, and exceeds the EU average (23.7%) by more than 17 percentage points. Within this at-risk population, 34.2 percent do not have the financial means to afford fundamental necessities of daily life (e.g., an appropriately heated apartment or a telephone). Of greatest concern is the fact that, among the population at risk, seniors and children are faring the worst. The average Bulgarian senior faces a situation worse than that faced by their counterparts in all other EU countries: 51.8 percent are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Of these seniors, 40.9 percent suffer from severe material deprivation and 31.7 percent are at risk of poverty. Similarly alarming, 43.7 percent of Bulgarian children and youth are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the second-highest rate in the EU. Among this at-risk population under 18 years of age, 37.3 percent suffer from severe material deprivation, and 25.4 percent are at risk of poverty. Progress, however, can be seen: the incidence of severe material deprivation, among the subgroups as well as the total population, is markedly lower than it was in 2008. Most significantly, the rate among seniors decreased by 20 percentage points.

The fate of Bulgarian children and youth remains particularly worrisome. In addition to bearing the second-highest rate of those at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the country also fares poorly on the other three indicators of this subindex. It ranks second to last (ahead of only Slovakia) with regard to the impact of socioeconomic factors on the PISA results of its students, underlining a missed opportunity to sufficiently integrate children and youth at the margins of Bulgarian society. In addition, 13.4 percent of Bulgarian 18-to-24-year-olds dropped out of education and training in 2015. In comparison, this rate was 2.8 percent in Croatia and 5 percent in Slovenia. Given the previous figures, it may come as little surprise that Bulgaria's NEET rate also places it among the bottom five. In 2015, 24 percent of Bulgarians 20 to 24 years old were neither employed nor participating in education or training. These young adults are at risk of permanent exclusion from the labor market which, in the long term, threatens the very viability of the Bulgarian economy.



Overall, Croatia's position on the SJI places it among the worst-performing EU countries. The country's score of 5.07 ranks it 19th and shows only a minor improvement over the previous year. How Croatia measures up against the other EU member countries varies greatly across our study's six dimensions. Particularly problematic is its performance in the areas of social cohesion and nondiscrimination as well as labor market access. In these dimensions Croatia ranks in the bottom three. With regard to our subindex on children and youth, Croatia comes in on place 13 with a score of 5.69.

In terms of equitable education, Croatia has a number of strengths; but in the quality of education, there is still much room for improvement. The education system can be lauded for featuring the lowest dropout incidence in the EU (2.8% in 2015). The number of 18-to-24-year-olds who leave education or training has nearly halved since peaking in 2010 at 5.2 percent. As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on preprimary education totaled 0.7 percent in 2011 (the most recent reported year), ranking the country 8th. The education system has also done well to ensure that learning opportunities do not unfairly favor particular socioeconomic groups, ranking the country 7th in terms of socioeconomic background and PISA performance. However, education quality lags behind EU standards, as vocational education is decoupled from market demands and the country grapples with a major skills mismatch. The average Croatian student's PISA results were more than 35 points below those of students in Finland, Estonia, and Poland, placing the country in the bottom third.

Croatia faces several major social justice challenges. The first relates to labor market access. Overall, the Croatian labor market is in a precarious state. In 2015, only 55.8 percent of working-age Croatians were employed (the rate has fluctuated between 52.5 and 60% in previous SJI editions), ranking the country ahead of only Spain and Greece. In addition, only 39 percent of older workers were employed. The overall unemployment rate hit 17.5 percent in 2013 before decreasing to 16.5 percent in 2015, far higher than the 8.7 percent seen in 2008. A near doubling can be seen in the number of persons unemployed for a year or more. Whereas the 2008 long-term unemployment rate was at 5.4 percent, in 2015 it stood at 10.4 percent of the labor force. Those with less than upper secondary education were unemployed at a much higher rate: 21.6 percent (up from 9.5% in 2008). Youth, however, fare the worst, with 43 percent of 15-to-24-year-old Croatians being unemployed. The plight of the young Croatian labor force has drastically worsened since 2008, with unemployment increasing by nearly 20 percentage points. The SGI country report notes that “various institutional and policy shortcomings continue to affect labor market performance. The severance payment regime hinders labor mobility and discourages the use of open-ended contracts. The multi-layered social benefits system and generous early retirement options create disincentives to work. The wage-setting regime is not conducive to aligning wage dynamics to macroeconomic conditions. In particular, little has been done to facilitate job creation. From a comparative perspective, it is the low rate of job creation rather than a high rate of job destruction that underlies the weak labor market performance in Croatia.”⁷¹


The country also faces a number of challenges associated with social cohesion and nondiscrimination. Croatia’s NEET rate ranks ahead of only Italy and Greece. In 2015, 24.2 percent of Croatians 20 to 24 years old were neither in employment nor participating in education or training. This dramatic rise from the 13.7 percent reported in 2008 threatens the long-term viability of the Croatian economy. Policies that assertively reactivate these young adults are urgently needed. “The Milanović government has been involved in the development of a relatively comprehensive Strategy of Education, Science and Technology. Drafted by more than 100 people, from education-ministry officials to student activists and teachers, the 180-page document was unveiled in September 2013. However, the government has been slow to endorse the strategy and to commence implementation.”⁷² The SGI researchers scored Croatia a 5 (out of 10 possible points) on its policy performance related to nondiscrimination and 3 on its integration of immigrants into society. “The treatment of returnees from among the 200,000 Croat citizens of Serbian ethnicity expelled from the country in 1995 represents a significant gap in migration policy. Nearly 21,500 minority returnees still have outstanding housing, reconstruction and civil-status issues to resolve.”⁷³ With the European refugee crisis, more than 350,000 migrants had passed through Croatia by early November 2015, though only a small share have sought asylum in the country.⁷⁴

71 Petak, Bartlett, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.



Cyprus's current SJI score of 5.04 places the country 20th in the EU, a nominal improvement over the previous SJI edition. Particularly problematic is the country's performance in the areas of intergenerational justice and labor market access. Here, Cyprus finds itself among the bottom five. With regard to our focus on children and youth, the country's score of 5.68 on this subindex ranks it 14th.

The Cyprian education system ranks 3rd for the comparatively low impact which socioeconomic factors have on the PISA results of its students. In addition, the education system has succeeded in more than halving the dropout rate since 2008. As of 2015, the number of 18-to-24-year-olds who have left education or training has fallen to 5.3 percent, placing the country 3rd. Yet, Cyprus's policies for ensuring that educational opportunities are equitable, while praiseworthy, have failed in one major aspect: quality. The average Cyprian student's PISA results were more than 75 points below those of students in Finland, Estonia, and Poland, ranking it 26th. The SGI experts identify an emphasis on knowledge-based education – “with limited focus on research, experimentation and critical thought” – as a limitation.⁷⁵

Massive problems are still visible in the Cyprian labor market. The number of unemployed has increased by more than 400 percent since our first SJI in 2008, standing at 15.3 percent (2015). Long-term unemployment rose from 0.5 percent in 2008 to 6.93 percent. Younger workers, those 15 to 24 years old, have been hit disproportionately hard during this period: 32.8 percent are unemployed, more

⁷⁵ Christophorou, Axt, and Karadag (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

than double the already high rate for the overall labor market, ranking Cyprus 24th. In addition, the country has the highest incidence of involuntary temporary employment. A distressing 92.9 percent of working-age Cypriots are in temporary employment because they could not find a permanent position, a rate that has exceeded 90 percent for years. In comparison, the rate across the EU averaged 62.3 percent. More must be done to enable all Cypriots, particularly younger workers, to find opportunities for permanent employment.


Cyprus also faces challenges in securing policies that are intergenerationally just. Like many other EU countries, Cyprus has been witnessing a growing gap between the generations in recent years. The number of children and youth threatened by poverty or social exclusion has fluctuated over the last years (from 20.2 percent in 2009 to 28.9 percent in 2015). However, the risk of poverty or social exclusion among senior citizens declined from 49.3 percent in 2007 to 20.8 percent (2015). The SGI country report notes: “Austerity policies and high unemployment rates have increased the risk of poverty and exclusion, though targeted aid and a means-tested guaranteed-minimum-income policy are helping many households, especially among the elderly.”⁷⁶ Also, the country experts flagged Cyprian family policy as inadequate, scoring it 4 out of 10. “A lack of adequate family support policies leads to, among other things, a low rate of enrollment in nurseries and child-care centers. Combining motherhood with employment is difficult in Cyprus, which may also account for the country’s low birth rates.”⁷⁷

Intergenerational justice also requires a sustainable public budget. Cyprus, however, ranks among the five EU countries with the highest public debt. With a general government gross debt of 108.7 percent of GDP (up from a reported 44.6 percent in 2008), Cyprus has a debt level well above the already high EU average (87.4%). While public debt has risen, total expenditure on research and development is just 0.5 percent of GDP. This places the country 27th, ahead of only Romania, and undermines the economic dexterity necessary to maintain a high level of employment. Finally, a truly broad-based social justice strategy requires the sustainable management of natural resources and preservation of a country’s vital ecological habitats. However, Cyprus shows major weaknesses in this respect as well. “Despite some efforts to promote solar and renewable energies, major challenges persist with regard to waste management and the development of a comprehensive environmental-policy framework.”⁷⁸

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.



The Czech Republic ranks a commendable 4th overall on the current SJI with a score of 6.85. The country's performance has modestly but progressively improved since our first assessment in 2008. Across the six social justice dimensions, the Czech Republic places 1st among the 28 EU countries in poverty prevention. It also ranks a noteworthy 4th on health and 9th on intergenerational justice. In terms of this edition's focus on children and youth, we see mixed performance. On three of the four measures, the Czech Republic ranks in the top ten and on one measure (socioeconomic influence on PISA results) among the bottom five.

The Czech government can be lauded for several policy successes relating to social justice, in particular the fight against poverty. At 14.0 percent, the country has the lowest percentage of the total population at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU. To put this in context, this rate averages 23.7 percent across the EU and was almost 1 percentage point higher in 2007. The contours of this policy achievement can be seen across a range of related indicators. The share of children and youth (under 18) at risk of poverty or social exclusion is 18.5 percent. Although higher than the rate for the total population, this is still far better than the 26.9 percent EU average. Those 65 or older fare particularly well, with a comparatively low 10.9 percent at risk. In terms of income poverty, a relative advantage can again be seen. The Czech population as a whole is the least at risk of income poverty: only 9.7 percent receives 60 percent or less of the median income (after social transfers). Among the populations under 18 and seniors these rates increase to 14.7 percent and decrease to 7.4 percent respectively.

The Czech government has also ranked among the top ten on a number of indicators assessing labor market access. In 2015, the Czech Republic's unemployment rate of 5.1 percent was 4.5 percentage points lower than the EU average (9.6%) and ranks the country a commendable 2nd. While the rate of unemployment is higher than the 4.4 percent seen in 2008, it is an improvement over the 7.4 percent observed in 2010. The percentage of unemployed who have been out of work for a year or more, 2.4 percent, likewise appears to be readjusting downward toward pre-crisis levels. Youth unemployment, which has remained persistently higher, was 12.6 percent in 2015, a marked improvement over the 19 percent seen in 2013. In addition, the employment rate in 2015 was higher than it had been in 2008 (70.2% versus 66.6%). Yet, not all of our labor market measures paint a rosy picture. For instance, those in temporary employment involuntarily make up 83.9 percent of all temporary workers, more than a 15 percentage point increase over 2008. "Groups such as parents with young children, low-skilled workers, persons with disabilities and Roma are still strongly disadvantaged on the labor market. Operationally poor public employment services hinder the transition from unemployment to employment, and the shortage of affordable high-quality child-care services together with the limited use of flexible working hours makes it difficult for mothers with small children to remain in the labor market."⁷⁹


In addition to the comparatively low rate of Czech children and youth at risk of poverty or social exclusion, this subgroup also fares among the top ten on two additional measures: NEET rate and early school-leavers. The percentage of 20-to-24-year-olds who are neither in employment nor participating in education or training has decreased to 10.8 percent. The rate of 18-to-24-year-olds who dropped out of education or training has been somewhat on the rise since 2010 and stands at 6.2 percent (rank 6). Critically, according to the OECD, the PISA performance of Czech students unduly depends on their socioeconomic background. In comparison with the 27 other EU countries, the Czech education system ranks 24th on this measure. In this context, "a long-standing and unresolved equity issue has been the process of inclusion of children into special schools, mostly attended by children of Roma descent or from the lower classes."⁸⁰ Implementing reforms to address this injustice should be a top priority for the Czech government.

Despite the Czech Republic's overall good performance on preventing poverty, the social exclusion of specific groups, most notably the Roma, remains a problem. "The problem is most visibly manifested by the existence of a growing number of areas of high social exclusion. In 2015, about 600 of such areas existed, 15% of them located in the Usti region. These areas have been characterized by accumulating social problems, such as unemployment, housing insecurity, low education levels and poor health."⁸¹

79 Guasti, Mansfeldová, Myant, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.



Denmark continues to be one of the most socially just countries in the EU. It ranks 3rd, behind Sweden and Finland, with an overall score of 7.16. This score shows a slight improvement over our previous SJI assessment, but a minor worsening since 2008 (a score reduction of 0.19). Denmark's overall success is broad-based, with the country ranking in the top five on five of the six dimensions (it places a respectable 7th in the other dimension, health). With regard to children and youth, Denmark's score of 7.09 on this subindex ranks it 4th.

Danish public policy has successfully confronted a broad spectrum of social justice issues. One policy area particularly worth highlighting relates to the country's success at promoting a well-functioning labor market. Denmark ranks 1st among the 28 EU member countries on labor market access, scoring 7.50. The employment rate stood at 73.5 percent in 2015. The rate among older workers (those 55 to 64 years old) has been increasing since 2010 to 64.7 percent (rank 3). Unemployment continued its gradual decline to 6.3 percent after hitting a high of 7.6 percent in 2010. This rate, however, remains higher than the 3.5 percent reported in our first SJI in 2008. The incidence of long-term unemployment was 1.7 percent, which is low in comparison to most other EU countries. Nonetheless, the long-term unemployment rate has more than tripled since 2008, when it was one of the lowest in the EU (0.5%). The unemployment rate among workers with less than upper secondary education was likewise comparatively low, standing at 8.5 percent. Yet, here as well, we see a nearly five percentage point increase over 2008. The unemployment rate of 15-to-24-year-olds has also increased since 2008 (8%), rising to 14 percent in 2010 before falling to 10.8 percent in 2015. These various measures, when taken as a whole, demonstrate that the Danish

labor market, thanks to sound active labor market policies, is effectively ensuring that employment benefits a broad spectrum of workers.

In terms of intergenerational justice, Denmark places 3rd with a score of 7.19, behind only Sweden and Finland. The SGI country experts awarded the Danish administration scores of 9 out of 10 for its family, pension and environmental policies. The SGI researchers note that “the country’s system of day care centers, pre-schools and kindergartens allow sufficient flexibility for both parents to work,” though some municipalities may lack the financial resources to offer quality, flexible day care.⁸² They also note that the pension system is well-diversified, but that current “means testing of public pension supplements has the effect that the net gain from additional pension savings or later retirements can be rather low (high effective marginal tax rates) for a broad segment of income earners.”⁸³ With regard to the environment, the “government has set rather ambitious goals including that Danish energy production should be fossil free by 2050” and free of coal by 2030.⁸⁴ Based on the most recent Eurostat data, the country ranks 5th on renewable energy consumption. A laudable 29.2 percent of gross final energy consumption in 2014 (the latest reported year) came from renewable sources, more than 13 percentage points higher than the EU average (16.0%). Denmark is also investing in the future, spending 3.1 percent of GDP on research and development. At fifty percent higher than the EU average (2.0%), this places it 3rd, behind Sweden and Finland.


Although poverty levels are low in the cross-EU comparison, Denmark, like many other EU countries, has been witnessing a growing gap between the generations in recent years. The number of children and youth threatened by poverty or social exclusion has fluctuated slightly over the last years but remained roughly stable (from a low of 14% in 2009 to a high of 15.7% in 2015). However, in the same period of time, the risk of poverty or social exclusion among senior citizens declined from 20.6 percent in 2009 to 9.9 percent in 2015. Also, in terms of income inequality, Denmark is no longer one of those EU countries with the most equal distribution of income (as it was for many years). “Although comparatively inequality is low and social cohesion is high, Danish society is trending toward more disparity and inequality. This applies to immigrants as well as other groups marginalized in the labor market, often due to insufficient job qualifications. ... The hallmark of Danish society has been to balance low inequality and an extensive public sector with a well-functioning economy and high income level. It remains an ongoing challenge to reconcile these objectives.”⁸⁵

82 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.



Estonia numbers among the better-performing EU countries in the current SJI. With an overall score of 6.15, it ranks 13th. Across the six dimensions that comprise the index, Estonia places among the top ten in three dimensions (equitable education, intergenerational justice, and labor market access). It places in the bottom third in our health dimension. With regard to this edition's focus on children and youth, Estonia ranks 8th with a score of 6.43 on this subindex.


The Estonian education system has had commendable successes in delivering high-quality, equitable opportunities, and ranks 4th in this dimension. It places 1st with respect to minimizing the effects of socioeconomic factors on PISA performance and 2nd in terms of overall PISA results (behind Finland). The average Estonian student scored about three points less than the average Finnish student and 34 points higher than the EU average. Also, the working-age population is highly educated: nearly 91 percent have attained at least an upper secondary education, ranking Estonia 4th. The government's education policy received a score of 9 out of 10 from the SGI country experts. While educational outcomes are generally excellent, they note that higher educational attainment does not correlate with better employability as much as it does in other countries. "Recent policy measures strengthening links between education and training and the labor market, such as involving companies and social partners in VET curricula development, including entrepreneurship skills in university curricula, and providing adults with low-level skills better access to lifelong learning, have sought to ensure that

the provision of education keeps pace with the changing needs of the economy.”⁸⁶ In addition, Estonia places among the bottom third when it comes to preprimary education expenditure, with the government spending just 0.4 percent of GDP. Although Estonia’s rate of 18-to-24-year-olds dropping out of education and training has fluctuated in recent years, it has remained relatively high and currently lingers at 11.2 percent. For this indicator, Estonia therefore achieves only place 21. If the Estonian labor market is to remain competitive, more must be done to keep these young adults in education or training.

Compared with most other EU countries, Estonia generally performs well with respect to intergenerational justice (rank 4). The SGI researchers awarded the government scores of 9 out of 10 for both its family and environmental policies and a score of 7 (out of 10) for its pension policy. They observe that “Estonia has one of the most generous parental benefit systems in the OECD, entitling parents to benefits equal to her/his previous salary for 435 days. ... Parents are allowed to work up to a certain limit without losing benefits, which facilitates a combination of professional and family life.”⁸⁷ The government can also be lauded for having maintained the lowest level of public debt in the EU throughout the crisis. Though currently higher than the level seen in 2008 (4.5% of GDP), the country’s current general government gross debt of 10.1 percent of GDP has improved since 2014 (when the debt level peaked) and even outperforms second-place Luxembourg by more than 10 percentage points. In comparison, the average public debt level in the EU is 87.4 percent of GDP. Regarding environmental preservation, the share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption has increased from 17.1 percent in 2007 to 26.5 percent (2014, the latest year for which data is available), placing Estonia 8th on this environmental indicator. Here, however, we see highly ambivalent policy performance. The country ranks second to last for its high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, ahead of only Luxembourg. It emits an alarming 16 tons of climate-warming gases per capita (reported in CO₂ equivalents). Most worrying, while most countries have lower emissions today than they did in 2005, Estonia is one of only four countries that have actually increased their GHG emissions.

86 Toots, Sikk, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

87 Ibid.



Since our first social justice assessment in 2008, Finland has consistently ranked as one of the best-performing countries in the EU. Its current score of 7.17 is slightly lower than in 2008 and places Finland 2nd behind Sweden. Noteworthy is that Finland ranks among the top ten of countries in all SJI dimensions. In four of the six dimensions (poverty prevention, equitable education, social cohesion and nondiscrimination, and intergenerational justice) it ranks among the top five. In terms of our 2016 subindex on children and youth, the country's performance varies. On two of the four measures comprising this subindex Finland can be applauded: both for its low rate of children and youth at risk of poverty or social exclusion and the comparatively weak influence of socioeconomic background on PISA performance.

With regard to education, Finland has numerous strengths – equity and quality are high. Yet, in terms of retaining youth in education there is still much room for improvement. The education system can be lauded for being the best-performing in the EU (as measured by PISA). The average Finnish student scored about 38 points higher than the EU average. The system has also done well to ensure that learning opportunities do not unfairly favor particular socioeconomic groups, ranking the country 2nd in terms of socioeconomic background and PISA performance. As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on preprimary education totaled 0.8 percent in 2013 (the most recent reported year), placing Finland 4th. However, the country continues to struggle with reducing the number of early school-leavers. The number of 18-to-24-year-olds who drop out of education or training has changed little since our first SJI in 2008, currently at 9.2 percent.


Finnish policies relating to intergenerational justice are some of the best seen in the EU. The country scores 7.20 in this dimension, ranking it 2nd behind Sweden. The SGI country experts award the Finnish government a score of 9 (out of 10 possible points) for its family and pension policies as well as an 8 for its environmental policies. However, the old age dependency ratio has steadily climbed in recent years, up from 24.8 in 2008 to 31.3 in 2015. With regard to the pension system, the SGI experts note that the country's aging population poses problems both in terms of labor force maintenance and fiscal sustainability, but that reforms agreed to in September 2014 ensure the viability of the system and "provide incentives for longer working careers."⁸⁸ These reform policies will raise the retirement age for most workers to 65, introduce flexible retirement, and amend the accumulation rate.⁸⁹ Also, Finnish energy consumption has become progressively more sustainable, with the share from renewable sources increasing from 29.6 percent in 2007 to 38.7 percent in 2014, the second-highest share in the EU. In terms of investing in the future, Finland devotes an exceptionally high share of its GDP to research and development. Indeed, public and private expenditure totals 3.2 percent of GDP. The country experts note, however, that "the Sipilä government ... announced dramatic new cuts in government spending for education and higher learning. In the long run, given the dependence of applied research on basic-research developments, the heavy bias in favor of applied research will have negative consequences for product development and productivity. More broadly, the system of technology transfer from universities to the private sector is also comparatively weak, and academic entrepreneurship is not well developed."⁹⁰

Problems also persist on the Finnish labor market. Comparatively, current progress in stemming unemployment, particularly among youth, and equalizing opportunities for foreign-born workers remain unsatisfactory. The high level of youth unemployment (22.4%) is a particular cause for concern. These young adults are at risk of permanent exclusion from the labor market. Similarly, the country places among the bottom third for the highly unequal ratio of employment outcomes achieved by foreign-born workers. Both of these measures highlight a missed opportunity to sufficiently integrate youth and marginalized adults into Finnish society.

88 Anckar, Kuitto, Oberst, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.



France's overall performance on the SJI has remained relatively stable and within the midrange since our first assessment in 2008. In the current index, it ranks 10th overall in the EU with a score of 6.27, and 6th in the dimensions of poverty prevention and health. However, areas such as labor market access, integration, and education policy exhibit shortcomings. With regard to our focus on children and youth, France's score of 5.57 yields it a 15th place ranking.

France's score of 6.77 in poverty prevention ranks it 6th. With 17.7 percent of the total population at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the country performs better than many of its EU counterparts. However, as in many other EU countries, the gap between young and old has widened over the last years. Several indicators provide additional detail. The share of children and youth (under 18) at risk of poverty or social exclusion is 21.2 percent (2015). While this is higher than the rate for the total population, it remains better than the 26.9 percent EU average. Those 65 or older fare especially well, with a comparatively low 9.3 percent at risk, and the rate has steadily declined over recent years. Some 4.5 percent (2015) of the total population do not have the financial means to afford fundamental necessities of daily life (e.g., an appropriately heated apartment or a telephone), landing the country at rank 9 for this measure. Yet, material deprivation does not affect all segments of society equally. Again, French seniors are less likely (1.9%) whereas children and youth are more likely (5.4%) to be materially deprived. In terms of income poverty, France places 6th. Among the total population, 13.6 percent must survive on 60 percent or less of the median income (after social transfers). Among the population segments under 18, this rate increases to 18.7 percent; for those 65 or older, it decreases to 8 percent.

With a score of 7.12, France ranks 8th in the fifth dimension of the SJI, health. The French rank 10th in healthy life expectancy. The average French citizen can expect 63.8 healthy life years, about two years more than the EU average. According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), French health policy has achieved shorter wait times as well as a higher range and reach of health services than many EU countries (rank 9). Also, the EHCI ranks the outcomes of the health system 7th. The French administration received a score of 7 from the SGI researchers for its health policies. They commend the country for having “a high-quality health system, which is generous and largely inclusive,” but note that France spends 10 percent of GDP on health care, “one of the highest ratios in Europe.”⁹¹ “The problem is cost efficiency and the containment of deficits, which have been constant in recent years. ... Savings have improved recently, but the high level of medication consumption is an issue still to be tackled with more decisive measures.”⁹²

Requiring urgent policy action, France ranks an alarming 26th with regard to the impact of socioeconomic factors on French students. “There are persisting inequalities that effectively penalize students of working-class families at the university level, and flagrantly in accessing the elite schools (*grandes écoles*). Social, ethnic and territorial inequalities are often linked (as a result of a massive concentration of poor immigrant families in suburban zones).”⁹³ The education system also requires reforms to reduce the number of early school-leavers and increase upper secondary attainment. The rate of 18-to-24-year-olds who dropped out of education or training has changed little since 2013 and stands at 9.3 percent. Also, only 78 percent of the working-age population has attained at least an upper secondary education. In comparison, the rate in first-place Lithuania is 94 percent.

The labor market represents another major issue for reform. Labor market policy has shown poor results during the review period. Specifically, difficult problems include the notoriously high youth unemployment figures (24.7%) and the fact that (especially young) French citizens with immigrant backgrounds face tremendous difficulties integrating into the labor market. The country ranks among the bottom five for the highly unequal ratio of employment outcomes achieved by foreign-born workers. Both of these measures highlight a missed opportunity to integrate youth and marginalized adults into society. According to the SGI country report “the high level of youth unemployment is linked to the French job-training system, which relies heavily on public schools; yet diplomas from such training are not really accepted in the industry at large, which hinders a potential worker’s transition from school to a job.”⁹⁴ “So-called second-generation immigrants, especially those living in the suburbs as well as less vocal groups in declining rural regions feel excluded from broader French society: abandoned to their fate, (the) situation combines poor education and training, unemployment and poverty.”⁹⁵

91 Mény, Uterwedde, and Zohlnhöfer (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

92 Ibid.


93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

Directly linked to France's poor results regarding equitable education and labor market access are massive shortcomings in the area of integration, where the SGI experts scored the country a 6 out of 10. "The traditional French model, based on an open policy toward immigrants acquiring French nationality and on the principle of equality of all citizens, regardless of ethnic origins or religion, has lost its integrative power over the last 30 years. The former key instruments of the integration process (education, work, religion, political parties, or trade unions) no longer work. This challenge requires multifaceted policy solutions, including in urban development, education, job training and employment. It should emphasize soft policies such as education, social integration and 'sociabilité,' all of which require time and human resources well beyond the current financial involvement of public authorities. What is at stake is a political and social cohesion that derives from common national values and rules. Unfortunately, the present situation, characterized by an identity crisis, an ethnic divide, the exclusion of migrants and political frustrations which have triggered extremist voting, has discouraged such a social cohesion policy."⁹⁶

96 Ibid.



With an overall score of 6.66 on the 2016 SJI, Germany ranks a respectable 7th in the EU. The country has measurably improved since our first social justice assessment in 2008. It ranks among the top ten on two of the six dimensions that comprise our index. It places a commendable 2nd in the area of labor market access, 6th in social cohesion and nondiscrimination, and 10th in equitable education. In terms of this year's focus on children and youth, we see mixed performance. On this subindex, Germany's score of 6.73 places it 7th.

With a score of 7.38, the country's labor market ranks among the best in the EU, behind only Denmark. The overall employment rate in 2015, 74 percent, was one of the highest in our sample, placing Germany 3rd behind the Netherlands and Sweden. The rate of employment has actually increased gradually throughout the crisis, especially among older workers (age 55 to 64). In 2015, 66.2 percent of this demographic were employed. This is the second-highest rate in the EU and more than 10 percentage points higher than in 2008. These high rates of employment are conversely reflected in low unemployment figures. Germany has the lowest overall unemployment in the EU. In 2015, a comparatively low 4.7 percent of the labor force was unemployed. Here again we observe a steady improvement throughout the crisis (the unemployment rate was 7.6% in 2008). A similar positive trend can be seen with youth unemployment: the rate has steadily decreased from 10.6 percent in 2008 to 7.2 percent (the lowest incidence in the EU). The number of people unemployed for a year or longer has also decreased. While in 2008 long-term unemployment stood at 4 percent, in 2015 that rate was cut to 2.1 percent. "Recent data from the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat, 2015, p. 230) indicates that the growth in employment does not

reflect a disproportionate increase in atypical employment. On the contrary, between 2009 and 2014, the share of ‘normal employment’ has increased, while the share of fixed-term employment has decreased and the share of ‘mini-jobs’ (i.e., jobs involving ... maximum monthly earnings of €450) has remained constant. Of those interviewed, less than 20% of people working part-time said that they would like to work more hours, which indicates that the increase in part-time employment largely reflects the preferences of individual employees.”⁹⁷

Nonetheless, there is a marked contrast between standard and nonstandard forms of employment in Germany. Related to this, a deterioration is evident in the “in-work poverty” measure since 2012, which suggests that the trend toward a segmented or dual labor market has gained traction, as it has elsewhere in the EU. Creating incentives for high employment rates and enhancing upward mobility from nonstandard to regular forms of employment and decent working conditions is therefore key to ensuring a socially just labor market. It remains to be seen whether the new minimum wage scheme imposed in 2015 can effectively reduce income inequality and the risk of in-work poverty. The actual effects of the minimum wage are only partially reflected in the available data on income distribution. The significantly weaker job opportunities afforded to people not born in Germany represent a further weak point, despite recent moderate improvements. The foreign-born to native employment ratio in 2015 was 0.91 (rank 16).

Germany has made much progress in ensuring social cohesion and that members of society are free from discrimination, but particularly the educational attainment of immigrants remains highly unequal. The NEET rate of 9.3 percent in 2015 (rank 3), when compared to the EU average of 16.6 percent, demonstrates that young adults in Germany are faring far better than most of their EU counterparts. Remarkably, this rate of 20-to-24-year-olds neither employed nor participating in education or training has actually declined since the crisis began (12.9% in 2008). Also, Germany ranks among the top ten countries for the share of parliamentary seats held by women (36.5% in 2015, until better data is available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society). The SGI country experts award the government a score of 8 out of 10 for its nondiscrimination policies as well as a score of 7 both for social inclusion and integration. They note that “between 2013 and 2014, the share of the population with a migrant background increased by about 3% to a total of 16.4 million. ... Integration of immigrants from other European countries is smooth. However, the integration of Muslim migrants, especially from Turkey, has been more difficult, as measured by educational achievement and unemployment rates.”⁹⁸ In 2015, in the context of the European refugee crisis, “the number of refugees claiming asylum in Germany far exceeded any recent levels and represents a substantial challenge for integration policy. ... This sudden increase exacerbated existing problems, especially at the local level. ... To date, the government has not provided a clear strategy to promote long-term integration and build political consensus.”⁹⁹ It is to be hoped that previous positive developments in the area of integration policy will not only continue, but be surpassed in the context of the current refugee crisis.


97 Rüb, Heinemann, Ulbricht, and Zohlnhöfer (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

Germany shows weaknesses in particular areas related to intergenerational justice and equitable education. With regard to the latter aspect, it must be noted that the influence of a student's socioeconomic background on his or her educational success is still far too strong in Germany, although the education system has made some progress over the last years in mitigating this dynamic. Germany places 15th in this important measure of equity. With regard to intergenerational justice (rank 13), critics claim that the recent pension reforms "undermine the long-term sustainability of the pensions system. ... While pension contribution rates will remain stable over the short term, future financial imbalances in the pay-as-you-go system will likely lead to increasing pension contribution rates and/or increasing federal subsidies."¹⁰⁰ Finally, the number of children and youth threatened by poverty or social exclusion is at 18.5 percent (compared to 17.2% among the elderly), a surprisingly high figure for the largest economy in the EU.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.



Greece ranks as the worst-performing country in terms of social justice. The country finds itself among the bottom five in all six dimensions that comprise our index, ranking very last in two of these dimensions (labor market access and intergenerational justice). Regarding this edition's special subindex on children and youth, Greece comes in at place 23 with a score of 4.37.

The crisis has had a devastating effect on poverty and social exclusion. The bailout package measures have aggravated existing social problems. The share of people threatened by poverty or social exclusion remains extraordinarily high: 35.7 percent of the total population is now at risk of poverty or social exclusion (2015). The rate for children is 37.8 percent and for older people 22.8 percent. The gap between old and young in terms of poverty have strongly increased over the last years with young people harder hit by poverty and social exclusion. Moreover, the share of children living under conditions of severe material deprivation has more than doubled from 10.4 percent in 2008 to 25.7 percent in 2015.

A thriving and socially just economy requires high employment rates in good, well-paying jobs. Greece, however, falls dauntingly far off the mark. Its score of 3.32 in the area of labor market access places it last among the 28-member EU. In 2015, only 50.8 percent of working-age Greeks were employed, the lowest rate in our sample. While the rate of employment has been moderately improving since 2014, it is still 10 percentage points lower than the rate seen in 2008. Older Greek workers, those 55 to 64, have the lowest incidence of employment in the EU, just 34.3 percent were employed. The ratio of women to men active in the labor force is likewise low (0.72 in 2015, rank 27). Looking at the Greek labor market

from the perspective of the unemployed, it becomes clear how much must still be done. The overall unemployment rate, 25.1 percent in 2015, is the highest in the EU. Again, a moderate improvement can be seen since the peak in 2013, but the number of unemployed is still more than 15 percentage points higher than it was in 2008 and far higher than the EU average of 9.8 percent. The share of the long-term unemployed, those out of work for a year or more, has also moderately improved but remains alarmingly high: 18.3 percent. These long-term unemployed are at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion. In addition, many of those who are employed find themselves in temporary employment. Indeed, 83.3 percent of Greeks in temporary work could not find a permanent placement. Likewise, young Greek workers face an uncertain future. The unemployment rate of these 15-to-24-year-olds has more than doubled since 2008 to 49.8 percent.

Greek policies are also failing to adequately ensure social cohesion and nondiscrimination. In terms of the Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, Greece ranks 21st. In addition, Greece has the second-highest NEET rate in the EU. In 2015, 26.1 percent of 20-to-24-year-old Greeks were neither employed nor participating in education or training. This rate has continued to decline since peaking at 31.3 percent in 2013, but remains distressingly far from the 15.8 percent seen in 2008. If unresolved, this high incidence of inactive young adults threatens to seriously destabilize the country over the long term. Given these already poor indications, it may come as little surprise that the government's social inclusion policies were assessed by the SGI researchers to be the worst-performing in the EU (receiving a score of 3 out of 10). The experts determine that "past governments' negligence in anti-poverty measures and social exclusion policymaking have left those most vulnerable in Greek society unprepared to sustain the effects of the economic crisis."¹⁰¹ "All in all, it seems that successive governments either did not have a comprehensive plan to fight poverty or deferred to react to increasing social exclusion."¹⁰² Social assistance NGOs and the Orthodox Church have intensified their charity work and "the traditional extended Greek family, often including family members over three generations who pool resources, has served as a solution of last resort for the poor and the socially excluded."¹⁰³

Greece's nondiscrimination policies fared only somewhat better, placing 19th with a score of 6. The experts point out that, though protections have been enacted both domestically and at the EU level, "legislation against discrimination has rarely been implemented."¹⁰⁴ There is, however, reason for optimism, with "the rise to power of a strong left-wing party, Syriza, ... the opposite of racist discrimination, namely tolerance, solidarity and support of foreigners, was observed in the summer and the fall of 2015, when Greece received a vast inflow of refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (210,000 refugees arrived in and passed through Greece in the month of October alone)."¹⁰⁵

Greece also ranks at the bottom in terms of intergenerational justice. The country is one of the demographically "oldest" countries in the EU and also carries the highest public debt (178.4% of GDP). Although budget deficits have been scaled

101 Sotiropoulos, Featherstone, and Karadag (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.


102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

back through the implementation of harsh austerity policies, the debt level remains dauntingly high. The fiscal burdens for today's young people as well as future generations are thus immense. At the same time, investment in research and development – vital for future economic growth – is very low (0.8% of GDP).



Hungary's overall performance on the SJI has fluctuated somewhat since our first edition in 2008, but the country has remained among the worst performers. Its score of 4.96 ranks 23rd in the EU. Hungary finds itself among the bottom third of countries in all six of the index's dimensions, and in two (social cohesion and nondiscrimination as well as intergenerational justice) it numbers among the bottom five. With regard to children and youth, Hungary ranks 25th with a score of 4.31 on this subindex.

Preventing poverty is a key priority of every modern state's social policy. Though progress can be seen, Hungary still struggles to meet this fundamental policy goal: 28.2 percent (2015) of the total population remain at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This ranks the country 19th among the 28 countries in the EU. Hardest hit are those under 18 years of age, with 36.1 percent at risk. Yet, while this rate is still troublingly high, the plight of Hungarian children and youth has markedly improved in recent years. In 2013, 43.9 percent of under 18-year-olds were at risk. Likewise, the share of Hungarians who do not have the financial means to afford fundamental necessities of daily life (e.g., an appropriately heated apartment or a telephone), 19.4 percent of the total population, has improved since peaking in 2013 (27.8%), but persists far above the EU average (8.1%). As observed in other countries in our sample, a much larger share of children and youth suffer from this material deprivation, whereas seniors suffer the least: the share among those under 18 is 24.9 percent, and 14.2 percent for those 65 and older. A growing gap between generations is thus also evident in Hungary.

Another major policy challenge confronting Hungary is strengthening social cohesion and combating discrimination. It ranks 25th in this dimension, with a score of 4.40. The Hungarian National Assembly has the lowest proportion of seats held by women in the EU (just 10.10% [until better data is available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society]). The SGI country experts awarded the government scores of 4 out of 10 for its social inclusion, nondiscrimination, and integration policies. They note that “despite the recent rise in economic growth rates, both the impoverishment of people in the lower income deciles and the fragmentation and weakening of the middle classes have continued since the 2014 elections. The budget for 2015 has cut social spending by 5%.”¹⁰⁶ With regard to nondiscrimination, the experts observe that “anti-discrimination efforts have shown only limited success,” with “discrimination against women in the areas of employment, career and pay ... exemplified by the small number of women in Hungarian politics. ... In the context of the refugee crisis, the government launched an all-out anti-Islam propaganda strategy that has been extended to all minority groups and political/civil organizations that have criticized government policy.”¹⁰⁷ The greatest policy failure, however, can be seen with regard to the Roma. “About half of all Roma children in Hungary still live in segregated communities and receive substandard education. In many cases, court rulings against segregation are not enforced.”¹⁰⁸


Due to legislation that allows dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians, the integration of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries – above all from Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine – has been carried out with relatively few problems. By contrast, the integration of other migrants remains a controversial process, as the government does not allocate sufficient resources for their cultural and social integration.¹⁰⁹ Given the strong negative demographic trend, a more open attitude toward immigration – especially with a view to the EU’s current refugee crisis – would clearly be in the country’s long-term interest.

¹⁰⁶ Ágh, Dieringer, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.



Ireland's overall score of 5.40 on our current SJI ranks it 18th in the EU. The country's policy performance on social justice tends toward below average. Across the six dimensions, it ranks in the bottom third on three. While it never rises to the top ten at the dimension level, it also never sinks to the bottom five. In terms of our focus on children and youth, we likewise see below-average performance (rank 20 with a score of 5.25 on this subindex). On two of the four measures, Ireland ranks among the bottom third, and on one measure (early school-leavers) in the top ten.

The SGI country experts awarded the Irish government a score of 9 out of 10 (the highest score achieved in the EU) for successfully fighting discrimination. They determine that Ireland's Equality Authority, an independent body set up to monitor discrimination, as well as its independent equality tribunal have been "successful in prosecuting cases on behalf of parties who felt they had been discriminated against."¹¹⁰ The employment of foreign-born workers has been on par with native workers for years (occasionally actually exceeding native employment, as in 2008), placing the country 2nd among the 28 EU countries. In addition, in May 2015, Irish voters approved by referendum a constitutional amendment extending the right to marriage to same-sex couples. However, the full state of social cohesion in Ireland is more complex. Our experts gave the government's integration policy a score of 7. They highlight that while "more than 70% of immigrants to Ireland have the right to reside, work and own property in the country by virtue of their EU citizenship," many are not employed "in occupations commensurate

¹¹⁰ Walsh, Mitchell, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.


with their skills and education.”¹¹¹ “There are signs of increasing gaps between schools in relatively deprived areas of the main cities, which often have high concentrations of children holding non-Irish citizenship, and schools in the more affluent areas with lower concentrations.”¹¹²

With specific regard to children and youth, Ireland largely performs below average. Still too high a percentage of Irish children and youth are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 30.3 percent in 2014 (the most recent reported year). The at-risk share has improved somewhat since peaking at 33.9 percent in 2013 and now places the country 18th in our sample. Ireland’s NEET rate has also continued to decline, but remains problematic. The percentage of 20-to-24-year-olds who are neither in employment nor participating in education or training decreased to 19.7 percent in 2015 (down from an extreme high of 26.1% in 2010). With regard to education, OECD data shows that the PISA performance of Irish students unduly depends on their socioeconomic background. The Irish education system ranks 19th on this measure. Even with these challenges, Irish youth have largely remained in education or training. The rate of 18-to-24-year-olds who dropped out of education or training has fallen since peaking in 2010, reaching 6.9 percent in 2015 (rank 7).

Some successes and challenges relating to health policy also deserve mention. Ireland has the third-highest healthy life expectancy in the EU, trailing only Malta and Sweden. The average person can expect 66.9 healthy life years, 5 years more than the EU average. This atypically good health could be attributed in part to the high quality of the country’s health service provision. According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), health system outcomes rank 7th among all EU countries. However, access remains a major problem. The EHCI points to longer wait times and a smaller range and reach of health services than in most other EU countries (rank 24). If Ireland is to maintain one of the healthiest populations in the EU, rapid health system reforms are needed to address deficiencies in access.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.



Overall, Italy's 24th place position on the latest SJI ranks it among the worst-performing EU countries with a score of 4.78. Italy's social justice performance has fluctuated somewhat since 2008 and shows only minimal improvement over the previous two years. How Italy measures up against the other EU member countries varies somewhat across the six dimensions, though it ranks among the bottom third in all. It performs worst in terms of intergenerational justice, where it places second to last, and ranks 23rd in labor market access. With regard to our subindex on children and youth, the country comes in 24th with a score of 4.35.

With the highest old-age dependency ratio in the EU, Italy is most in need of a well-functioning labor market with high employment. Yet the country's score of 4.83 on labor market access is emblematic of the poor performance seen on most of the indicators that comprise this dimension. In 2015, only 56.3 percent of the working age population was employed, one of the lowest employment rates in the EU (only Croatia and Greece have a lower employment level). More troubling is that Italian employment levels have been anemic going back at least to 2008. The employment situation for women has somewhat improved since 2008, but still remains far below parity or the EU average. Also, full-time employment has not protected all workers from poverty. A grudgingly high 9.8 percent of Italians working full-time were at risk of poverty in 2015. Looking at the Italian labor market from the perspective of the unemployed, it becomes clear how much must still be done. The overall unemployment rate has gone from 6.8 percent in 2008 to 12.1 percent in 2015. Since the crisis began, the long-term unemployed have seen their numbers more than double (from 3.1% in 2008 to a peak of 7.9% in 2014). Similarly, for youth the unemployment rate has nearly doubled since 2008.

With 40.3 percent of 15-to-24-year-olds unemployed (rank 25), the Italian administration faces a truly urgent policy challenge. Without rapid labor market activation, many of these youth are at risk of being permanently shut out of stable employment, and Italy will have to bear the long-term societal consequences. However, recent reforms point in the right direction. The SGI country experts note that in 2014 the Renzi government undertook to resolutely tackle this challenge: “starting with some more limited but immediate measures to make the hiring of youth easier, the government launched a systematic revision of the labor code aimed at encouraging firms to adopt more flexible but also stable labor contracts. ... the government has gradually expanded the scope of this law and encouraged a new type of labor contract. This new labor contract increases employers’ ability to hire and fire, while also encouraging a shift from precarious to long-term contracts. It has been received very favorably and 2015 data on new contracts indicates that it has been a significant success.”¹¹³


Structural weaknesses also threaten social cohesion. Italy has a high level of income inequality, with a Gini coefficient that has remained largely unchanged for years. Moreover, Italy, like many other EU countries, has been witnessing a growing gap between the generations in recent years. The percentage of children and youth who are threatened by poverty or social exclusion (33.5%) far exceeds the 19.9 percent seen among older people (65 or older). In addition, the country’s NEET rate is the highest in our survey. In 2015, 31.1 percent of Italians 20 to 24 years old were neither in employment nor education or training (a 10 percentage point increase over 2008). As mentioned earlier, these young adults are at risk of permanent exclusion from the labor market. In addition, the country experts scored Italian social inclusion policy 5 out of 10 points. They find that the tax system’s redistributive functions “have largely ceased to work,” having “been curtailed by the rise in tax rates and the erosion of benefits and deductions due to inflation. ... Moreover, the system’s redistributive effects fail to reach that part of the population which earns less than the minimum taxable income.”¹¹⁴

The country ranks second to last in terms of intergenerational justice. Aside from the poor prospects for young people on the labor market, Italy is demographically the “oldest” country in the EU and also carries one of the highest public debts (132.6% of GDP). The fiscal burdens for today’s young people as well as future generations are thus immense. At the same time, investment in research and development has remained too low (1.3% of GDP). “The Renzi government has not been able to make much headway in this regard given the tight budgetary context. Funds for R&D have not increased, but some new measures have been introduced to foster start-up companies.”¹¹⁵ Even in the state’s current financial situation, such investments remain vital for future economic growth.

113 Cotta, Maruhn, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.



Latvia's SJI score of 5.04 places it 20th among the 28-member EU. For two of the six dimensions in our study (health and poverty prevention) Latvia ranks among the bottom five. It does, however, excel in terms of intergenerational justice, placing 7th. The country's performance regarding children and youth is similarly mixed, though it tends toward the middle (ranking 19th with a score of 5.25 of this subindex).

Ensuring that policies are intergenerationally just requires, in part, that they are environmentally sustainable. Here Latvia performs particularly well. The country has comparatively low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, ranking 5th. In 2013 (the most recent reported year), the average Latvian emitted 5.3 tons (in CO₂ equivalents) of climate-warming gases. However, there is still much room for improvement as these emissions are far higher than in 2008. In recent years, the country has steadily increased renewable energy use. The share of energy from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption increased from 29.6 percent in 2007 to a laudable 38.7 percent in 2014, the second-highest rate in the EU (behind Sweden). Given these and additional successes in ecological stewardship, the SGI country experts awarded the Latvian government a score of 9 out of 10 (the highest score achieved in the EU) on its environmental policy. They determine that the country's "environmental policy effectively ensures the sustainability of natural resources and protects the quality of the environment."¹¹⁶

116 Terauda, Auers, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.


Latvia also performs well in terms of fiscal sustainability. The public debt level (34.8%) ranks a commendable 4th and is less than half the EU average. Nonetheless, when it comes to spending on research and development, another important indicator in the dimension of intergenerational justice, Latvia still has a lot of catching up to do: total expenditures on research and development only amount to 0.7 percent of GDP, the third-lowest investment rate in the EU. Moreover, “public funding for research institutions fluctuates year to year. This creates an environment of uncertainty that discourages young people from entering the fields of science, technology and innovation, or encourages these young people to look for opportunities abroad. There are few links between industry and research institutions, a fact that further hampers the growth of the R&D sector.”¹¹⁷

In targeting broad-based social justice, Latvia faces many challenges, particularly in the area of health policy. The country ranks last in the dimension of health, with a score of 3.25, and has the lowest healthy life expectancy in the EU. The average Latvian can expect just 53.6 healthy life years, which is eight years less than the EU average and a shocking two decades less than the average Swede. Insufficient access to health services may well be the root cause of this figure, as Latvia also has the highest percentage of respondents reporting unmet medical needs. In 2014, 12.5 percent reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance, or long waiting lists. The Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI) confirms this, reporting that Latvian health policy performs far below average, with comparatively long wait times as well as a low range and reach of health services. In terms of health system outcomes (another measure from the EHCI) the country ranks 21st. The government received only 4 out of 10 points from the SGI researchers for its health policies. The researchers point to an evaluation by the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies regarding the allocative efficiency of Latvia’s health sector, which concluded that “the share of resources allocated to health care is inadequate” and that “the share of resources allocated to different types of services is not efficient, as evidenced by long waiting lists, a lack of attention to chronic conditions and a lack of focus on preventable lifestyle diseases.”¹¹⁸

Poverty prevention continues to pose another major policy challenge. In 2015, 30.9 percent of the total Latvian population was at risk of poverty or social exclusion. In comparison, the average across the EU was 23.7 percent. The situation is particularly acute for seniors. Whereas senior citizens fare better than the overall population in many EU countries, in Latvia, they are worse off. In 2015, 42.1 percent of those 65 and older were at risk, placing 27th (ahead of only Bulgaria). The number of seniors who received 60 percent or less of the median income (after social transfers) was 34.6 percent, the highest rate in our sample. In addition, the percentage of seniors suffering from severe material deprivation, while far lower today than in 2007, remains high by EU standards: 18.2 percent of Latvian seniors.

117 Ibid.

118 As cited in Terauda, Auers, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.



Lithuania's current overall score of 5.69 places it 15th in the EU. The country's performance across the six dimensions varies greatly, placing among the top five on two dimensions (equitable education and intergenerational justice) and in the bottom half on another three (poverty prevention, social cohesion and non-discrimination, and health). With regard to this edition's focus on children and youth, Lithuania's performance is mixed and below average, ranking 16th with a score of 5.56 on this subindex.

The Lithuanian education system has seen considerable success at ensuring that educational opportunities are equitably distributed. The country ranks a commendable 3rd, after Finland and Sweden, in this dimension. The working-age population is highly educated: nearly 93.5 percent have attained at least an upper secondary education, the highest rate in our sample. Related to this, Lithuania has one of the lowest dropout rates, placing it 5th among the 28 EU countries. In 2015, 5.5 percent of 18-to-24-year-olds dropped out of education or training. The education system has also done relatively well to ensure that learning opportunities do not unfairly favor particular socioeconomic backgrounds (rank 6). As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on preprimary education totaled 0.6 percent in 2012 (the most recent reported year), placing the country 10th. Much evidence has shown that these early investments in children's education yield significant, lifelong positive effects. Overall, the SGI country experts gave the Lithuanian government a score of 7 out of a possible 10 for its education policy. They note, however, several challenges to equity, including "an urban-rural divide and some disparities in educational achievements between girls and boys"

as well as gaps in access to education for “the Roma population and, to a certain extent, the migrant population.”¹¹⁹

One of the country’s principal social justice challenges is poverty and income inequality. No other EU country reported a higher Gini coefficient in 2015 than did this Baltic country. Moreover, in 2015, 29.3 percent of the total population was at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Although this is a clear improvement compared to 2012 (32.5%), the country’s performance (rank 23) places it among the bottom third. “Families with many children, people living in rural areas, youth and disabled people, unemployed people, and elderly people are the demographic groups with the highest poverty risk.”¹²⁰ Here the share of the general population without the financial means to afford fundamental necessities of daily life (e.g., an appropriately heated apartment or a telephone) was 13.9 percent in 2015. On this measure, Lithuanians 65 and over fare the worst, with 18.2 percent living under conditions of severe material deprivation. “A mix of government interventions (general improvements to the business environment, active labor-market measures, adequate education and training, cash social assistance, and social services targeted at the most vulnerable groups) is needed in order to ameliorate Lithuania’s remaining problems of poverty and social exclusion.”¹²¹


Lithuania shows major weaknesses in the area of health (rank 18). The country places among the bottom third on meeting the medical needs of its population. In 2014, 3.7 percent reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance, or long waiting lists. In addition, the Euro Health Consumer Index ranks Lithuania 23rd in terms of health system outcomes. According to the SGI report, “the provision of health care services varies to a certain extent among the Lithuanian counties; the inhabitants of a few comparatively poor counties characterized by lower life expectancies (e.g., Tauragė county) on average received fewer health care services. Out-of-pocket payments remain high (in particular for pharmaceuticals), a fact that may reduce health access for vulnerable groups. ... There is a need to make the existing health care system more efficient, by shifting more resources from costly inpatient treatments to primary care, outpatient treatment and nursing care.”¹²²

119 Nakrošis, Vilpišauskas, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.



With an overall score of 6.57 on the SJI, Luxembourg ranks 8th in the EU. The country ranks among the top ten in three of the index's six dimensions. It ranks 2nd in the area of health and 3rd in social cohesion and nondiscrimination. With respect to children and youth, we see mixed performance: on one of the four measures (NEET rate) Luxembourg ranks a laudable 2nd. On this subindex, the country's score of 6.33 places it 10th.

With a score of 7.43 for successfully promoting social cohesion and combating discrimination, Luxembourg is bested only by Sweden and the Netherlands. It has the second-lowest NEET rate in the EU. In 2015, 8.8 percent of 20-to-24-year-olds were neither employed nor participating in education or training. While low when compared to most of its European counterparts, this rate remains higher than in 2010 (7.2%). The SGI country experts awarded the government a top place score of 9 (out of 10 possible points) for its social inclusion policy and 8 for both its nondiscrimination and integration policies. These researchers report that "Luxembourg's welfare system is possibly one of the most substantial and comprehensive in Europe. ... Since 1986, Luxembourg has offered a guaranteed minimum income (revenu minimum garanti, RMG) system to ensure all residents older than 24 (with certain exceptions, such as one-parent families and the disabled) have sufficient income to live."¹²³ With respect to integration, they commend the 2010 introduction of "a national action plan to better integrate the immigrant populations as well as combat discrimination (Plan d'action national d'intégration et de lutte contre les discriminations)" and "improved consultation mechanisms with

¹²³ Schneider, Lorig, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

migrants.”¹²⁴ These include a policy requiring each municipality “to establish an integration commission (Commissions consultatives communales d’intégration, CCI) that accurately represents the region’s migrant mix. ... All foreigners, EU citizens and third-country citizens can vote and run for office in local elections, provided they fulfill certain residency requirements and are registered on the electoral list.”¹²⁵ Looking at discrimination, the SGI researchers note that since 90 percent of migrants are European and most of a Christian faith, “migration issues have caused fewer conflicts on ethnic concerns than in neighboring countries.”¹²⁶

Because illness undermines an individual’s capacity to fully achieve his or her potential, access to quality health services is considered a precondition for social inclusion. Luxembourg can be praised for being a leader among the 28 EU member countries in our health dimension with a score of 7.95. In 2014 (the latest survey year), a comparatively low 0.8 percent of Luxembourgers reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance, or long waiting lists. According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), Luxembourg’s health system is among the best-performing (rank 4), with comparatively few wait lists as well as a high range and reach of health care services. The country also ranks 5th on the EHCI in terms of health system outcomes. The government received a score of 8 out of 10 from the SGI experts for its health policy. Though it has many strengths, they point out that the health care system is one of the most expensive in the OECD, and that “the new government is expected to swiftly implement a comprehensive reform of the health-insurance system (e.g., introducing digital patient files, a primary-doctor principle and a performance-oriented fee-per-case system) with the aim of improving long-term budgetary sustainability within the health care and statutory nursing care systems.”¹²⁷

Despite its overall strong performance in social justice, Luxembourg does face certain challenges across the various dimensions examined. One significant challenge is found in the area of intergenerational justice. Luxembourg has the highest rate of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and lowest share of renewable energy use in the EU. The country emits an alarming 19.9 tons of GHGs per capita (2013, reported in CO₂ equivalents). In comparison, the top five countries on this measure each release less than 6 tons per capita. Luxembourg’s share of energy from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption has increased only marginally from 2.7 percent in 2007 to 4.5 percent (2014). Climate change may well be the most significant challenge ever faced by humanity and, as such, aggressive interventions must come from countries large and small. Wealthy Luxembourg can and should do its share and take more policy action to combat this global threat. In the context of intergenerational justice, another problematic aspect deserves attention: the share of children and youth threatened by poverty or social exclusion has measurably risen since 2007 (from 21.2% to 23%) and is also much higher than the respective rate among elderly persons (8.2%). In addition, Luxembourg has one of the lowest employment rates among older workers. In 2015, only 38.4 percent of this age group was in gainful employment (down from 42.5% in 2014). This highlights a growing generational divide; a trend seen in many of

124 Ibid.


125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.

EU countries. Related to this, the country experts note that “the poverty risk for single-parent families in Luxembourg has risen dramatically from 25.2% in 2003 to 46.1% in 2013.”¹²⁸

¹²⁸ Ibid.



Malta's overall performance on the SJI has remained stable and within the mid-range since the 2014 edition of the SJI. In the current index, it ranks 16th in the EU with a score of 5.57. Across the six dimensions of our index, the country ranks among the top ten in two dimensions (labor market access and health) and in the bottom five in two other dimensions (equitable education and intergenerational justice). With regard to our focus on children and youth, Malta's score of 5.27 on this subindex places 18th.

Malta ranks 9th in our labor market access dimension, with a score of 6.48. In 2015, 5.5 percent of working-age Maltese were unemployed, placing the country 4th (behind Germany, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom). The rate of long-term unemployment has fallen since peaking in 2010 (3.1%). In 2015, 2.4 percent of 15-to-64-year-olds had been unemployed for a year or more. As in many other countries, unemployment affects the population aged 15 to 24 years by far the most. At its peak in 2010, 13.2 percent of Maltese youth were unemployed. This rate stands at 11.8 percent (2015), placing the country 5th. Those with less than upper secondary education have fared relatively well in Malta: 7.3 percent are unemployed, the lowest rate in the EU.

With regard to the equitable distribution of employment opportunities, Malta shows strengths and weaknesses. In recent years, the employment of foreign-born workers has been relatively on par with that of native workers (in 2015, the ratio was 1.05). The employment opportunities of some other groups, however, have been far less equitable. In Malta, women face the most exclusionary labor market in the EU. The ratio of women to men active in the labor force was just

0.67 in 2015. This employment gap between men and women has much improved since 2008 (0.52), giving rise to cautious optimism. The SGI country experts report that “the 2015 budget introduced a pilot scheme to subsidize care workers for the elderly. This pilot may enable more women to enter the labor market, as women are disproportionately more likely to care for elderly relatives. Already, these initiatives have resulted in an increase of 1.6 percentage points in the female participation rate.”¹²⁹ They also note, however, that “while Malta possesses a consolidated support system for the unemployed in terms of social benefits and retraining opportunities, schemes to help low-skilled individuals find employment are only now being introduced.”¹³⁰ In addition, older workers, those 55 to 64, fare poorly. In 2015, just 40.3 percent of this age group were employed. Here again, though, we see a positive trend: the rate of older employment has steadily increased since our first SJI in 2008 (30.1%).

Malta also faces serious challenges within its education system, ranking last in the EU in this dimension. The system has the second-highest incidence of youth dropping out of education and training. While this rate has improved since 2008 (27.2%), 19.8 percent of 18-to-24-year-olds dropped out in 2015. Related to this, the working-age population is less educated than in other EU countries: only 43.5 percent has attained at least an upper secondary education, the lowest rate in our sample. Keeping young adults in education or training and improving targeted qualification measures as well as vocational training is thus of vital importance for the long-term viability of the Maltese labor market.


Elements of intergenerational justice related to environmental sustainability are also posing a challenge for the Maltese government. The country has the second-lowest rate of renewable energy use in our study, ahead of only Luxembourg. Only 4.7 percent of gross final energy consumption came from renewable sources in 2014 (the latest reported year). While this is an improvement over the 0.2 percent seen in 2009, it remains shamefully far below the 16 percent EU average. The SGI researchers awarded the government a score of just 4 out of 10 for its largely insufficient environmental policy. They note that though “Malta is bound to fulfill key climate targets within the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy,” most of its energy is derived from foreign oil.¹³¹ They also detail many new policies to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels, and protect biodiversity and the freshwater supply, but it will take some years before the results of these new efforts are realized.¹³²

129 Pirotta, Calleja, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.



The Netherlands is one of the most socially just countries in the EU. It ranks a laudable 5th, behind Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and the Czech Republic with an overall score of 6.8. The country's score, however, has been in constant decline since our first social justice assessment in 2008. Much of this can be attributed to negative developments in the Dutch labor market during the global financial crisis. The overall success, however, is broad-based, with the country ranking among the top three in three of the six dimensions. Most commendable, the Netherlands is number two within the EU in terms of social cohesion and nondiscrimination and number four within the EU in terms of poverty prevention and equitable access to health care. In terms of this edition's focus on children and youth, the Netherlands also excels with a score of 7.2, coming in second to Sweden.

The Netherlands is successful in fostering an inclusive society. The country achieves the second-highest score awarded – 7.72 – in the dimension of social cohesion and nondiscrimination. Most commendable, the Netherlands has the lowest NEET rate in the EU. In 2015, only 7.2 percent of 20-to-24-year-olds were neither in employment nor participating in education or training. While this rate is higher than in 2010 and 2008, it remains considerably below the 17.3 percent EU average. In addition, the country ranks among the top ten for both its low Gini coefficient and gender equality. The Dutch national parliament (Staten-Generaal) has the 6th-highest proportion of seats held by women in the EU (until better data is available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society).

The SGI country experts awarded the Netherlands scores of 7 and 8 (out of 10) respectively for its social inclusion and integration policies. Though the Dutch

government is doing much right, the experts identify several areas warranting further policy intervention. They note, for example, that “wealth inequality has plummeted since 2008, largely because of a decrease in the value of housing stock. Of the country’s 4.3 million home-owning households, 1.4 million had mortgage debts higher than the market value of their house.”¹³³ In addition, “levels of health inequality in the Netherlands are high; wealthier and comparatively highly educated people live longer (on average seven years compared to low-income and less-educated populations), with healthier lives.”¹³⁴ They also fault the country for its continued high gender pay gap (men earn 40% more than their female counterparts).¹³⁵ In addition, the experts gave the government’s nondiscrimination policy a score of 9 (the highest score awarded). They note that “the Dutch government does not pursue affirmative action to tackle inequality and facilitate non-discrimination. Generally, the government relies on ‘soft law’ measures as a preferred policy instrument.”¹³⁶

With regard to poverty prevention, the Netherlands has the second-lowest population share of at-risk-poverty or social exclusion, 16.8 percent (2015). However, the rate has increased recently by almost two percentage points (2012: 15%). As in many other countries, we see a growing gap between young and old in terms of poverty. The rate among Dutch under 18 years of age, though higher (17.2%), has likewise fluctuated little since 2007. Likewise, the percentage of at-risk-of poverty among seniors (65 and older) has shifted little in recent years (6.1%). The share of old-age poverty thus is the lowest within the EU. As in many other countries, this evinces a growing gap between young and old in terms of poverty. The rate of severe material deprivation, both for the total population and each of the aforementioned subgroups, shows a recent improvement. The share of the total population without the financial means to afford fundamental necessities of daily life (e.g., an appropriately heated apartment or a telephone) decreased from 3.2 percent in 2014 to 2.5 percent 2015. The rate among children and youth as well as seniors also decreased, to 2.6 percent and 0.5 percent respectively.


One policy area where the Netherlands continues to lag behind is in the fight against climate change. The country ranks 25th on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In 2013 (the most recent reported year), the Dutch emitted 12 tons per capita of climate-warming gases (in CO₂ equivalents). This is in large part a result of the country’s dismally low use of renewable energy. Whereas EU-wide 16 percent of gross final energy consumption comes from renewable sources, renewables made up only 5.5 percent in the Netherlands (2014). This ranks the country a reprehensible 26th, ahead of only Luxembourg and Malta. Vastly increasing the use of renewable energy would help the Netherlands significantly cut its GHG emissions and demonstrate far greater solidarity with the global community on climate change.

133 Hoppe, Woldendorp, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.



Poland's overall performance on the SJI has steadily improved since our first assessment in 2008. In the current edition, it ranks 14th in the EU with a score of 5.81. Across the six dimensions, the country ranks in the top ten on one dimension (equitable education) and among the bottom five in the health dimension. With regard to children and youth, Poland's score on this subindex of 5.90 places it 11th.

Social justice requires that all students be provided with high-quality, equitably distributed education. Only then do all young people have an equal opportunity to achieve their potential. Poland has had some commendable policy successes at attaining this goal. The country's score of 7.21 in the dimension of equitable education (rank 6) reflects the education system's comparative progress. The system has consistently featured a low dropout rate. In 2015, 5.3 percent of 18-to-24-year-olds had dropped out of education or training, placing the country 3rd (behind Croatia and Slovenia). According to the OECD's standardized student assessment, the Polish education system ranks 3rd in the EU (behind Finland and Estonia). The most recent PISA study in 2012 showed that the average Polish student scores nearly 30 points higher than the EU average (492 points). Socioeconomic background does have an impact on PISA scores, but to a lesser extent than it does in 16 other EU countries. In addition, the working-age population is highly educated: nearly 91 percent have attained at least an upper secondary education (rank 5). The SGI country experts awarded the Polish administration a score of 7 out of 10 for its education policy. They report that education reforms implemented by the first Tusk government "have gradually become effective and have

significantly increased the quality of education in the country.”¹³⁷ The main focus of these reforms was to better align the skills of graduates with the needs of the labor market.¹³⁸ These “reforms have led to a greater emphasis in the curriculum on mathematics, science and technology; a strengthening of vocational education; attempts to attract more students to economically relevant areas; measures to improve the quality of research and teaching at universities; and the adoption of a national strategy for lifelong learning.”¹³⁹

While Poland ranks above average on two of the four measures used for our special subindex on children and youth, it ranks below average on the other two indicators. In 2015, 26.6 percent of children and youth (under 18) were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. While high, this rate is a substantial improvement over the share who were at risk in 2007 (37.1%). Also, Poland’s NEET rate ranks 18th. Though on the decline since peaking in 2013 (19.4%), the number of youth neither in employment nor participating in education or training – 17.6 percent – remains high. While Polish children and youth are surely in a better situation than some of their European counterparts, more can be done to ensure that all of them have the resources and support to achieve their potential.

The greatest policy challenge affecting the general population is broad access to high-quality health care. Poland ranks 25th in our health dimension, with a score of 4.39. In 2014, 7.8 percent of Poles surveyed reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists (rank 24). In comparison, in the top five countries this percentage is less than one. In addition, according to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI) the Polish health care system is one of the worst. The range and reach of health services is low and wait times are long, placing the country last in the EU. Also, the EHCI ranks Poland 21st on health outcomes. The SGI researchers gave the government’s health policy a score of 5 out of 10. In their assessment, they note that while “public health insurance covers some 98% of Poland’s citizens and legal residents,” access is highly uneven and out-of-pocket costs are high.¹⁴⁰ “Two reform packages adopted in 2014, the ‘waiting lists’ and ‘oncology’ packages,” have been implemented, but “the Kopacz government failed to pass more comprehensive reforms.”¹⁴¹


137 Matthes, Markowski, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.



Portugal's SJI score of 4.97 places it 22nd among the 28 EU member countries – a minor improvement compared to 2015. The country remains far from realizing a socially just society. In all but two of the six dimensions in our study (social cohesion and nondiscrimination and poverty prevention), it ranks among the bottom third. Moreover, in our equitable education dimension, it ranks among the bottom three. Portugal's performance in terms of children and youth is similarly mixed, though it remains clearly below average (placing 21st with a score of 5.15).

Portugal is among the better-performing countries on several social justice measures. One policy issue worth noting relates to addressing climate change. The country ranks a respectable 5th in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 7th in renewable energy use. In 2013 (the most recent reported year), the average Portuguese emitted 5.3 tons of climate warming gases (in CO₂ equivalents), almost 3 tons less than the per capita average across the EU (8.2 tons). In addition, the share of energy coming from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption has gradually increased from 21.9 percent in 2007 to 27 percent in 2014.

Portugal confronts a number of major policy challenges to achieving broad-based social justice. Unemployment rates and long-term unemployment rates have declined since peaking in 2013, but remain very high. The high unemployment among youth (32%) is most troublesome. Some of the gains have come from increased emigration. Related to this, poverty remains high. The share of the total population at risk of poverty or social exclusion has risen from 25 percent in 2007 to 26.6 percent (2015), the respective rate for children has increased to 29.6 percent (2007: 26.9%). As is the case in other EU countries, the gap in poverty levels

between the generations has been growing. Indeed, whereas child poverty has increased, senior citizen poverty has decreased: in 2007, 27.7 percent of those 65 and older were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, whereas only 21.7 percent of this group were at risk in 2015. Moreover, in-work poverty has also grown considerably in recent years from 7.7 percent (2007) to 9.6 percent (2015).

Ensuring that educational opportunities reach all segments of society and are equitably distributed is another major challenge. The country's score of 4.50 in our equitable education dimension places Portugal second to last in our ranking, with only Malta performing worse. The working-age population is less educated than in other EU countries: only 45.1 percent have attained at least an upper secondary education, the second lowest rate in our sample. Although Portugal's dropout rate has more than halved since 2008 – from a staggering 34.9 percent to 13.7 percent in 2015 – it remains one of the highest in the EU (rank 24). In order to promote both social cohesion and long-term labor market success, more of these 18-to-24-year-olds must remain in education or training. The SGI country experts give the government's education policy a score of 4 out of 10. These researchers point to a number of worrying trends. The Coelho government's reform efforts have focused on strengthening technical and professional education, "expanding vocational courses across the educational sector," as well as increasing student testing.¹⁴² "However, there is little evidence that these measures have generated gains in terms of quality, access or efficiency."¹⁴³ In addition, spending cuts associated with the austerity measures "have had an adverse impact on the already poor overall quality of education in Portugal. ... Schools have lost teachers, with those leaving being selected not on the basis of merit, but rather on the basis of their contract terms. Universities have also seen a brain drain, with many professors going abroad, as a result of lower budgets and reductions in wages. ... In the 2015 budget, the Ministry of Education suffered the largest budget cuts of any ministry, with a spending decrease of 11% as compared to 2014 imposed on primary and secondary education."¹⁴⁴


Likewise, ensuring that the policy decisions taken today do not risk the well-being of future generations is another significant challenge facing Portugal. With a score of 4.80, the country ranks 21st in terms of intergenerational justice. Public debt has increased by 80 percent since 2008 – to 128.8 percent of GDP in 2015. Portuguese gross government debt thus ranks among the highest in the EU. Add to this heavy burden a high old-age dependency ratio (31.1%), and a wholly unsustainable picture emerges. The birth rate has stabilized after a declining significantly between 2011 and 2013, but "the country still showed the EU's lowest birth rate in 2014, at 7.9 births per 1,000 persons."¹⁴⁵

142 Bruneau, Jalali, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.



Romania's overall performance on the SJI places it among the EU countries most urgently in need of policy reforms. With a score of 3.91, it ranks 27th. The country ranks among the bottom five performers in four of the six dimensions in our study. Most worrying, it ranks second to last in the areas of poverty prevention and health. With regard to our focus on children and youth, Romania's score on this subindex of 2.77 places it last in the EU.

One major policy challenge confronting the Romanian government is poverty prevention. In 2015, an alarming 37.3 percent of Romanians were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the second-highest rate in the 28-member EU. While this rate has improved since 2007 (47%), it remains 13 percentage points higher than the EU average. In addition, 22.7 percent (2015) of the total population suffered from severe material deprivation (the second-highest rate in our sample) and 25.4 percent (2015) were income-poor (i.e., they receive 60% or less of the median income, after social transfers). Among those at risk, children fare the worst, with 46.8 percent of all children and youth under 18 at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the highest rate in the EU. Seniors (65 and over) find themselves similarly worse off than most of their EU counterparts: 33.3 percent are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. While the government has made significant strides at reducing severe material deprivation among seniors – from 39 percent in 2008 to 21.5 percent – it remains the second-highest rate (ahead of only Bulgaria). Clearly, across the spectrum of society, far more must be done in order to reduce the incidence of poverty.

Because illness undermines an individual's capacity to fully achieve her or his potential, access to quality health services is considered a precondition for social inclusion. Romania, however, is failing to adequately provide this precondition. With a score of 3.76 in our health dimension, the country places second to last in the EU. According to Eurostat, in 2014, 9.3 percent of Romanians reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance, or long waiting lists (rank 25). Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI) data shows that Romania's health system is insufficient to meet the needs of its population (rank 23), with long waiting times for treatment as well as a low range and reach of health services. Most critical, the EHCI ranks the system last in the EU on health outcomes. Given these metrics, it should come as no surprise that the SGI country experts flagged Romanian health policy as inadequate, scoring it 4 out of 10. They credit inadequate funding with undermining the country's health system, which receives "the lowest health-budget allocation of any EU member state. Moreover, after a gradual increase from 3.5% of GDP in 2002 to 4.8% in 2010, health-care spending declined again to 4.2% in 2014 and 4% in (the) 2015 budget despite rising health-care demand. ... the de facto availability of many medical services is severely limited, thereby leading to widespread bribe-giving by patients even for basic services as well as to significant inequities in medical-care access."¹⁴⁶ They note that a major reform undertaken in mid-2015 introduced mandatory health insurance cards – a measure that "seeks to modernize the health-care system by synchronizing medical information among health-care providers. ... However, the distribution of the new cards suffered from problems, with thousands of Romanians queuing up ... to request cards they were supposed to have received by mail."¹⁴⁷

Another major challenge is the condition of the minority groups. According to the SGI researchers, the government has been ineffective in combating discrimination against the LGBT community, the disabled, HIV positive people and the large Roma community.¹⁴⁸ "Stark vulnerabilities remain a reality for the country's Roma minority, whose members experience poor access to education and economic mobility, accentuated by discrimination."¹⁴⁹ "The civil code still prohibits same-sex partnership and marriage, and fails to recognize any such marriages registered abroad. ... In September 2015, officials from the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance recommended that Romanian authorities enforce legislation to penalize discrimination, initiate a public awareness campaign, and provide training to societal actors such as teachers, police officers, and judges."¹⁵⁰


¹⁴⁶ Wagner, Stan, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.



Slovakia's current SJI score of 5.55 ranks the country 17th in the EU, somewhat worse than in our inaugural assessment in 2008. Its performance across the six dimensions varies greatly, placing among the top ten in one dimension (poverty prevention) and in the bottom third in three dimensions (equitable education, labor market access, social cohesion, and nondiscrimination and health). With regard to children and youth, Slovakia's score of 5.09 on this subindex places it 22nd. Most worrying, Slovakia ranks at the very bottom in terms of the extent to which socioeconomic factors influence student performance.

Poverty prevention features as the first dimension in our index because it is such an essential factor in achieving broad-based social justice. Slovakia, in 7th place in this dimension, ranks relatively well mainly because of the country's comparatively uniform income distribution patterns. In 2015, 18.4 percent of the population were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. By comparison, the EU average was almost 6 percentage points higher. Particularly noteworthy, poverty has been noticeably reduced among seniors. Indeed, the share of seniors (65 and older) at risk of poverty or social exclusion has fallen from 21.9 percent in 2007 to 12.8 percent in 2015. By contrast, the respective rate among children and youth is much higher at 24.9 percent. In terms of severe material deprivation, Slovakia's performance is mediocre. In 2015, some 9.0 percent of the total population did not have the financial means to afford fundamental necessities of daily life (e.g., an appropriately heated apartment or a telephone).

The Slovak government possibly faces its most serious challenges within its education system. Though 91.4 percent of the working-age population has attained at

least an upper secondary education (rank 3), a closer examination reveals the poor quality of education. According to the OECD's standardized student assessment, the Slovak education system ranks 24th in the EU. The most recent PISA study in 2012 showed that the average Slovak student scores 20 points below the EU average (492 points) and more than 40 points below the average student in the top five countries (Finland, Estonia, Poland, the Netherlands, and Italy). The OECD data also shows that the education system unfairly favors particular socioeconomic groups more so than in any other EU country. As such, educational opportunities in the country are miserably far from being socially just. In assessing the administration's education policy, the SGI country experts awarded a score of 4 out of 10. They determine that "the quality of education and training in Slovakia has suffered both from low levels of spending and a lack of structural reforms," with spending levels on education, which "have fallen as a percentage of GDP since 2009," ranking among the lowest in the EU.¹⁵¹ "Because vocational education is underdeveloped and universities focus on non-technical education, Slovakia faces a shortage of skilled workers needed for its industry-oriented economy. A new act addressing vocational education and training went into effect in 2015 which is to foster the transition from a school-based supply-driven system of vocational education to a demand-driven system based on work-based learning, inter alia by introducing tax incentives for enterprises providing practical training in certified training facilities."¹⁵²


A second major challenge relates to labor market access. Overall, the Slovak labor market is in a particularly precarious and unsustainable state. The country receives a score of just 4.75 in terms of labor market access, which places it 25th. In 2015, only 62.7 percent of the working-age population was employed (a moderate improvement over the 58.8% seen in 2010). Low levels of employment have hit one group the hardest: women. With regard to the ratio of women to men active in the labor force, Slovakia ranks 23rd. In this context, the country experts note that "mothers of children under two years of age rarely work" and "the employment rate for women (25–49) with children below six years of age reaches a mere 40%. ... Working women face an enormous double burden of both professional and domestic responsibilities."¹⁵³ The country also has one of the highest incidences of involuntary temporary employment. Since 2008, the share of working-age Slovaks in temporary employment because they could not find a permanent position has increased by more than 10 percentage points to the current 86.5 percent. In comparison, the rate in Austria, which ranks first place on this measure, is 9.5 percent and across the EU averages 62.3 percent. The overall unemployment rate, 11.5 percent, though lower than at its peak in 2010 (14.4%), remains significantly worse than the 9.5 percent seen in 2008. Those with less than upper secondary education suffer a much higher unemployment rate of 34.4 percent, the highest rate in our study. In addition, "the Roma minority remains largely excluded from the labor market."¹⁵⁴

151 Kneuer, Malová, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.



Slovenia's SJI score of 6.51 places it 9th among the countries of the EU. In four of the six dimensions in our study, Slovenia ranks among the top ten and, notably, on no dimension among the bottom half. It ranks 6th in intergenerational justice, 7th in social cohesion and nondiscrimination, and 8th in equitable education. In terms of our special focus on children and youth, Slovenia ranks a commendable 5th with a score of 6.97 on this subindex.

The Slovenian government, scoring 6.24 in terms of intergenerational justice (rank 6), has proven more successful than 22 of its EU counterparts at ensuring that the policy decisions it takes today do not inequitably burden future generations. One example of this is the growth in renewable energy use. In 2014 (the latest reported year), 21.9 percent of gross final energy consumption came from renewable sources, placing the country at rank 11. The SGI country experts scored the government's environmental policy 8 out of 10 points. They commend Slovenia's "tradition of close-to-natural forest management and ... low-intensity farming" noting that "forests occupy approximately 62% of the total land area, about twice the OECD average."¹⁵⁵ They also praise the active role of environmental NGOs in environmental policymaking and management, pointing as well to their important watchdog role.¹⁵⁶ This sound investment in the future has been accompanied by another, research and development spending. Intramural research and development expenditure totaled 2.4 percent of GDP in 2014, the 7th-highest in the EU. Impressively, the government actually increased spending

¹⁵⁵ Haček, Pickel, and Bönker (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.


on research and development in the years following the global financial crisis (the share was 1.4% of GDP in 2007 and peaked at 2.6% in 2013). Also, the SGI experts scored the administration's family policy 8 out of 10 points, noting that "at 75.5%, the employment rate among mothers with children under six years of age was the highest in the European Union in 2012. Reconciling parenting and employment is facilitated by a provision of child-care facilities that exceeds the EU average."¹⁵⁷

Slovenia is performing comparatively well on policies affecting children and youth. In three of the four measures comprising our special subindex, it places in the top ten. Though it remains higher than in 2007, the percentage of children and youth at risk of poverty or social exclusion (16.6% in 2015) is actually lower than in the general population (19.2%). This bucks a trend seen in most EU countries, where the under-18 population is typically at greater risk. Also, the Slovenian education system can be commended for having the second-lowest dropout rate in our study (only Croatia performs better). In 2015, just 5 percent of 18-to-24-year-olds dropped out of education and training, whereas the EU average (11.0%) is more than double. Along with this, Slovenia continues to rank among the top ten for its comparatively low NEET rate. In 2015, 14 percent of 20-to-24-year-olds were neither in education nor training. This rate, however, has climbed steadily since 2008 (8.7%); additional policy interventions appear necessary to keep more young adults activated. In addition, the country's performance is only middling when it comes to the influence socioeconomic background has on educational attainment (as measured by PISA).

Some shortcomings persist in the area of labor market access (rank 12). The employment rate among elderly workers (55–64) is the second-lowest in the EU (36.6% in 2015). In addition, while the incidence of unemployment (9.1%) has improved slightly since 2013, it remains double the rate seen in 2008. Also, the share of workers unemployed for a year or more, 4.8 percent, remains higher than before the global financial crisis, but has moderately improved since 2014. The SGI researchers note: "While Slovenia has a tradition of labor-market policy that dates back to Yugoslav times and participates in a number of EU-funded programs (i.e., EURES), existing programs have suffered from budget cuts and have not proven too effective."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.



Spain's overall performance on the SJI has worsened since our first edition in 2008; it remains among the most poorly functioning countries when it comes to social justice. With a score of 4.76 it ranks 25th in the EU. Indeed, Spain places among the bottom third in four of the six dimensions used in our index, and among the bottom five in terms of equitable education and labor market access. With regard to our 2016 subindex on children and youth, Spain's score of 4.28 yields it a 26th-place ranking. On three of the four measures in this special sub-index, it ranks among the bottom third.

Spain faces a number of major policy challenges to achieving broad-based social justice. Despite signs of recovery from the brutal recession, the greatest of these continues to be ensuring equitable access to the labor market. Beginning in 2014, unemployment began to fall when the Spanish economy entered recovery. The overall unemployment rate increased from 11.3 percent in 2008 to 26.2 percent in 2013 before sinking in 2015 (22.2%). However, despite this positive trend, the country's labor market remains far from inclusive. "Especially among youth and those who have now been out of the labor market for several years, the government has to find job-creation policies more substantial than simple wage cuts."¹⁵⁹ Since the crisis began, the long-term unemployed have seen their numbers increase from 2 percent in 2008 to an alarming 11.5 percent. Those with less than upper secondary education are unemployed at a much higher rate: 28.9 percent, the second-highest rate in our study. Among youth, the unemployment rate has nearly doubled since 2008. With 48.3 percent of 15-to-24-year-olds unemployed

159 Molina, Homs, and Colino (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

(the second-highest rate in the EU), the Spanish government faces a truly urgent policy challenge.


Looking at the Spanish labor market from the perspective of the employed, the magnitude of the challenge becomes even clearer. Only 57.8 percent of the working-age population is employed – one of the lowest employment rates in the EU. In addition, the incidence of involuntary temporary employment, 90.6 percent, is the second-highest. In comparison, the rate in Austria, which ranks first place on this indicator, is 9.5 percent. “The Spanish labor market continues to languish under problems that public policies have been unable to solve. Perhaps the three most significant ones include: 1) a lack of flexibility in the labor force (insufficient mobility, few part-time contracts); 2) a high share of undeclared work (which also means the actual unemployment rate is not as extreme as official figures indicate); and above all, 3) the ... dual labor market, which is a serious source of inequality.”¹⁶⁰

Children and youth fare comparatively poorly in Spain. The fact that the risk of poverty among children and youth has steadily increased since our first edition in 2008 is very troubling. In 2015, some 34.4 percent of children and youth were at risk of poverty and social exclusion. As in other countries in our study, this rate is far higher than the rate among the overall population (28.6%), though it too has progressively worsened (23.3% in 2007). Moreover, while child poverty has increased over the last years due to falling income levels, the poverty rate among senior citizens has declined. Spain has a comparatively low number of persons over 65 at risk of poverty or social exclusion (13.7% in 2015 compared to 26.2% in 2007). This underlines the dramatic challenge of a growing gap between the generations in Spain.

The Spanish education system faces several equity challenges. Despite significant improvements since the 1980s and broad awareness of the need for additional reforms, the SGI experts note that “budgetary austerity has meant that only a few relatively inexpensive regulatory measures targeting quality and efficiency in resources allocation have been implemented; moreover, these have come at the expense of fairness in access.”¹⁶¹ The education system continues to face the highest dropout rate in the EU. In 2015, a distressing one out of five Spanish 18-to-24-year-olds still dropped out of education and training. While this rate may be significantly lower than the 31.7 percent seen in 2008, it remains double the EU average (11.0%). Along with this, Spain ranks 22nd for its high NEET rate. In 2015, 22.2 percent of 20-to-24-year-olds were neither in employment nor participating in education or training. Additional policy interventions are necessary to keep more young adults activated and prevent them from being permanently shut out of the labor market because of a lack of education or training.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.



Sweden is the most socially just country in the EU, ranking first on the 2016 SJI with an overall score of 7.51. While its performance has fluctuated somewhat since our first assessment in 2008, Sweden has consistently maintained its position as the best-performing country, although there remain problems in the areas of labor market access and integration. Overall, the success is broad-based, with the country ranking in the top five across all six dimensions, three of these being in first place (social cohesion and nondiscrimination, health, and intergenerational justice). With regard to our focus on children and youth, Sweden is likewise the best performer, with a score of 7.56 on this subindex. Notably, it ranks among the top 10 on each of the four measures used in this subindex.

Sweden has had the most success at ensuring its policies are equitable both for the current and coming generations. Sweden is the top-ranked country in terms of intergenerational justice. The country's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have steadily declined since 2005. It now reports the lowest GHG emissions in the EU with 1.5 tons per capita (2013, in CO₂ equivalents). The use of renewable energy has likewise progressively improved. In 2014 (the latest reported year), an admirable 52.6 percent of gross final energy consumption came from renewable sources, the highest share in our sample. In comparison, the EU-wide average was 16.0 percent. Sweden's forward-looking policies also include strong investments in research and development. In 2014, the public and private sector invested a total of 3.2 percent of GDP in research and development. Such expenditures are sound investments in the future, helping to ensure that the Swedish economy will remain globally competitive in the years and decades to come. At the same time, investments made today must not unduly burden future taxpayers with debt. While

the government's gross debt remains higher than in 2008, at 44.1 percent of GDP (2015), it is relatively on the low end (rank 8).

In addition, the SGI country experts awarded the Swedish government's family policy a top score of 10. They conclude that the "major features of Sweden's policy have been the separation of spouses' income and individual taxation, the expansion of public and private day care centers and a very generous parental leave program provided to both women and men, which has created much better possibilities to combine a professional career with parenthood."¹⁶²

Sweden, however, faces an escalating policy challenge because of its aging population. The country's old-age dependency ratio (31.1%) ranks as one of the more burdensome in the EU (rank 24). In this context, our experts are optimistic that recent major pension reforms, which strengthen capital-funded occupational and private pension schemes, have improved the system's stability and sustainability.¹⁶³ They warn, however, that a high and persistent youth unemployment rate threatens equity in the long term.¹⁶⁴

The Swedish administration can also be praised for effectively promoting social inclusion and combating discrimination. With a score of 7.88 in this dimension, the country ranks 1st. The Riksdag enjoys the highest gender equity of any national parliament in the EU, with 43.6 percent of seats being held by women (until better data is available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society). Furthermore, Sweden's NEET rate has steadily declined since our first assessment in 2008. A comparatively low 9.3 percent of 20-to-24-year-olds are in neither employment nor education or training (rank 3). Also, the country's Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality) ranks 4th in our study, though income inequality has grown significantly in Sweden since the mid-1980s. The SGI experts awarded the government a score of 9 (out of 10) for its nondiscrimination policies and 8 for its social inclusion. They conclude that while discrimination of any kind is not officially tolerated, "it is clear that there are still differences between salaries for men and women performing the same work as well as between immigrants and Swedes in the labor market."¹⁶⁵ In addition, "ethnic segmentation in several suburbs of metropolitan areas in Sweden has increased."¹⁶⁶ In terms of social cohesion, these experts warn that "data and recent developments suggest that Sweden is gradually losing its leading role ... and is increasingly at par with other European countries in terms of its poverty levels and income distribution. If Sweden could previously boast an egalitarian and inclusive society, there is less reason to do so today."¹⁶⁷

Although Sweden is still in a comfortable position, there are several problems and challenges with regard to the labor market. According to the SGI researchers, "current labor market statistics indicate that Sweden today does not differ in any significant way from comparable capitalist economies."¹⁶⁸ The country ranks a

¹⁶² Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.


¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

dismal second to last in the EU for the highly unequal employment outcomes achieved by foreign-born workers. Here the country experts highlight the fact that “immigrants to Sweden have for a long time experienced severe problems in entering the labor market. Sweden shares this problem with a large number of countries but it has proven to be inept at addressing this aspect of integration. The large number of unemployed immigrants erodes integration policies to a great extent and this will be a major challenge for policymakers in the future.”¹⁶⁹


¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

United Kingdom

EU Social Justice Index 2016



Source: Own calculations.



| BertelsmannStiftung

The United Kingdom's performance on the SJI has remained stable and within the midrange since our first edition in 2008. In the current index, it places 12th in the EU with a score of 6.16. Across the six dimensions that comprise the index, the UK performs best in labor market access (rank 4) and social cohesion and nondiscrimination (rank 10). With regard to this edition's focus on children and youth, its score of 5.38 on this subindex ranks just above the EU average at 17th place.

The UK offers a relatively well-functioning labor market. With a score of 7.21, it ranks 4th in this dimension. The overall employment rate, 72.7 percent (2015), has remained relatively stable since 2008 and places 5th. Employment among older workers has slightly increased since 2013: 62.2 percent of this demographic are employed (rank 5). Also workers with less than upper secondary education have fared relatively well: 7.3 percent are unemployed, the lowest rate in the EU (together with Malta). These high rates of employment are conversely reflected in the country's unemployment figures. At 5.4 percent, the UK has one of the lowest incidences of unemployment in the EU. Also, the share of workers unemployed for a year or more, 1.7 percent, remains only moderately higher than before the global financial crisis. Youth unemployment peaked in 2013 (20.7%), but has since decreased to 14.6 percent. According to the SGI country report, "recent labor market performance has been so robust that the new government has declared full employment an official government objective. ... However, the increase in employ-

ment has come at the cost of weakness in real wages. Furthermore, wages have only recently returned to their pre-crisis levels, partly because of a moderating effect of immigration.”¹⁷⁰

The UK’s health sector performs above average, but has growing challenges. The country ranks 13th in this dimension, with a score of 6.98. The average British citizen can expect 63.8 healthy life years (rank 10). Though this is one-and-a-half years less than in 2007, it still exceeds the EU average (61.6 years) by more than two years. In addition, in 2014 (the latest reported year), 2.1 percent reported that the UK’s National Health Service had failed to meet all of their medical needs. This comparatively low percentage, however, has been on the rise since 2009. The country’s performance is also mixed in the assessments of the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI). According to the EHCI measures used in our study, wait times as well as the range and reach of health services are middling (rank 15). Health system outcomes, however, are assessed by the EHCI as above average (rank 12). The SGI experts note that “input and outcome indicators of health care, such as how quickly cancer patients are seen by specialists or the incidence of ‘bed-blocking’ (i.e., where complementary social care is difficult to arrange and so patients are kept in hospital), vary considerably across localities.”¹⁷¹ In addition, “the financial position of many hospital trusts is rather precarious.”¹⁷²

The UK faces major challenges with regard to the opportunities offered children and young people. The share of this demographic threatened by poverty or social exclusion (2015, 30.3%) remains too high. It is also measurably higher than the rate for the overall population (2015, 23.5%). The country report notes that “the high incidence of NEETs ... , particularly in less affluent cities, and (that) the average income of young people has started to lag behind the average income of other working-age population groups.”¹⁷³ In addition, while the rate of 18-to-24-year-olds who dropped out of education or training (10.8%) has been falling since 2010, it remains higher than in two thirds of EU countries. More must be done to keep these youth in education. The SGI experts report that “the socioeconomic composition of many of the UK’s schools still poses a significant challenge for students from disadvantaged and immigrant backgrounds. A Children’s Commission on Poverty inquiry indicated that inter-school competition has increased financial costs for pupils and their families, as many schools try to stand out by introducing fancier uniforms, new textbooks or extravagant field trips.”¹⁷⁴

170 Busch, Begg, and Bandelow (2016), available at www.sgi-network.org.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 Ibid.

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Appendix

TABLE 1A Overview of results

RANK	COUNTRY	WEIGHTED INDEX					UNWEIGHTED INDEX				
		2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2008	2011	2014	2015	2016
6	Austria	6.88	6.57	6.67	6.64	6.67	6.89	6.57	6.68	6.67	6.64
11	Belgium	6.19	6.24	6.16	6.21	6.18	6.33	6.35	6.27	6.29	6.25
26	Bulgaria			3.83	3.85	4.03			4.29	4.27	4.44
19	Croatia			4.69	4.95	5.07			4.88	5.05	5.12
20	Cyprus			5.10	5.03	5.04			5.12	5.08	5.12
4	Czech Republic	6.74	6.75	6.66	6.74	6.85	6.59	6.56	6.52	6.58	6.66
3	Denmark	7.35	7.07	7.17	7.13	7.16	7.43	7.15	7.26	7.24	7.22
13	Estonia			6.24	6.29	6.15			6.24	6.30	6.13
2	Finland	7.22	7.11	7.08	7.29	7.17	7.32	7.17	7.12	7.30	7.20
10	France	6.27	6.18	6.16	6.22	6.27	6.28	6.15	6.16	6.17	6.21
7	Germany	6.23	6.39	6.67	6.57	6.66	6.25	6.40	6.71	6.60	6.66
28	Greece	4.44	4.44	3.58	3.64	3.66	4.44	4.47	3.74	3.84	3.85
23	Hungary	5.08	4.83	4.54	4.47	4.96	5.20	4.99	4.72	4.71	4.96
18	Ireland	5.91	5.52	5.09	5.16	5.40	5.98	5.72	5.38	5.38	5.57
24	Italy	5.10	5.11	4.56	4.63	4.78	5.11	5.09	4.68	4.68	4.87
21	Latvia			4.64	4.70	5.04			4.88	4.91	5.11
15	Lithuania			5.43	5.46	5.69			5.79	5.68	5.88
8	Luxembourg	6.41	6.58	6.60	6.50	6.57	6.46	6.71	6.69	6.59	6.67
16	Malta			5.40	5.36	5.57			5.42	5.41	5.59
5	Netherlands	7.17	7.09	7.00	6.91	6.80	7.21	7.05	7.00	6.92	6.81
14	Poland	4.56	5.12	5.38	5.54	5.81	4.77	5.17	5.40	5.51	5.72
22	Portugal	4.97	5.03	4.95	4.81	4.97	4.99	5.11	5.09	5.02	5.13
27	Romania			3.72	3.54	3.91			4.09	3.92	4.17
17	Slovakia	5.66	5.54	5.30	5.38	5.55	5.62	5.32	5.21	5.28	5.37
9	Slovenia			6.39	6.35	6.51			6.38	6.39	6.53
25	Spain	5.45	5.04	4.78	4.75	4.76	5.60	5.24	5.03	5.00	5.09
1	Sweden	7.58	7.39	7.48	7.40	7.51	7.67	7.61	7.60	7.50	7.64
12	United Kingdom	6.02	6.01	6.00	6.01	6.16	6.08	6.09	6.14	6.16	6.26

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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TABLE 1B Overview of results

RANK	COUNTRY	POVERTY PREVENTION					EQUITABLE EDUCATION				
		2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2008	2011	2014	2015	2016
6	Austria	7.00	6.44	6.58	6.51	6.62	6.15	6.18	6.26	6.16	6.36
11	Belgium	5.84	6.17	5.84	6.03	5.96	6.04	6.00	6.31	6.27	6.32
26	Bulgaria			1.00	1.00	1.18			5.58	5.56	5.86
19	Croatia			3.24	3.88	4.07			7.05	7.20	7.21
20	Cyprus			4.54	4.37	4.11			6.59	6.65	6.77
4	Czech Republic	7.22	7.64	7.31	7.50	7.64	6.84	6.98	6.93	6.73	6.74
3	Denmark	6.98	6.79	6.81	6.62	6.77	6.97	6.93	7.18	7.23	7.25
13	Estonia			5.42	5.39	5.23			7.47	7.38	7.25
2	Finland	6.84	6.96	6.89	7.17	6.98	7.16	7.21	7.21	7.86	7.76
10	France	6.46	6.58	6.44	6.67	6.77	5.51	5.44	5.67	5.83	5.86
7	Germany	6.08	6.22	6.32	6.15	6.22	6.10	6.15	6.47	6.43	6.76
28	Greece	4.26	4.42	2.76	2.50	2.50	4.16	4.21	4.76	5.06	5.18
23	Hungary	4.00	3.95	3.02	2.72	4.28	6.31	5.88	6.04	5.39	5.55
18	Ireland	5.49	4.87	3.85	3.97	4.42	5.26	5.36	5.47	5.64	5.68
24	Italy	4.80	5.06	3.88	4.21	4.16	5.08	5.01	5.01	5.18	5.49
21	Latvia			2.39	2.65	3.64			6.87	6.57	6.50
15	Lithuania			3.26	3.66	4.02			7.58	7.46	7.49
8	Luxembourg	7.19	6.74	6.60	6.46	6.58	4.63	5.51	6.43	6.30	6.14
16	Malta			5.49	5.27	5.65			4.15	4.31	4.34
5	Netherlands	7.24	7.38	7.41	7.19	6.98	6.18	6.30	6.14	6.18	6.24
14	Poland	2.81	4.37	4.64	4.85	5.42	6.31	6.38	6.89	7.15	7.21
22	Portugal	5.04	5.06	4.97	4.45	4.66	3.54	3.67	4.17	4.23	4.50
27	Romania			1.00	1.04	2.12			5.42	4.65	4.67
17	Slovakia	5.89	6.32	6.10	6.27	6.60	6.09	6.40	5.48	5.21	5.38
9	Slovenia			6.32	6.13	6.41			7.15	7.17	7.03
25	Spain	5.44	5.11	4.52	4.49	4.19	4.42	4.60	5.02	4.85	4.98
1	Sweden	7.67	7.19	7.26	7.07	7.17	6.96	6.89	7.49	7.72	7.72
12	United Kingdom	5.61	5.75	5.25	5.09	5.39	5.43	5.38	6.01	6.02	6.09

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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TABLE 1C Overview of results

RANK	COUNTRY	LABOR MARKET ACCESS					SOCIAL COHESION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION				
		2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2008	2011	2014	2015	2016
6	Austria	7.27	7.27	7.27	7.19	7.23	6.84	6.27	6.44	6.76	6.53
11	Belgium	6.14	5.97	5.97	6.01	6.02	7.16	7.06	6.60	6.72	6.51
26	Bulgaria			5.01	5.31	5.45			4.45	4.11	4.07
19	Croatia			4.14	4.28	4.61			4.20	4.25	4.09
20	Cyprus			4.62	4.42	4.75			4.91	5.03	5.10
4	Czech Republic	6.61	5.90	5.96	6.21	6.46	6.15	6.07	5.82	5.92	5.79
3	Denmark	7.98	7.27	7.30	7.36	7.50	7.68	7.49	7.54	7.53	7.24
13	Estonia			6.69	6.95	7.00			5.83	5.96	5.85
2	Finland	7.41	6.94	7.10	6.94	6.76	7.88	7.56	7.65	7.61	7.38
10	France	6.63	6.29	6.09	6.04	6.00	5.93	5.48	5.97	5.95	5.93
7	Germany	6.53	6.87	7.36	7.37	7.40	6.60	6.71	7.33	7.25	7.07
28	Greece	5.13	4.53	3.10	3.30	3.32	4.57	4.64	3.75	4.20	4.44
23	Hungary	5.35	4.64	5.03	5.62	5.75	5.21	5.08	4.64	4.61	4.40
18	Ireland	6.97	5.71	5.44	5.72	6.06	6.09	6.06	6.07	5.95	5.97
24	Italy	5.64	5.38	4.75	4.64	4.82	5.14	4.80	4.81	4.78	5.16
21	Latvia			5.47	5.72	5.96			5.13	5.04	5.10
15	Lithuania			5.42	5.68	6.04			5.88	5.84	5.69
8	Luxembourg	6.25	6.55	6.23	6.19	6.41	7.12	7.38	7.37	7.27	7.43
16	Malta			6.31	6.33	6.48			5.22	5.15	5.12
5	Netherlands	7.80	7.57	7.10	7.05	6.97	8.04	7.98	7.96	7.94	7.72
14	Poland	5.02	5.08	5.22	5.48	5.72	4.89	5.16	5.87	5.92	6.07
22	Portugal	6.14	5.78	4.88	4.86	5.16	6.12	5.72	5.77	5.60	5.95
27	Romania			5.29	5.17	5.09			4.40	4.37	4.18
17	Slovakia	5.03	4.40	4.10	4.37	4.75	5.73	4.68	5.15	5.29	5.12
9	Slovenia			5.80	5.72	6.08			6.43	6.49	6.84
25	Spain	5.56	4.16	3.60	3.65	3.75	6.31	5.81	5.42	5.46	5.73
1	Sweden	7.52	6.98	7.14	7.16	7.20	7.98	8.02	8.06	7.91	7.88
12	United Kingdom	7.03	6.70	6.66	6.98	7.21	6.29	6.27	6.19	6.33	6.48

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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TABLE 1D Overview of results

RANK	COUNTRY	HEALTH					INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE				
		2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2008	2011	2014	2015	2016
6	Austria	7.77	7.48	7.48	7.36	7.06	6.31	5.77	6.03	6.05	6.04
11	Belgium	7.68	7.97	7.90	7.68	7.56	5.14	4.95	4.97	5.01	5.13
26	Bulgaria			4.31	4.40	4.81			5.39	5.26	5.27
19	Croatia			6.04	5.70	5.96			4.61	4.98	4.79
20	Cyprus			6.15	6.00	5.97			3.87	3.98	3.99
4	Czech Republic	7.01	7.25	7.40	7.37	7.69	5.73	5.49	5.70	5.73	5.65
3	Denmark	8.18	7.47	7.73	7.47	7.40	6.81	6.95	7.01	7.19	7.19
13	Estonia			5.19	5.51	5.07			6.85	6.64	6.41
2	Finland	7.11	6.77	6.66	6.86	7.10	7.51	7.59	7.22	7.35	7.20
10	France	7.34	7.44	7.25	7.04	7.12	5.82	5.68	5.56	5.50	5.59
7	Germany	6.74	7.09	7.20	7.10	7.03	5.46	5.37	5.55	5.30	5.47
28	Greece	5.68	6.13	4.68	4.41	4.09	2.83	2.88	3.37	3.55	3.56
23	Hungary	5.56	5.24	4.97	5.27	5.18	4.75	5.13	4.60	4.63	4.60
18	Ireland	6.73	7.33	6.56	6.15	6.18	5.36	5.01	4.88	4.84	5.09
24	Italy	6.42	6.47	5.89	5.50	5.76	3.60	3.84	3.75	3.79	3.82
21	Latvia			3.13	3.32	3.25			6.30	6.16	6.22
15	Lithuania			6.24	5.38	5.79			6.36	6.07	6.25
8	Luxembourg	8.24	8.21	8.12	7.88	7.95	5.35	5.85	5.41	5.46	5.48
16	Malta			7.09	7.00	7.53			4.29	4.38	4.43
5	Netherlands	8.18	7.70	8.00	7.81	7.73	5.79	5.37	5.39	5.36	5.23
14	Poland	4.47	4.66	4.26	4.11	4.39	5.14	5.37	5.54	5.56	5.53
22	Portugal	4.23	5.52	6.15	6.43	5.68	4.88	4.93	4.62	4.57	4.80
27	Romania			3.18	3.09	3.76			5.24	5.21	5.22
17	Slovakia	5.42	4.88	5.32	5.40	5.19	5.57	5.26	5.11	5.13	5.16
9	Slovenia			6.28	6.47	6.60			6.30	6.37	6.24
25	Spain	7.04	6.84	7.01	6.86	7.10	4.84	4.92	4.61	4.66	4.79
1	Sweden	7.75	8.41	7.81	7.33	8.00	8.12	8.17	7.85	7.81	7.87
12	United Kingdom	6.77	6.98	7.26	7.03	6.98	5.38	5.47	5.49	5.48	5.39

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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TABLE 2 Dimension I: Poverty prevention

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
A1 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Total Population	People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, total population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
A2 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Children (0-17)	People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, age less than 18 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
A3 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Seniors (65+)	People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, age 65 years or over (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
A4 Population Living in Quasi-Jobless Households	People living in households with very low work intensity, age 0 to 59 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
A5 Severe Material Deprivation, Total Population	Severe material deprivation rate, total population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
A6 Severe Material Deprivation, Children (0-17)	Severe material deprivation rate, age less than 18 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008, 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
A7 Severe Material Deprivation, Seniors (65+)	Severe material deprivation rate, age 65 years or over (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008, 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
A8 Income Poverty, Total Population	At risk of poverty (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalized income after social transfers), total population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012, 2013; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
A9 Income Poverty, Children (0-17)	At risk of poverty (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalized income after social transfers), age less than 18 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
A10 Income Poverty, Seniors (65+)	At risk of poverty (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalized income after social transfers), age 65 years or over (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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TABLE 3 Dimension II: Equitable education

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
B1 Education Policy (SGI)	Policy performance in delivering high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016, expert assessment "To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?"
B2 Socioeconomic Background and Student Performance	PISA results, product of slope of ESCS for reading and strength of relationship between reading and ESCS	OECD PISA (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2012; e: 2012) (Data for Malta are missing; imputed value=mean)
B3 Pre-primary Education Expenditure	Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP, at pre-primary level of education and not allocated by level (% of GDP)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006; b: 2004, 2007, 2008; c: 2004, 2011; d: 2004, 2011, 2012; e: 2004, 2011, 2012, 2013), extracted 31 May 2016
B4 Early School Leavers	Early leavers from education and training, age 18 to 24 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 31 May 2016
B5 Less Than Upper Secondary Attainment	Population with less than upper secondary attainment, age 25 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 28 August 2016

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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TABLE 4 Dimension III: Labor market access

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
C1 Employment Rate	Employment rate, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 17 May 2016
C2 Older Employment Rate	Employment rate, age 55 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 17 May 2016
C3 Foreign-born To Native Employment	Ratio of foreign-born to native-born employment rates, age 15 to 64 years	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 17 May 2016
C4 Employment Rates By Gender, Women/Men	Ratio of employment rates women/men, age 15 to 64 years	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 2 June 2016
C5 Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 17 May 2016
C6 Long-term Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate, unemployed greater than or equal to 1 year (% of labor force)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 17 May 2016
C7 Youth Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate, age 15 to 24 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 17 May 2016
C8 Low-skilled Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate, age 25 to 64 years, less than upper secondary education (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 17 May 2016
C9 Involuntary Temporary Employment Rate	Main reason for temporary employment: Could not find permanent job, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 1999, 2003, 2008; b: 1999, 2003, 2009, 2010; c: 1999, 2009, 2013; d: 1999, 2009, 2014; e: 1999, 2009, 2015), extracted 2 June 2016
C10 In-work Poverty Rate	In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate, full-time workers (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
C11 Low Pay Incidence	Low-wage earners as a proportion of all employees (excluding apprentices), less than upper secondary education (%)	OECD Online Database (data refer to a: 2006, 2007, 2008; b: 2006, 2008, 2009; c: 2010, 2012; d: 2010, 2012, 2013; e: 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014), extracted 17 May 2016; Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006, 2010; b: 2006, 2010; c: 2010; d: 2010; e: 2010), extracted 17 May 2016; ILOSTAT Online Database (data refer to a: 2011; b: 2011; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2013), extracted 17 May 2016

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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TABLE 5 Dimension IV: Social cohesion and non-discrimination

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
D1 Social Inclusion (SGI)	Policy performance in strengthening social cohesion and inclusion	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016, expert assessment "To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?"
D2 Gini Coefficient	Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014, 2015), extracted 26 October 2016
D3 Non-discrimination (SGI)	Policy performance in protecting against discrimination	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016, expert assessment "How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?"
D4 Gender Equality in Parliaments	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)	World Bank Gender Statistics Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 17 May 2016
D5 Integration Policy (SGI)	Policy performance in integrating migrants into society	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016, expert assessment "How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?"
D6 NEET Rate	Young people not employed and not participating in education or training, age 20 to 24 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 21 May 2016

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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TABLE 6 Dimension V: Health

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
E1 Health Policy (SGI)	Policy performance in providing high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016, expert assessment "To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?"
E2 Self-reported Unmet Needs for Medical Help	Self-reported unmet needs for medical examination; Reason: too expensive or too far to travel or waiting list (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2011, 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014), extracted 2 June 2016
E3 Healthy Life Expectancy	Healthy life years at birth, total population	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007, 2010; b: 2009, 2010; c: 2011, 2012; d: 2012, 2013; e: 2014), extracted 2 June 2016
E4 Health System Accessibility and Range	Mean of standardized index values "waiting time for treatment" and "range and reach of services provided"	Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015)
E5 Health System Outcomes	Standardized index values "outcome"	Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015)

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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TABLE 7 Dimension VI: Intergenerational justice

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
F1 Family Policy (SGI)	Policy performance in enabling women to combine parenting with labor market participation	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016, expert assessment "To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?"
F2 Pension Policy (SGI)	Policy performance in promoting pensions that prevent poverty, are intergenerationally just and fiscally sustainable	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016, expert assessment "To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?"
F3 Environmental Policy (SGI)	Policy performance in the sustainable use of natural resources and environmental protection	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016, expert assessment "How effectively does environmental policy protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment?"
F4 Greenhouse Gas Emissions	Greenhouse gas emissions, all sectors excluding all memo items, tons in CO ₂ equivalents per capita	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2005; b: 2008; c: 2011; d: 2012; e: 2013), extracted 14 June 2016
F5 Renewable Energy (Consumption)	Share of energy from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014), extracted 2 June 2016
F6 Total R&D Spending	Total intramural R&D expenditure, all sectors (% of GDP)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2007, 2009; c: 2012; d: 2012, 2013; e: 2014), extracted 19 May 2016
F7 General Government Gross Debt	General government gross debt (% of GDP)	IMF World Economic Outlook Database April 2016 (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2012, 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015)
F8 Old Age Dependency Ratio	Old age dependency ratio (% of working-age population)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015), extracted 2 June 2016

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 8A SJI 2008 raw data

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10
Austria	16.7%	18.5%	21.2%	7.4%	5.9%	6.7%	4.4%	12.0%	14.8%	14.0%
Belgium	21.6%	21.6%	22.9%	11.7%	5.6%	7.3%	3.2%	15.2%	16.9%	23.0%
Bulgaria*	60.7%	60.8%	65.5%	8.1%	41.2%	40.8%	61.0%	22.0%	29.9%	23.9%
Croatia*	31.1%	29.4%	37.5%	13.9%	14.3%	14.8%	15.7%	20.6%	19.6%	30.5%
Cyprus*	25.2%	20.8%	49.3%	4.5%	9.1%	9.7%	10.9%	15.5%	12.4%	50.6%
Czech Republic	15.8%	21.5%	12.5%	7.2%	6.8%	8.3%	6.4%	9.6%	16.6%	5.5%
Denmark	16.8%	14.2%	18.6%	8.5%	2.0%	2.5%	0.9%	11.7%	9.6%	17.7%
Estonia*	22.0%	20.1%	40.9%	5.3%	4.9%	5.3%	5.8%	19.4%	18.2%	33.2%
Finland	17.4%	15.1%	23.9%	7.5%	3.5%	3.1%	3.2%	13.0%	10.9%	21.6%
France	19.0%	19.6%	14.1%	8.8%	5.4%	6.6%	3.3%	13.1%	15.3%	13.1%
Germany	20.6%	19.7%	15.5%	11.7%	5.5%	6.9%	2.1%	15.2%	14.1%	16.2%
Greece	28.3%	28.2%	28.1%	7.5%	11.2%	10.4%	14.8%	20.3%	23.3%	22.9%
Hungary	29.4%	34.1%	17.5%	12.0%	17.9%	21.5%	14.4%	12.3%	18.8%	6.1%
Ireland	23.1%	26.2%	22.5%	13.7%	5.5%	6.8%	2.2%	17.2%	19.2%	28.3%
Italy	26.0%	28.6%	24.4%	10.4%	7.5%	8.6%	6.7%	19.5%	24.6%	22.2%
Latvia*	35.1%	32.8%	58.8%	5.4%	19.3%	19.2%	28.7%	21.2%	19.8%	35.6%
Lithuania*	28.7%	29.9%	39.9%	6.1%	12.5%	11.8%	17.1%	19.1%	22.1%	29.8%
Luxembourg	15.9%	21.2%	5.4%	4.7%	0.7%	0.9%	0.0%	13.5%	19.9%	7.2%
Malta*	19.7%	23.9%	26.0%	8.6%	4.3%	6.3%	3.1%	15.1%	19.8%	20.3%
Netherlands	15.7%	17.2%	9.7%	8.2%	1.5%	2.2%	0.4%	10.2%	14.0%	9.5%
Poland	34.4%	37.1%	26.9%	8.0%	17.7%	17.5%	20.8%	17.3%	24.2%	7.8%
Portugal	25.0%	26.9%	27.7%	6.3%	9.7%	11.8%	10.1%	18.1%	20.9%	25.5%
Romania*	47.0%	51.8%	57.9%	9.9%	32.7%	38.5%	39.0%	24.6%	33.0%	29.4%
Slovakia	21.4%	25.8%	21.9%	5.2%	11.8%	12.6%	15.3%	10.6%	17.2%	8.5%
Slovenia*	17.1%	14.7%	24.4%	6.7%	6.7%	5.2%	7.4%	11.5%	11.3%	19.4%
Spain	23.3%	28.6%	26.2%	6.6%	3.6%	5.5%	1.9%	19.7%	26.2%	26.1%
Sweden	13.9%	14.9%	15.5%	5.5%	1.4%	1.7%	0.8%	10.5%	12.0%	9.9%
United Kingdom	22.6%	27.6%	28.5%	10.4%	4.5%	6.5%	1.4%	18.6%	23.0%	26.5%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 8B SJI 2008 raw data

COUNTRY	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5
Austria	7	5.99	0.4%	10.2%	20.1%
Belgium	7	7.59	0.7%	12.0%	32.0%
Bulgaria*		12.47	0.7%	14.8%	22.6%
Croatia*		3.31	0.6%	4.4%	24.3%
Cyprus*			0.3%	13.7%	27.9%
Czech Republic	7	6.43	0.5%	5.6%	9.5%
Denmark	7	3.48	0.9%	12.5%	25.7%
Estonia*		2.21	0.4%	14.0%	10.9%
Finland	10	2.21	0.3%	9.8%	19.5%
France	5	7.93	0.6%	11.8%	31.5%
Germany	7	7.51	0.5%	11.8%	15.6%
Greece	2	3.67	0.1%	14.4%	39.9%
Hungary	5	8.71	1.0%	11.7%	21.0%
Ireland	7	4.63	0.0%	11.4%	32.2%
Italy	5	2.25	0.5%	19.6%	47.8%
Latvia*		2.90	0.7%	15.5%	15.4%
Lithuania*		5.43	0.6%	7.5%	11.5%
Luxembourg	3	8.48	0.5%	13.4%	34.3%
Malta*			1.0%	27.2%	73.4%
Netherlands	8	5.47	0.4%	11.4%	26.8%
Poland	4	5.57	0.5%	5.0%	13.7%
Portugal	5	5.85	0.5%	34.9%	72.7%
Romania*		3.49	0.7%	15.9%	25.0%
Slovakia	4	6.63	0.5%	6.0%	10.9%
Slovenia*		5.91	0.5%	5.1%	18.2%
Spain	5	2.82	0.6%	31.7%	49.4%
Sweden	7	3.05	0.6%	7.9%	20.6%
United Kingdom	6	5.25	0.4%	16.9%	26.6%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 8C SJI 2008 raw data

COUNTRY	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11
Austria	70.8%	38.8%	0.88	0.84	4.2%	1.0%	8.5%	6.8%	12.6%	5.3%	16.2%
Belgium	62.4%	34.5%	0.85	0.82	7.0%	3.3%	18.0%	10.8%	78.6%	3.5%	5.6%
Bulgaria*	64.0%	46.0%	0.88	0.87	5.7%	2.9%	12.7%	13.6%	63.6%	5.1%	18.0%
Croatia*	60.0%	37.1%	0.96	0.78	8.7%	5.4%	23.7%	9.5%	51.1%	5.9%	21.5%
Cyprus*	70.9%	54.8%	1.03	0.79	3.8%	0.5%	9.0%	4.8%	90.9%	5.7%	22.2%
Czech Republic	66.6%	47.6%	1.00	0.76	4.4%	2.2%	9.9%	17.3%	67.7%	3.2%	19.7%
Denmark	77.9%	58.4%	0.86	0.91	3.5%	0.5%	8.0%	3.6%	38.9%	3.7%	7.9%
Estonia*	70.1%	62.3%	1.08	0.90	5.6%	1.7%	12.0%	9.8%	32.2%	7.2%	24.5%
Finland	71.1%	56.5%	0.92	0.94	6.4%	1.2%	16.5%	8.1%	61.9%	3.4%	7.9%
France	64.9%	38.2%	0.91	0.87	7.1%	2.6%	18.3%	9.1%	56.4%	5.3%	7.8%
Germany	70.1%	53.7%	0.86	0.85	7.6%	4.0%	10.6%	16.5%	24.0%	6.1%	18.2%
Greece	61.4%	43.0%	1.10	0.65	7.9%	3.7%	21.9%	6.9%	82.2%	12.9%	17.6%
Hungary	56.4%	30.9%	1.15	0.80	7.9%	3.6%	19.5%	17.7%	60.1%	5.1%	21.2%
Ireland	67.4%	53.9%	1.05	0.81	6.5%	1.7%	13.3%	8.4%	34.3%	3.8%	21.7%
Italy	58.6%	34.3%	1.12	0.67	6.8%	3.1%	21.2%	7.4%	64.8%	8.5%	9.7%
Latvia*	68.2%	59.1%	1.04	0.91	8.0%	1.9%	13.6%	13.0%	66.7%	8.0%	30.3%
Lithuania*	64.4%	53.0%	1.10	0.92	5.9%	1.3%	13.3%	9.6%	56.8%	6.9%	28.3%
Luxembourg	63.4%	34.1%	1.16	0.77	5.1%	1.6%	17.9%	4.8%	48.1%	8.7%	10.7%
Malta*	55.5%	30.1%	1.10	0.52	6.0%	2.6%	11.7%	6.8%	50.3%	4.1%	12.1%
Netherlands	77.2%	53.0%	0.86	0.85	2.7%	0.9%	5.3%	3.4%	35.5%	4.3%	9.1%
Poland	59.2%	31.6%	0.73	0.79	7.2%	2.4%	17.3%	11.5%	71.0%	10.7%	20.9%
Portugal	68.0%	50.7%	1.09	0.85	8.0%	3.8%	16.7%	7.6%	81.8%	7.7%	17.5%
Romania*	59.0%	43.1%	1.06	0.80	6.1%	2.5%	18.6%	6.5%	79.2%	14.1%	26.7%
Slovakia	62.3%	39.2%	1.09	0.78	9.5%	6.6%	19.0%	35.9%	74.0%	4.5%	18.0%
Slovenia*	68.6%	32.8%	1.00	0.88	4.5%	1.9%	10.4%	5.9%	44.8%	4.0%	19.1%
Spain	64.5%	45.5%	1.04	0.76	11.3%	2.0%	24.5%	13.2%	87.2%	9.7%	16.0%
Sweden	74.3%	70.1%	0.84	0.94	6.3%	0.8%	20.2%	7.0%	54.3%	5.8%	1.2%
United Kingdom	71.5%	58.0%	0.94	0.85	5.7%	1.4%	15.0%	6.6%	50.4%	5.8%	20.6%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 8D SJI 2008 raw data

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
Austria	8	26.2	7	27.3%	6	9.2%
Belgium	8	26.3	8	35.3%	7	15.1%
Bulgaria*		35.3		21.7%		21.6%
Croatia*		31.6		20.9%		13.7%
Cyprus*		29.8		14.3%		13.3%
Czech Republic	8	25.3	6	15.5%	5	10.4%
Denmark	9	25.2	7	38.0%	7	6.2%
Estonia*		33.4		20.8%		11.9%
Finland	9	26.2	9	41.5%	7	10.5%
France	6	26.6	7	18.2%	6	15.7%
Germany	7	30.4	8	32.2%	6	12.9%
Greece	3	34.3	6	14.7%	5	15.8%
Hungary	5	25.6	6	11.1%	5	17.1%
Ireland	7	31.3	9	13.3%	7	18.2%
Italy	5	32.0	7	21.3%	5	21.6%
Latvia*		35.4		20.0%		15.7%
Lithuania*		33.8		17.7%		14.9%
Luxembourg	9	27.4	7	23.3%	8	10.0%
Malta*		26.3		8.7%		7.3%
Netherlands	9	27.6	9	41.3%	7	5.0%
Poland	5	32.2	5	20.2%	4	14.9%
Portugal	4	36.8	8	28.3%	9	13.2%
Romania*		38.3		11.4%		13.8%
Slovakia	7	24.5	6	19.3%	4	16.1%
Slovenia*		23.2		13.3%		8.7%
Spain	5	31.9	8	36.3%	7	16.6%
Sweden	9	23.4	8	47.0%	7	11.7%
United Kingdom	6	32.6	9	19.5%	8	16.1%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 8E SJI 2008 raw data

COUNTRY	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	9	0.6%	60.09	79.25	80.80
Belgium	9	0.3%	63.70	87.58	52.40
Bulgaria*		18.2%	70.59	52.58	42.80
Croatia*		6.3%	58.95	48.25	47.60
Cyprus*		3.6%	62.95	55.00	57.20
Czech Republic	7	0.7%	62.37	67.42	71.60
Denmark	9	0.3%	67.40	69.00	85.60
Estonia*		8.9%	52.53	67.42	57.20
Finland	8	0.5%	57.41	64.33	85.60
France	8	1.4%	63.63	69.25	76.00
Germany	7	3.5%	58.80	80.08	76.00
Greece	4	5.4%	66.81	55.58	71.60
Hungary	5	2.6%	56.52	70.67	52.40
Ireland	7	2.3%	64.25	57.42	76.00
Italy	7	4.7%	62.99	63.33	76.00
Latvia*		12.3%	53.24	50.08	57.20
Lithuania*		7.1%	55.87	52.33	47.60
Luxembourg	9	0.5%	63.46	91.08	76.00
Malta*		0.8%	70.16	57.42	47.60
Netherlands	8	0.4%	65.19	83.25	85.60
Poland	4	7.0%	59.62	54.42	52.40
Portugal	6	9.8%	58.19	50.67	52.40
Romania*		12.3%	61.53	62.33	28.40
Slovakia	6	1.4%	55.86	63.92	38.00
Slovenia*		0.2%	60.53	50.67	66.80
Spain	7	0.1%	63.35	62.25	71.60
Sweden	9	3.1%	67.25	61.67	95.20
United Kingdom	7	1.4%	65.31	62.25	62.00

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 8F SJI 2008 raw data

COUNTRY	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
Austria	6	8	8	9.92	27.3%	2.4%	68.5%	25.4%
Belgium	9	7	7	13.59	3.4%	1.8%	92.4%	25.8%
Bulgaria*				7.19	9.2%	0.4%	14.7%	25.8%
Croatia*				5.51	22.2%	0.8%	38.9%	26.7%
Cyprus*				12.21	4.0%	0.4%	44.6%	17.9%
Czech Republic	7	7	7	13.53	7.4%	1.3%	28.7%	20.6%
Denmark	9	9	8	13.23	17.8%	2.5%	33.4%	23.6%
Estonia*				9.93	17.1%	1.1%	4.5%	25.8%
Finland	9	9	7	7.58	29.6%	3.4%	32.7%	24.8%
France	9	6	7	8.06	10.2%	2.0%	67.9%	25.2%
Germany	7	7	8	11.88	9.1%	2.5%	65.0%	30.4%
Greece	3	2	3	12.19	8.2%	0.6%	108.8%	28.0%
Hungary	5	5	6	6.97	5.9%	1.0%	71.6%	23.5%
Ireland	7	8	5	18.18	3.6%	1.2%	42.4%	15.6%
Italy	4	4	4	9.46	9.8%	1.1%	102.4%	30.7%
Latvia*				3.09	29.6%	0.6%	16.2%	25.7%
Lithuania*				5.37	16.7%	0.8%	15.4%	25.2%
Luxembourg	6	8	6	27.71	2.7%	1.6%	14.4%	20.6%
Malta*				7.33	0.2%	0.6%	62.7%	19.9%
Netherlands	9	9	6	13.45	3.3%	1.7%	54.5%	21.8%
Poland	4	7	6	9.27	6.9%	0.6%	46.6%	18.9%
Portugal	5	5	5	8.41	21.9%	1.1%	71.7%	26.6%
Romania*				5.72	18.3%	0.5%	13.4%	22.6%
Slovakia	5	9	4	8.71	7.8%	0.5%	28.2%	16.8%
Slovenia*				6.66	15.6%	1.4%	21.6%	23.3%
Spain	5	5	4	9.43	9.7%	1.2%	39.4%	23.8%
Sweden	10	9	8	3.17	44.2%	3.3%	36.7%	26.7%
United Kingdom	7	7	7	11.55	1.8%	1.7%	51.7%	24.0%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 9A SJI 2011 raw data

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10
Austria	19.1%	20.8%	18.6%	7.1%	4.3%	5.6%	1.9%	14.5%	17.1%	17.4%
Belgium	20.2%	20.5%	23.1%	12.3%	5.9%	7.7%	2.8%	14.6%	16.6%	21.6%
Bulgaria*	46.2%	47.3%	66.0%	6.9%	45.7%	46.5%	58.1%	21.8%	24.9%	39.3%
Croatia*	31.1%	29.4%	37.5%	13.9%	14.3%	14.8%	15.7%	20.6%	19.6%	30.5%
Cyprus*	23.5%	20.2%	48.6%	4.0%	11.2%	12.5%	7.3%	15.8%	12.3%	46.4%
Czech Republic	14.0%	17.2%	11.7%	6.0%	6.2%	8.6%	4.3%	8.6%	13.3%	7.2%
Denmark	17.6%	14.0%	20.6%	8.8%	2.7%	3.1%	0.9%	13.1%	10.6%	20.1%
Estonia*	23.4%	24.5%	35.6%	5.6%	9.0%	10.7%	6.6%	19.7%	20.6%	33.9%
Finland	16.9%	14.0%	23.1%	8.4%	2.8%	2.3%	1.7%	13.8%	12.1%	22.1%
France	18.5%	21.2%	13.4%	8.4%	5.8%	7.0%	3.4%	12.9%	16.8%	11.9%
Germany	20.0%	20.4%	16.0%	10.9%	4.5%	5.2%	2.1%	15.5%	15.0%	15.0%
Greece	27.6%	30.0%	26.8%	6.6%	11.6%	12.2%	12.4%	19.7%	23.7%	21.4%
Hungary	29.6%	37.2%	17.5%	11.3%	21.6%	28.8%	14.1%	12.4%	20.6%	4.6%
Ireland	25.7%	31.4%	17.9%	20.0%	5.7%	8.2%	1.5%	15.0%	18.8%	16.2%
Italy	24.9%	28.7%	22.9%	9.2%	7.4%	8.6%	6.3%	18.4%	24.1%	19.6%
Latvia*	37.9%	38.4%	55.5%	7.4%	27.6%	30.7%	27.5%	26.4%	26.3%	47.6%
Lithuania*	29.6%	30.8%	35.3%	7.2%	19.9%	20.0%	24.0%	20.3%	23.3%	23.9%
Luxembourg	17.8%	23.7%	6.2%	6.3%	0.5%	0.2%	0.1%	14.9%	22.3%	6.0%
Malta*	20.3%	26.5%	22.2%	9.2%	6.5%	7.7%	5.0%	14.9%	21.2%	19.7%
Netherlands	15.1%	17.5%	8.1%	8.5%	2.2%	2.0%	0.3%	11.1%	15.4%	7.7%
Poland	27.8%	31.0%	25.8%	6.9%	14.2%	14.9%	16.5%	17.1%	23.0%	14.4%
Portugal	24.9%	28.7%	26.0%	7.0%	9.0%	10.8%	9.6%	17.9%	22.9%	20.1%
Romania*	43.0%	50.6%	43.3%	8.1%	30.5%	35.8%	32.4%	22.1%	31.9%	21.4%
Slovakia	19.6%	23.7%	19.7%	5.6%	11.4%	13.5%	11.1%	11.0%	16.8%	10.8%
Slovenia*	17.1%	15.1%	23.3%	5.6%	5.9%	5.1%	6.3%	11.3%	11.2%	20.0%
Spain	24.7%	32.0%	24.9%	7.6%	4.9%	7.4%	2.2%	20.4%	29.0%	23.8%
Sweden	15.9%	15.1%	18.0%	6.4%	1.3%	1.3%	0.7%	13.3%	13.1%	17.7%
United Kingdom	22.0%	27.4%	23.1%	12.7%	4.8%	7.3%	1.3%	17.3%	20.7%	22.3%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 9B SJI 2011 raw data

COUNTRY	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5
Austria	7	7.97	0.5%	8.3%	17.6%
Belgium	7	9.07	0.8%	11.9%	29.5%
Bulgaria*		10.30	0.9%	12.6%	20.9%
Croatia*		3.52	0.6%	5.2%	22.7%
Cyprus*			0.4%	12.7%	26.0%
Czech Republic	7	5.70	0.5%	4.9%	8.1%
Denmark	7	5.22	0.9%	11.0%	24.4%
Estonia*		2.20	0.6%	11.0%	10.7%
Finland	10	2.42	0.4%	10.3%	17.0%
France	5	8.52	0.6%	12.7%	29.3%
Germany	7	7.88	0.5%	11.8%	13.9%
Greece	2	4.25	0.1%	13.5%	37.3%
Hungary	5	12.48	1.0%	10.8%	18.8%
Ireland	7	4.91	0.0%	11.5%	27.2%
Italy	5	3.78	0.5%	18.6%	44.9%
Latvia*		2.99	0.9%	12.9%	11.4%
Lithuania*		4.49	0.5%	7.9%	8.1%
Luxembourg	3	7.20	0.5%	7.1%	22.3%
Malta*			0.4%	23.8%	67.0%
Netherlands	8	4.74	0.4%	10.0%	27.7%
Poland	4	5.77	0.6%	5.4%	11.5%
Portugal	5	4.95	0.5%	28.3%	68.3%
Romania*		4.90	0.8%	19.3%	26.1%
Slovakia	4	5.99	0.5%	4.7%	9.0%
Slovenia*		5.58	0.5%	5.0%	16.7%
Spain	5	3.94	0.6%	28.2%	47.1%
Sweden	7	5.76	0.7%	6.5%	18.8%
United Kingdom	6	6.03	0.3%	14.8%	23.9%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 9C SJI 2011 raw data

COUNTRY	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11
Austria	70.8%	41.2%	0.90	0.86	4.9%	1.2%	9.5%	8.1%	8.7%	6.6%	16.0%
Belgium	62.0%	37.3%	0.83	0.84	8.4%	4.1%	22.4%	13.2%	74.5%	3.8%	3.7%
Bulgaria*	59.8%	44.9%	0.79	0.89	10.3%	4.7%	21.9%	21.7%	73.9%	6.2%	18.0%
Croatia*	57.4%	39.1%	0.94	0.83	11.9%	6.7%	32.4%	12.0%	47.3%	5.9%	21.5%
Cyprus*	68.9%	56.3%	1.05	0.84	6.5%	1.3%	16.6%	7.1%	93.9%	6.0%	22.2%
Czech Republic	65.0%	46.5%	1.05	0.77	7.4%	3.0%	18.3%	22.7%	75.2%	2.9%	20.0%
Denmark	73.3%	58.4%	0.85	0.94	7.6%	1.5%	14.0%	9.0%	47.6%	5.2%	7.3%
Estonia*	61.2%	53.8%	0.97	0.99	17.1%	7.7%	32.9%	27.3%	43.1%	6.9%	24.5%
Finland	68.1%	56.2%	0.88	0.96	8.5%	2.0%	21.4%	11.6%	65.1%	2.9%	8.5%
France	64.0%	39.7%	0.90	0.88	8.9%	3.6%	22.5%	12.1%	58.0%	5.3%	7.8%
Germany	71.3%	57.8%	0.89	0.87	7.1%	3.4%	9.8%	15.7%	21.7%	5.1%	18.7%
Greece	59.1%	42.4%	1.09	0.68	12.9%	5.8%	33.0%	11.9%	84.6%	12.5%	15.1%
Hungary	54.9%	33.6%	1.19	0.84	11.3%	5.5%	26.4%	23.6%	69.8%	5.2%	21.8%
Ireland	59.6%	50.2%	0.99	0.88	14.1%	6.9%	27.6%	19.4%	34.3%	4.2%	21.5%
Italy	56.8%	36.5%	1.10	0.68	8.5%	4.1%	27.9%	9.0%	67.9%	9.0%	8.1%
Latvia*	58.5%	47.8%	1.02	1.02	19.8%	8.9%	36.2%	29.1%	72.3%	9.3%	30.3%
Lithuania*	57.6%	48.3%	1.08	1.04	18.1%	7.5%	35.7%	37.8%	71.5%	8.9%	28.3%
Luxembourg	65.2%	39.6%	1.16	0.78	4.4%	1.3%	14.2%	4.1%	41.4%	9.0%	10.7%
Malta*	56.2%	31.9%	1.08	0.54	6.9%	3.1%	13.2%	8.2%	53.1%	5.0%	12.1%
Netherlands	74.7%	53.7%	0.84	0.87	4.5%	1.2%	8.7%	5.7%	31.9%	4.0%	9.1%
Poland	58.9%	34.1%	0.86	0.81	9.7%	3.0%	23.7%	16.1%	74.1%	10.0%	18.7%
Portugal	65.3%	49.5%	1.06	0.87	11.4%	6.0%	22.8%	11.7%	84.1%	8.5%	10.8%
Romania*	60.2%	40.7%	1.30	0.77	7.3%	2.5%	22.1%	5.5%	79.7%	13.5%	26.7%
Slovakia	58.8%	40.5%	0.96	0.80	14.4%	9.2%	33.6%	40.8%	76.1%	4.8%	20.0%
Slovenia*	66.2%	35.0%	0.98	0.90	7.4%	3.2%	14.7%	11.2%	51.8%	4.3%	19.1%
Spain	58.8%	43.5%	0.97	0.81	20.0%	7.3%	41.5%	24.5%	91.3%	9.6%	16.4%
Sweden	72.1%	70.4%	0.82	0.93	8.8%	1.6%	24.8%	11.6%	59.1%	6.2%	1.2%
United Kingdom	69.4%	57.2%	0.94	0.87	7.9%	2.6%	19.9%	10.3%	50.4%	4.9%	20.6%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 9D SJI 2011 raw data

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
Austria	8	27.5	6	27.9%	4	9.6%
Belgium	8	26.4	8	39.3%	6	16.2%
Bulgaria*		33.4		20.8%		26.0%
Croatia*		31.6		23.5%		20.3%
Cyprus*		29.5		12.5%		16.2%
Czech Republic	7	25.1	6	22.0%	5	13.3%
Denmark	9	26.9	7	38.0%	7	8.5%
Estonia*		31.4		22.8%		20.8%
Finland	8	25.9	9	40.0%	7	13.3%
France	6	29.9	6	18.9%	6	18.6%
Germany	7	29.1	8	32.8%	6	12.4%
Greece	4	33.1	6	17.3%	5	21.4%
Hungary	5	24.7	6	9.1%	5	19.9%
Ireland	8	28.8	9	13.9%	7	26.1%
Italy	5	31.8	7	21.3%	4	25.9%
Latvia*		37.5		20.0%		25.9%
Lithuania*		35.9		19.1%		22.2%
Luxembourg	9	29.2	8	20.0%	9	7.2%
Malta*		27.4		8.7%		10.0%
Netherlands	8	27.2	9	40.7%	8	6.4%
Poland	5	31.4	7	20.0%	4	17.2%
Portugal	4	35.4	7	27.4%	8	15.9%
Romania*		34.5		11.4%		22.0%
Slovakia	5	24.8	4	15.3%	4	21.7%
Slovenia*		22.7		14.4%		9.8%
Spain	5	32.9	8	36.6%	6	23.2%
Sweden	9	24.8	9	45.0%	7	11.5%
United Kingdom	7	32.4	8	22.0%	8	18.5%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 9E SJI 2011 raw data

COUNTRY	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	8	0.5%	60.17	78.92	76.00
Belgium	9	0.6%	63.80	92.08	62.00
Bulgaria*		10.3%	64.05	49.00	38.00
Croatia*		6.3%	58.95	61.00	57.20
Cyprus*		3.4%	65.06	73.33	62.00
Czech Republic	7	0.6%	61.91	73.58	76.00
Denmark	9	1.5%	61.09	70.33	80.80
Estonia*		4.3%	57.25	63.33	57.20
Finland	8	3.7%	58.40	63.58	90.40
France	7	1.9%	63.16	81.25	80.80
Germany	7	2.1%	57.61	80.08	85.60
Greece	5	5.5%	66.46	63.08	76.00
Hungary	4	2.1%	57.11	65.42	47.60
Ireland	6	2.0%	64.55	81.25	80.80
Italy	7	5.3%	62.99	61.00	85.60
Latvia*		9.9%	54.44	56.33	52.40
Lithuania*		3.1%	59.35	53.67	52.40
Luxembourg	8	0.6%	65.50	88.58	80.80
Malta*		1.4%	70.20	63.33	52.40
Netherlands	7	0.3%	60.89	79.75	90.40
Poland	5	7.6%	60.47	55.42	52.40
Portugal	7	3.3%	57.31	55.67	52.40
Romania*		8.5%	60.77	53.67	42.80
Slovakia	5	1.7%	52.50	61.92	38.00
Slovenia*		0.2%	61.06	65.67	62.00
Spain	7	0.5%	62.59	58.92	71.60
Sweden	9	2.0%	70.15	68.58	100.00
United Kingdom	7	1.2%	65.56	60.33	71.60

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 9F SJI 2011 raw data

COUNTRY	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
Austria	6	6	6	9.87	30.2%	2.6%	82.3%	26.2%
Belgium	9	6	6	12.66	5.1%	2.0%	99.6%	26.0%
Bulgaria*				7.80	12.1%	0.5%	14.3%	26.5%
Croatia*				5.73	23.6%	0.8%	57.0%	26.7%
Cyprus*				12.55	5.6%	0.5%	56.3%	17.8%
Czech Republic	6	7	7	13.29	8.5%	1.3%	38.2%	21.7%
Denmark	9	9	8	11.84	20.0%	3.1%	42.9%	24.9%
Estonia*				8.98	23.0%	1.4%	6.6%	25.9%
Finland	9	9	8	8.34	31.4%	3.8%	47.1%	25.6%
France	10	5	6	7.45	12.1%	2.2%	81.5%	25.6%
Germany	7	7	8	11.62	9.9%	2.7%	81.0%	31.4%
Greece	4	2	3	11.66	8.5%	0.6%	145.8%	28.6%
Hungary	5	7	7	6.59	8.0%	1.1%	80.6%	24.2%
Ireland	7	6	6	16.45	5.1%	1.6%	86.8%	16.5%
Italy	4	5	5	8.87	12.8%	1.2%	115.4%	31.2%
Latvia*				3.08	34.3%	0.5%	40.3%	26.8%
Lithuania*				4.72	20.0%	0.8%	36.3%	25.6%
Luxembourg	9	8	7	24.43	2.9%	1.7%	19.6%	20.4%
Malta*				7.48	0.2%	0.5%	67.6%	21.4%
Netherlands	8	8	5	13.02	4.3%	1.7%	59.0%	22.8%
Poland	6	7	6	9.83	8.7%	0.7%	53.3%	19.1%
Portugal	5	4	6	6.06	24.4%	1.6%	96.2%	27.5%
Romania*				5.71	22.7%	0.5%	30.5%	23.7%
Slovakia	5	7	4	8.16	9.4%	0.5%	40.8%	17.3%
Slovenia*				8.17	20.0%	1.8%	37.9%	23.8%
Spain	5	5	5	8.17	13.0%	1.4%	60.1%	24.6%
Sweden	10	9	8	1.97	48.2%	3.5%	37.6%	27.7%
United Kingdom	8	8	7	10.65	3.3%	1.7%	76.6%	24.6%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 10A SJI 2014 raw data

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10
Austria	18.5%	20.9%	16.2%	7.7%	4.2%	6.4%	1.8%	14.4%	17.5%	15.1%
Belgium	21.6%	22.8%	21.2%	13.9%	5.1%	5.5%	2.0%	15.3%	17.3%	19.4%
Bulgaria	49.3%	52.3%	59.1%	12.5%	43.0%	46.3%	50.7%	21.2%	28.2%	28.2%
Croatia	32.6%	34.8%	33.1%	16.8%	14.7%	13.7%	16.9%	20.4%	23.3%	25.6%
Cyprus	27.1%	27.5%	33.4%	6.5%	16.1%	18.7%	9.0%	14.7%	13.9%	29.3%
Czech Republic	15.4%	18.8%	10.8%	6.8%	6.6%	7.3%	5.3%	9.6%	13.9%	6.0%
Denmark	17.5%	14.9%	13.2%	10.2%	3.6%	3.8%	1.1%	12.0%	10.4%	12.8%
Estonia	23.4%	22.4%	21.8%	9.1%	7.6%	7.0%	6.3%	17.5%	17.0%	17.2%
Finland	17.2%	14.9%	19.5%	9.3%	2.5%	1.8%	1.1%	13.2%	11.1%	18.4%
France	19.1%	23.2%	11.1%	8.4%	4.9%	5.6%	2.6%	14.1%	19.0%	9.4%
Germany	19.6%	18.4%	15.8%	9.9%	5.4%	5.6%	3.2%	16.1%	15.2%	15.0%
Greece	34.6%	35.4%	23.5%	14.2%	20.3%	23.3%	13.7%	23.1%	26.9%	17.2%
Hungary	33.5%	41.9%	22.0%	13.5%	27.8%	35.6%	17.8%	14.3%	22.9%	6.3%
Ireland	30.0%	33.1%	14.7%	23.4%	9.9%	13.4%	3.6%	15.7%	18.0%	12.2%
Italy	29.9%	34.1%	24.7%	10.6%	12.3%	13.5%	10.3%	19.5%	26.2%	16.1%
Latvia	36.2%	40.0%	33.7%	11.7%	24.0%	25.4%	26.6%	19.2%	24.4%	13.9%
Lithuania	32.5%	31.9%	35.7%	11.4%	16.0%	18.5%	18.4%	18.6%	20.8%	18.7%
Luxembourg	18.4%	24.6%	6.1%	6.1%	1.8%	2.4%	0.9%	15.1%	22.6%	6.1%
Malta	23.1%	31.0%	22.3%	9.0%	9.5%	11.8%	7.1%	15.1%	23.1%	17.3%
Netherlands	15.0%	16.9%	6.2%	8.9%	2.5%	2.3%	0.8%	10.1%	13.2%	5.5%
Poland	26.7%	29.3%	23.4%	6.9%	11.9%	11.8%	11.5%	17.1%	21.5%	14.0%
Portugal	25.3%	27.8%	22.2%	10.1%	10.9%	13.9%	9.0%	17.9%	21.8%	17.4%
Romania	43.2%	52.5%	35.4%	7.9%	29.8%	36.4%	28.4%	22.9%	33.3%	14.4%
Slovakia	20.5%	26.6%	16.3%	7.2%	10.2%	13.0%	9.2%	13.2%	21.9%	7.8%
Slovenia	19.6%	16.4%	22.8%	7.5%	6.7%	6.0%	6.7%	13.5%	13.5%	19.6%
Spain	27.2%	32.4%	16.5%	14.3%	6.2%	8.3%	2.7%	20.8%	27.9%	14.8%
Sweden	15.6%	15.4%	17.9%	5.7%	1.4%	1.9%	0.2%	14.1%	14.6%	17.7%
United Kingdom	24.1%	31.2%	17.3%	13.0%	8.3%	12.3%	2.1%	16.0%	18.0%	16.4%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 10B SJI 2014 raw data

COUNTRY	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5
Austria	5	6.42	0.6%	7.5%	17.0%
Belgium	6	6.30	0.8%	11.0%	27.2%
Bulgaria	4	11.52	0.9%	12.5%	18.2%
Croatia	6	3.75	0.7%	4.5%	18.7%
Cyprus	7	2.83	0.4%	9.1%	21.5%
Czech Republic	6	6.76	0.7%	5.4%	7.2%
Denmark	6	5.99	1.6%	8.0%	21.7%
Estonia	9	1.76	0.4%	9.7%	9.4%
Finland	9	2.47	0.4%	9.3%	14.1%
France	6	10.90	0.7%	9.7%	25.0%
Germany	6	5.61	0.6%	9.8%	13.3%
Greece	3	4.06	0.1%	10.1%	32.8%
Hungary	4	8.47	0.9%	11.9%	17.5%
Ireland	6	5.89	0.1%	8.4%	23.3%
Italy	4	2.98	0.4%	16.8%	41.8%
Latvia	5	5.00	0.8%	9.8%	10.6%
Lithuania	7	3.56	0.7%	6.3%	6.6%
Luxembourg	4	5.82	0.8%	6.1%	19.5%
Malta	5	5.62	0.4%	20.5%	59.5%
Netherlands	6	4.17	0.4%	9.3%	24.2%
Poland	6	4.77	0.5%	5.6%	9.9%
Portugal	4	5.18	0.5%	18.9%	60.2%
Romania	4	6.33	0.7%	17.3%	24.3%
Slovakia	4	13.39	0.5%	6.4%	8.1%
Slovenia	7	5.62	0.7%	3.9%	14.5%
Spain	5	3.92	0.7%	23.6%	44.5%
Sweden	8	3.45	0.7%	7.1%	16.8%
United Kingdom	7	4.75	0.3%	12.3%	21.7%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 10C **SJI 2014 raw data**

COUNTRY	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11
Austria	71.4%	43.8%	0.90	0.88	5.4%	1.3%	9.7%	9.5%	8.2%	6.4%	16.1%
Belgium	61.8%	41.7%	0.83	0.86	8.5%	3.9%	23.7%	13.5%	78.0%	3.4%	6.0%
Bulgaria	59.5%	47.4%	0.96	0.91	13.0%	7.4%	28.4%	28.5%	70.9%	6.6%	20.1%
Croatia	52.5%	37.8%	0.89	0.86	17.5%	11.1%	50.0%	19.8%	49.9%	5.6%	21.5%
Cyprus	61.7%	49.6%	1.09	0.85	16.1%	6.2%	38.9%	18.0%	95.2%	6.9%	21.4%
Czech Republic	67.7%	51.6%	1.03	0.79	7.0%	3.0%	19.0%	23.4%	82.4%	4.2%	19.8%
Denmark	72.5%	61.7%	0.85	0.93	7.2%	1.8%	13.1%	9.2%	50.6%	4.4%	7.6%
Estonia	68.5%	62.6%	1.00	0.92	8.9%	4.0%	18.7%	13.7%	34.8%	7.1%	24.0%
Finland	68.9%	58.5%	0.92	0.97	8.3%	1.7%	19.9%	12.2%	66.8%	3.0%	8.9%
France	64.1%	45.6%	0.87	0.89	9.9%	4.0%	24.0%	13.9%	60.6%	6.6%	7.5%
Germany	73.5%	63.6%	0.92	0.88	5.3%	2.4%	7.8%	12.3%	21.7%	5.7%	18.3%
Greece	48.8%	35.6%	0.97	0.69	27.7%	18.6%	58.3%	28.7%	87.8%	13.4%	11.8%
Hungary	58.1%	37.9%	1.17	0.83	10.2%	4.9%	26.6%	21.6%	73.4%	4.7%	17.4%
Ireland	60.5%	51.3%	1.00	0.86	13.3%	8.1%	26.8%	20.3%	65.3%	3.3%	21.8%
Italy	55.5%	42.7%	1.05	0.72	12.3%	7.0%	40.0%	14.4%	73.4%	9.3%	10.1%
Latvia	65.0%	54.8%	0.95	0.95	12.1%	5.9%	23.2%	22.6%	69.1%	7.1%	27.6%
Lithuania	63.7%	53.4%	1.08	0.97	12.0%	5.1%	21.9%	32.9%	64.5%	5.8%	26.2%
Luxembourg	65.7%	40.5%	1.19	0.82	5.9%	1.8%	15.5%	8.6%	53.1%	9.0%	11.3%
Malta	60.8%	36.3%	1.01	0.63	6.5%	3.0%	13.0%	8.4%	51.6%	4.4%	13.8%
Netherlands	73.6%	59.2%	0.81	0.88	7.3%	2.6%	13.2%	9.0%	40.7%	4.1%	8.1%
Poland	60.0%	40.6%	0.99	0.80	10.5%	4.5%	27.3%	19.3%	66.8%	9.6%	21.6%
Portugal	60.6%	46.9%	1.04	0.91	17.0%	9.6%	38.1%	17.0%	86.1%	8.5%	8.8%
Romania	60.1%	41.8%	0.99	0.78	7.4%	3.3%	23.7%	6.6%	87.7%	15.9%	25.2%
Slovakia	59.9%	44.0%	1.11	0.80	14.3%	10.0%	33.7%	40.0%	86.9%	5.8%	19.0%
Slovenia	63.3%	33.5%	0.95	0.88	10.3%	5.3%	21.6%	17.8%	55.9%	5.6%	17.0%
Spain	54.8%	43.2%	0.91	0.85	26.2%	13.0%	55.5%	32.7%	91.7%	8.7%	14.6%
Sweden	74.4%	73.6%	0.81	0.95	8.2%	1.5%	23.5%	13.4%	58.6%	5.1%	1.7%
United Kingdom	70.5%	59.8%	0.95	0.87	7.7%	2.8%	20.7%	10.6%	50.4%	6.6%	20.5%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 10D SJI 2014 raw data

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
Austria	7	27.6	6	33.3%	5	9.4%
Belgium	7	26.5	7	38.0%	6	18.0%
Bulgaria	4	33.6	6	24.6%	4	26.3%
Croatia	4	30.9	5	23.8%	3	27.2%
Cyprus	7	31.0	8	10.7%	4	28.4%
Czech Republic	6	24.9	6	19.5%	5	13.7%
Denmark	8	26.5	8	39.1%	7	8.7%
Estonia	6	32.5	7	20.8%	7	16.2%
Finland	8	25.9	8	42.5%	8	13.1%
France	7	30.5	6	26.9%	6	16.0%
Germany	7	28.3	8	36.5%	8	9.5%
Greece	3	34.3	4	21.0%	5	31.3%
Hungary	5	27.2	5	8.8%	5	22.8%
Ireland	7	29.9	9	15.7%	7	22.1%
Italy	4	32.4	7	31.4%	5	31.9%
Latvia	5	35.7	7	23.0%	5	18.3%
Lithuania	6	32.0	7	24.1%	7	18.0%
Luxembourg	9	28.0	8	23.3%	8	7.4%
Malta	6	27.1	5	14.3%	3	9.7%
Netherlands	8	25.4	9	38.7%	8	8.7%
Poland	7	30.9	8	23.7%	5	19.4%
Portugal	5	34.5	8	28.7%	7	20.6%
Romania	4	34.0	5	13.3%	6	22.9%
Slovakia	5	25.3	5	18.7%	5	20.4%
Slovenia	7	23.7	7	32.2%	4	13.7%
Spain	5	34.2	7	36.0%	6	26.3%
Sweden	9	24.8	9	44.7%	7	10.3%
United Kingdom	7	31.3	8	22.5%	7	18.4%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 10E SJI 2014 raw data

COUNTRY	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	8	0.3%	61.38	82.11	66.80
Belgium	8	1.7%	64.61	93.67	71.60
Bulgaria	4	8.2%	63.95	55.56	38.00
Croatia	5	3.5%	63.09	68.33	62.00
Cyprus	7	3.5%	63.71	55.67	62.00
Czech Republic	8	1.0%	63.22	74.22	71.60
Denmark	8	1.2%	61.00	82.22	85.60
Estonia	8	8.3%	55.29	63.11	62.00
Finland	8	4.6%	56.74	69.44	90.40
France	7	2.2%	63.22	79.44	76.00
Germany	8	1.6%	57.65	77.78	80.80
Greece	3	8.0%	64.85	53.67	62.00
Hungary	4	2.8%	59.88	55.67	42.80
Ireland	5	3.4%	67.21	68.33	71.60
Italy	7	5.6%	61.79	55.67	71.60
Latvia	4	12.4%	56.99	45.22	42.80
Lithuania	8	2.3%	59.30	60.33	57.20
Luxembourg	8	0.7%	66.10	88.11	76.00
Malta	7	1.2%	71.85	67.44	47.60
Netherlands	7	0.5%	61.18	91.78	90.40
Poland	5	9.0%	61.01	50.78	47.60
Portugal	6	3.3%	63.51	58.44	66.80
Romania	4	10.7%	57.65	48.78	33.20
Slovakia	5	2.2%	53.25	63.89	57.20
Slovenia	6	0.1%	56.05	57.11	76.00
Spain	6	0.7%	65.31	66.78	71.60
Sweden	8	1.4%	66.25	68.22	90.40
United Kingdom	8	1.4%	64.55	71.44	66.80

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 10F SJI 2014 raw data

COUNTRY	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
Austria	7	6	6	9.09	31.6%	2.9%	80.8%	26.8%
Belgium	8	6	6	10.84	7.2%	2.4%	105.1%	26.8%
Bulgaria	6	6	6	7.75	16.0%	0.6%	17.2%	28.5%
Croatia	5	4	5	5.25	26.8%	0.8%	80.8%	27.1%
Cyprus	4	4	4	10.78	6.8%	0.4%	102.5%	18.8%
Czech Republic	6	8	7	12.17	11.4%	1.8%	45.2%	24.6%
Denmark	9	9	8	10.47	25.6%	3.0%	44.6%	27.6%
Estonia	9	7	9	13.03	25.8%	2.1%	9.9%	27.2%
Finland	9	9	7	7.79	34.4%	3.4%	55.4%	28.9%
France	10	5	6	6.86	13.4%	2.2%	92.3%	27.5%
Germany	7	7	8	11.08	12.1%	2.9%	77.4%	31.3%
Greece	4	4	4	10.18	13.4%	0.7%	176.9%	30.7%
Hungary	4	4	6	6.03	9.6%	1.3%	76.8%	25.1%
Ireland	7	6	7	14.37	7.1%	1.6%	120.0%	18.6%
Italy	4	5	4	7.85	15.4%	1.3%	128.9%	32.7%
Latvia	7	5	9	5.61	35.7%	0.7%	35.9%	28.1%
Lithuania	8	7	8	3.36	21.7%	0.9%	38.8%	27.2%
Luxembourg	9	7	6	22.79	3.1%	1.3%	23.3%	20.2%
Malta	5	5	4	7.41	2.9%	0.9%	68.5%	25.1%
Netherlands	9	8	5	12.37	4.7%	1.9%	67.9%	25.5%
Poland	7	7	6	9.72	10.9%	0.9%	55.9%	20.4%
Portugal	6	4	5	5.23	25.0%	1.4%	129.0%	29.4%
Romania	5	4	5	4.85	22.8%	0.5%	38.8%	23.9%
Slovakia	5	5	5	7.49	10.4%	0.8%	54.6%	18.4%
Slovenia	8	7	7	7.16	20.9%	2.6%	70.5%	25.0%
Spain	5	6	4	6.89	14.3%	1.3%	93.7%	26.3%
Sweden	10	8	8	2.33	51.1%	3.3%	39.8%	29.9%
United Kingdom	8	8	8	8.96	4.6%	1.6%	86.2%	26.4%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 11A SJI 2015 raw data

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10
Austria	18.8%	22.9%	16.2%	7.8%	4.0%	6.0%	2.0%	14.4%	18.6%	15.4%
Belgium	20.8%	21.9%	19.5%	14.0%	5.9%	6.8%	2.4%	15.1%	17.2%	18.4%
Bulgaria	48.0%	51.5%	57.6%	13.0%	33.1%	38.4%	40.3%	21.0%	28.4%	27.9%
Croatia	29.9%	29.3%	31.9%	14.8%	13.9%	13.1%	14.7%	19.5%	21.8%	23.4%
Cyprus	27.8%	27.7%	26.1%	7.9%	15.3%	15.6%	7.4%	15.3%	15.5%	20.1%
Czech Republic	14.6%	16.4%	10.4%	6.9%	6.7%	9.7%	5.1%	8.6%	11.3%	5.8%
Denmark	18.3%	15.4%	10.8%	11.9%	3.2%	3.1%	0.9%	11.9%	9.1%	10.1%
Estonia	23.5%	22.3%	28.0%	8.4%	6.2%	5.7%	6.4%	18.6%	18.1%	24.4%
Finland	16.0%	13.0%	16.8%	9.0%	2.8%	2.0%	1.7%	11.8%	9.3%	16.1%
France	18.1%	20.8%	10.8%	8.1%	4.8%	5.7%	2.4%	13.7%	17.6%	9.1%
Germany	20.3%	19.4%	16.0%	9.9%	5.0%	5.0%	3.2%	16.1%	14.7%	14.9%
Greece	35.7%	38.1%	23.1%	18.2%	21.5%	23.8%	15.5%	23.1%	28.8%	15.1%
Hungary	34.8%	43.9%	20.2%	13.6%	24.0%	31.9%	16.5%	15.0%	23.8%	4.6%
Ireland	29.5%	33.9%	13.3%	23.9%	8.4%	10.1%	2.9%	14.1%	16.0%	10.1%
Italy	28.5%	32.0%	22.0%	11.3%	11.6%	13.7%	8.8%	19.3%	25.2%	15.0%
Latvia	35.1%	38.4%	36.1%	10.0%	19.2%	19.9%	22.0%	19.4%	23.4%	17.6%
Lithuania	30.8%	35.4%	31.7%	11.0%	13.6%	13.7%	17.8%	20.6%	26.9%	19.4%
Luxembourg	19.0%	26.0%	7.0%	6.6%	1.4%	1.8%	0.1%	15.9%	23.9%	6.2%
Malta	24.0%	32.0%	20.8%	9.0%	10.2%	13.9%	8.1%	15.7%	24.0%	14.9%
Netherlands	15.9%	17.0%	6.1%	9.3%	3.2%	3.7%	1.0%	10.4%	12.6%	5.5%
Poland	25.8%	29.8%	19.7%	7.2%	10.4%	10.2%	9.7%	17.3%	23.2%	12.3%
Portugal	27.5%	31.7%	20.3%	12.2%	10.6%	12.9%	9.8%	18.7%	24.4%	14.6%
Romania	41.9%	51.4%	35.8%	7.6%	25.0%	30.4%	24.8%	23.0%	34.7%	14.5%
Slovakia	19.8%	25.5%	13.6%	7.6%	9.9%	12.1%	9.2%	12.8%	20.3%	6.0%
Slovenia	20.4%	17.5%	23.0%	8.0%	6.6%	4.9%	6.7%	14.5%	14.7%	20.5%
Spain	27.3%	32.6%	14.5%	15.7%	7.1%	9.5%	2.4%	20.4%	27.5%	12.7%
Sweden	16.4%	16.2%	16.5%	7.1%	0.7%	1.1%	0.2%	14.8%	15.4%	16.4%
United Kingdom	24.8%	32.6%	18.1%	13.2%	7.4%	10.8%	1.9%	15.9%	18.9%	16.6%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 11B SJI 2015 raw data

COUNTRY	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5
Austria	5	6.42	0.5%	7.0%	16.1%
Belgium	6	6.30	0.7%	9.8%	26.4%
Bulgaria	4	11.52	0.9%	12.9%	18.9%
Croatia	6	3.75	0.7%	2.7%	17.1%
Cyprus	7	2.83	0.4%	6.8%	22.4%
Czech Republic	6	6.76	0.5%	5.5%	6.8%
Denmark	6	5.99	1.6%	7.8%	20.4%
Estonia	9	1.76	0.4%	11.4%	8.8%
Finland	9	2.47	0.8%	9.5%	13.5%
France	6	10.90	0.7%	9.0%	23.3%
Germany	7	5.61	0.4%	9.5%	13.1%
Greece	4	4.06	0.1%	9.0%	31.6%
Hungary	3	8.47	0.6%	11.4%	16.9%
Ireland	6	5.89	0.1%	6.9%	21.2%
Italy	4	2.98	0.5%	15.0%	40.7%
Latvia	5	5.00	0.6%	8.5%	10.5%
Lithuania	7	3.56	0.6%	5.9%	6.7%
Luxembourg	4	5.82	0.7%	6.1%	18.0%
Malta	5	5.62	0.5%	20.3%	57.8%
Netherlands	6	4.17	0.4%	8.7%	24.1%
Poland	7	4.77	0.6%	5.4%	9.5%
Portugal	4	5.18	0.4%	17.4%	56.7%
Romania	4	6.33	0.3%	18.1%	27.2%
Slovakia	4	13.39	0.4%	6.7%	9.0%
Slovenia	7	5.62	0.7%	4.4%	14.3%
Spain	5	3.92	0.5%	21.9%	43.4%
Sweden	6	3.45	1.3%	6.7%	16.3%
United Kingdom	7	4.75	0.3%	11.8%	20.8%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 11C SJI 2015 raw data

COUNTRY	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11
Austria	71.1%	45.1%	0.89	0.89	5.7%	1.6%	10.3%	10.8%	8.8%	6.8%	15.9%
Belgium	61.9%	42.7%	0.83	0.88	8.6%	4.3%	23.2%	14.3%	76.6%	3.5%	4.6%
Bulgaria	61.0%	50.0%	0.95	0.91	11.5%	6.9%	23.8%	27.5%	64.8%	6.4%	20.1%
Croatia	54.6%	36.2%	0.97	0.85	17.5%	10.2%	45.5%	24.3%	47.2%	5.3%	21.5%
Cyprus	62.1%	46.9%	1.13	0.89	16.3%	7.8%	36.0%	19.4%	94.3%	7.8%	21.4%
Czech Republic	69.0%	54.0%	1.04	0.79	6.2%	2.7%	15.9%	20.7%	82.5%	3.5%	20.1%
Denmark	72.8%	63.2%	0.86	0.92	6.8%	1.7%	12.6%	8.4%	53.5%	4.2%	7.9%
Estonia	69.6%	64.0%	0.97	0.91	7.5%	3.4%	15.0%	11.9%	29.1%	6.4%	24.0%
Finland	68.7%	59.1%	0.88	0.98	8.8%	2.0%	20.5%	12.5%	70.1%	2.7%	9.1%
France	63.8%	46.9%	0.87	0.90	10.3%	4.6%	24.2%	14.8%	61.4%	5.9%	7.5%
Germany	73.8%	65.6%	0.91	0.89	5.1%	2.3%	7.7%	12.0%	21.7%	6.3%	18.8%
Greece	49.4%	34.0%	1.02	0.71	26.7%	19.6%	52.4%	27.6%	86.3%	10.7%	14.0%
Hungary	61.8%	41.7%	1.14	0.82	7.8%	3.7%	20.4%	16.7%	74.0%	5.8%	16.8%
Ireland	61.7%	53.0%	0.99	0.85	11.5%	6.8%	23.9%	18.7%	61.7%	2.9%	23.3%
Italy	55.7%	46.2%	1.06	0.72	12.9%	7.9%	42.7%	15.2%	72.7%	9.3%	10.1%
Latvia	66.3%	56.4%	0.97	0.94	11.1%	4.8%	19.6%	23.6%	63.9%	7.7%	27.6%
Lithuania	65.7%	56.2%	1.06	0.98	10.9%	4.9%	19.3%	28.6%	58.3%	7.6%	26.2%
Luxembourg	66.6%	42.5%	1.17	0.83	5.9%	1.6%	22.6%	7.7%	54.2%	10.1%	11.3%
Malta	62.4%	37.8%	1.04	0.66	5.9%	2.8%	11.7%	7.7%	56.6%	5.3%	13.8%
Netherlands	73.1%	59.9%	0.82	0.87	7.5%	3.0%	12.7%	10.1%	44.4%	3.4%	8.1%
Poland	61.7%	42.5%	1.02	0.81	9.1%	3.9%	23.9%	18.0%	66.5%	9.7%	21.6%
Portugal	62.6%	47.8%	1.07	0.91	14.5%	8.6%	34.8%	14.8%	83.9%	8.8%	19.4%
Romania	61.0%	43.1%	0.90	0.78	7.1%	2.9%	24.0%	6.4%	88.8%	13.6%	25.2%
Slovakia	61.0%	44.8%	1.09	0.80	13.2%	9.3%	29.7%	39.3%	87.3%	5.3%	20.0%
Slovenia	63.9%	35.4%	0.90	0.89	9.9%	5.4%	20.2%	15.5%	65.5%	5.8%	17.0%
Spain	56.0%	44.3%	0.92	0.84	24.6%	13.0%	53.2%	31.4%	91.5%	8.9%	14.6%
Sweden	74.9%	74.0%	0.82	0.96	8.1%	1.5%	22.9%	13.9%	59.6%	5.2%	1.7%
United Kingdom	71.9%	61.0%	0.96	0.87	6.3%	2.2%	16.9%	8.4%	50.4%	6.2%	20.5%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 11D SJI 2015 raw data

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
Austria	7	27.0%	6	32.2%	7	9.6%
Belgium	7	25.9%	7	39.3%	6	17.0%
Bulgaria	4	35.4%	6	20.0%	3	24.8%
Croatia	4	30.9%	5	23.8%	3	26.1%
Cyprus	7	32.4%	8	12.5%	4	25.2%
Czech Republic	6	24.6%	6	19.5%	5	11.8%
Denmark	8	26.8%	8	39.1%	7	8.4%
Estonia	6	32.9%	8	19.0%	7	15.4%
Finland	8	25.4%	8	42.5%	8	14.6%
France	7	30.1%	6	26.2%	6	16.5%
Germany	7	29.7%	8	36.5%	8	9.5%
Greece	3	34.4%	5	21.0%	6	28.4%
Hungary	4	28.3%	5	10.1%	5	19.3%
Ireland	6	30.0%	9	15.7%	7	20.9%
Italy	4	32.8%	7	31.4%	5	32.0%
Latvia	5	35.2%	7	18.0%	5	17.7%
Lithuania	6	34.6%	7	24.1%	7	15.7%
Luxembourg	9	30.4%	8	28.3%	8	10.2%
Malta	6	27.9%	5	14.3%	3	10.2%
Netherlands	8	25.1%	9	38.7%	8	8.7%
Poland	7	30.7%	8	24.3%	5	18.8%
Portugal	4	34.2%	7	31.3%	7	19.0%
Romania	4	34.6%	5	13.5%	6	23.1%
Slovakia	5	24.2%	5	18.7%	5	18.5%
Slovenia	7	24.4%	7	35.6%	4	13.8%
Spain	4	33.7%	7	39.7%	6	24.8%
Sweden	8	24.9%	9	44.7%	7	9.8%
United Kingdom	7	30.2%	8	22.6%	7	16.5%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 11E SJI 2015 raw data

COUNTRY	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	8	0.4%	59.96	84.11	70.80
Belgium	7	1.9%	63.85	96.00	79.20
Bulgaria	4	8.9%	64.56	54.89	50.00
Croatia	5	3.3%	59.05	69.56	62.40
Cyprus	6	4.4%	64.66	58.33	70.80
Czech Republic	8	1.0%	63.37	78.56	70.80
Denmark	8	1.3%	59.74	88.11	79.20
Estonia	8	8.4%	55.61	73.00	70.80
Finland	8	4.3%	56.74	84.89	87.60
France	7	2.7%	63.72	76.56	79.20
Germany	8	1.6%	57.39	73.11	91.60
Greece	3	9.0%	64.90	53.67	62.40
Hungary	4	2.4%	59.62	65.56	46.00
Ireland	5	3.3%	66.91	52.89	79.20
Italy	7	7.1%	61.34	60.00	66.80
Latvia	4	13.8%	53.06	60.33	50.00
Lithuania	7	3.2%	59.39	49.22	50.00
Luxembourg	8	0.9%	63.35	85.44	87.60
Malta	7	0.9%	72.15	65.44	46.00
Netherlands	7	0.4%	59.43	91.78	96.00
Poland	5	8.8%	61.01	51.56	41.60
Portugal	6	3.0%	63.01	67.56	75.20
Romania	4	10.4%	58.24	43.22	33.20
Slovakia	5	1.9%	54.40	68.22	54.00
Slovenia	6	0.0%	58.56	60.44	79.20
Spain	7	0.8%	64.29	59.89	75.20
Sweden	7	1.9%	66.45	69.56	87.60
United Kingdom	8	1.6%	64.60	65.89	70.80

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 11F SJI 2015 raw data

COUNTRY	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
Austria	7	6	6	8.77	32.3%	3.0%	84.2%	27.2%
Belgium	8	6	6	10.40	7.5%	2.4%	106.7%	27.3%
Bulgaria	6	5	6	7.10	19.0%	0.6%	26.4%	29.3%
Croatia	5	5	5	4.79	28.1%	0.8%	85.1%	27.6%
Cyprus	4	5	4	9.85	8.1%	0.5%	108.2%	19.9%
Czech Republic	6	8	7	11.76	12.4%	1.9%	42.7%	25.7%
Denmark	9	9	9	9.83	27.3%	3.1%	44.6%	28.3%
Estonia	9	7	9	13.54	25.6%	1.7%	10.4%	27.9%
Finland	9	9	8	6.39	36.7%	3.3%	59.3%	30.2%
France	10	5	6	6.75	14.0%	2.2%	95.6%	28.4%
Germany	7	5	8	11.15	12.4%	2.8%	74.9%	31.6%
Greece	5	4	4	9.90	15.0%	0.8%	178.4%	31.6%
Hungary	4	4	6	5.61	9.5%	1.4%	76.2%	25.8%
Ireland	6	6	7	14.22	7.7%	1.5%	107.5%	19.3%
Italy	4	5	4	7.54	16.7%	1.3%	132.5%	33.1%
Latvia	7	4	9	5.16	37.1%	0.6%	38.5%	28.8%
Lithuania	6	7	8	4.10	23.0%	1.0%	42.5%	27.5%
Luxembourg	9	7	6	21.53	3.6%	1.3%	22.9%	20.4%
Malta	6	5	4	7.59	3.7%	0.8%	66.9%	26.4%
Netherlands	8	9	5	12.10	4.8%	2.0%	68.2%	26.4%
Poland	7	7	6	9.57	11.3%	0.9%	50.4%	21.2%
Portugal	6	4	5	5.39	25.7%	1.3%	130.2%	30.3%
Romania	5	4	5	4.79	23.9%	0.4%	40.5%	24.3%
Slovakia	5	5	5	6.73	10.1%	0.8%	53.3%	19.0%
Slovenia	8	7	8	6.88	22.5%	2.6%	80.8%	25.7%
Spain	5	6	5	6.73	15.3%	1.3%	99.3%	27.2%
Sweden	10	8	8	1.51	52.0%	3.3%	44.9%	30.6%
United Kingdom	8	8	8	9.14	5.1%	1.7%	88.2%	27.0%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 12A SJI 2016 raw data

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10
Austria	18.3%	22.3%	14.0%	8.2%	3.6%	4.2%	1.4%	13.9%	17.8%	13.2%
Belgium	21.1%	23.3%	16.2%	14.9%	5.8%	7.8%	2.4%	14.9%	18.0%	15.2%
Bulgaria	41.3%	43.7%	51.8%	11.6%	34.2%	37.3%	40.9%	22.0%	25.4%	31.7%
Croatia	29.1%	28.2%	31.9%	14.4%	13.7%	13.4%	14.5%	20.0%	20.9%	26.3%
Cyprus	28.9%	28.9%	20.8%	10.9%	15.4%	17.2%	5.1%	16.2%	16.7%	17.3%
Czech Republic	14.0%	18.5%	10.9%	6.8%	5.6%	7.2%	4.5%	9.7%	14.7%	7.4%
Denmark	17.7%	15.7%	9.9%	11.6%	3.7%	4.3%	0.9%	12.2%	10.4%	9.1%
Estonia	24.2%	22.5%	37.0%	6.6%	4.5%	3.9%	5.2%	21.6%	20.0%	35.8%
Finland	16.8%	14.9%	14.5%	10.8%	2.2%	2.0%	1.2%	12.4%	10.0%	13.8%
France	17.7%	21.2%	9.3%	8.6%	4.5%	5.4%	1.9%	13.6%	18.7%	8.0%
Germany	20.0%	18.5%	17.2%	9.8%	4.4%	4.7%	2.4%	16.7%	14.6%	16.5%
Greece	35.7%	37.8%	22.8%	16.8%	22.2%	25.7%	15.2%	21.4%	26.6%	13.7%
Hungary	28.2%	36.1%	17.1%	9.4%	19.4%	24.9%	14.2%	14.9%	22.7%	4.6%
Ireland	27.6%	30.3%	13.5%	21.1%	8.4%	10.1%	2.9%	15.6%	17.0%	10.9%
Italy	28.7%	33.5%	19.9%	11.7%	11.5%	13.0%	8.2%	19.9%	26.8%	14.7%
Latvia	30.9%	31.3%	42.1%	7.8%	16.4%	17.0%	18.2%	22.5%	23.2%	34.6%
Lithuania	29.3%	32.7%	36.0%	9.2%	13.9%	13.8%	18.2%	22.2%	28.9%	25.0%
Luxembourg	18.5%	23.0%	8.2%	5.7%	2.0%	3.0%	0.3%	15.3%	21.5%	7.9%
Malta	22.4%	28.2%	23.7%	9.2%	8.1%	10.4%	4.7%	16.3%	23.4%	21.0%
Netherlands	16.8%	17.2%	6.1%	10.2%	2.5%	2.6%	0.5%	12.1%	14.5%	5.7%
Poland	23.4%	26.6%	17.0%	6.9%	8.1%	7.9%	7.9%	17.6%	22.4%	12.1%
Portugal	26.6%	29.6%	21.7%	10.9%	9.6%	11.0%	8.4%	19.5%	24.8%	17.0%
Romania	37.3%	46.8%	33.3%	7.9%	22.7%	28.9%	21.5%	25.4%	38.1%	19.3%
Slovakia	18.4%	24.9%	12.8%	7.1%	9.0%	11.2%	9.2%	12.3%	20.1%	5.6%
Slovenia	19.2%	16.6%	20.2%	7.4%	5.8%	4.7%	6.1%	14.3%	14.2%	17.2%
Spain	28.6%	34.4%	13.7%	15.4%	6.4%	9.1%	2.2%	22.1%	29.6%	12.3%
Sweden	16.0%	14.0%	18.3%	5.8%	0.7%	0.8%	0.4%	14.5%	12.9%	18.2%
United Kingdom	23.5%	30.3%	17.7%	11.9%	6.1%	9.6%	1.6%	16.7%	19.8%	16.4%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 12B SJI 2016 raw data

COUNTRY	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5
Austria	6	6.42	0.5%	7.3%	15.4%
Belgium	6	6.30	0.7%	10.1%	25.3%
Bulgaria	4	11.52	1.1%	13.4%	18.1%
Croatia	6	3.75	0.7%	2.8%	16.7%
Cyprus	7	2.83	0.4%	5.3%	21.90%
Czech Republic	6	6.76	0.6%	6.2%	6.8%
Denmark	6	5.99	1.6%	7.8%	19.6%
Estonia	9	1.76	0.4%	11.2%	8.9%
Finland	8	2.47	0.8%	9.2%	12.3%
France	6	10.90	0.7%	9.3%	22.5%
Germany	8	5.61	0.5%	10.1%	13.2%
Greece	4	4.06	0.1%	7.9%	29.6%
Hungary	3	8.47	0.7%	11.6%	16.8%
Ireland	6	5.89	0.1%	6.9%	20.2%
Italy	5	2.98	0.5%	14.7%	40.1%
Latvia	5	5.00	0.6%	9.9%	9.9%
Lithuania	7	3.56	0.6%	5.5%	6.5%
Luxembourg	5	5.82	0.7%	9.3%	24.0%
Malta	5	5.62	0.5%	19.8%	56.5%
Netherlands	6	4.17	0.4%	8.2%	23.6%
Poland	7	4.77	0.6%	5.3%	9.2%
Portugal	4	5.18	0.4%	13.7%	54.9%
Romania	4	6.33	0.3%	19.1%	25.0%
Slovakia	4	13.39	0.5%	6.9%	8.6%
Slovenia	7	5.62	0.6%	5.0%	13.2%
Spain	5	3.92	0.5%	20.0%	42.6%
Sweden	6	3.45	1.3%	7.0%	15.7%
United Kingdom	7	4.75	0.3%	10.8%	20.3%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 12C SJI 2016 raw data

COUNTRY	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11
Austria	71.1%	46.3%	0.89	0.89	5.8%	1.7%	10.6%	10.6%	9.5%	5.9%	15.9%
Belgium	61.8%	44.0%	0.84	0.89	8.6%	4.4%	22.1%	14.8%	80.1%	3.7%	4.6%
Bulgaria	62.9%	53.0%	0.88	0.91	9.2%	5.6%	21.6%	24.7%	69.9%	6.7%	20.1%
Croatia	55.8%	39.0%	1.01	0.86	16.5%	10.4%	43.0%	21.6%	43.4%	5.4%	21.5%
Cyprus	62.4%	48.2%	1.10	0.89	15.3%	6.9%	32.8%	17.9%	92.9%	7.6%	21.4%
Czech Republic	70.2%	55.5%	1.01	0.80	5.1%	2.4%	12.6%	20.7%	83.9%	3.8%	20.1%
Denmark	73.5%	64.7%	0.85	0.92	6.3%	1.7%	10.8%	8.5%	43.5%	4.0%	7.9%
Estonia	71.9%	64.5%	0.97	0.91	6.3%	2.4%	13.1%	12.5%	30.9%	8.9%	24.0%
Finland	68.5%	60.0%	0.86	0.98	9.6%	2.4%	22.4%	12.3%	72.6%	2.9%	9.1%
France	63.8%	48.6%	0.85	0.90	10.4%	4.6%	24.7%	15.6%	59.7%	6.0%	7.5%
Germany	74.0%	66.2%	0.91	0.90	4.7%	2.1%	7.2%	11.4%	21.7%	7.1%	18.8%
Greece	50.8%	34.3%	1.04	0.72	25.1%	18.3%	49.8%	26.2%	83.3%	11.6%	14.0%
Hungary	63.9%	45.3%	1.11	0.82	6.8%	3.1%	17.3%	15.5%	76.3%	8.4%	18.7%
Ireland	63.3%	55.6%	0.99	0.84	9.6%	5.5%	20.9%	15.9%	63.2%	3.2%	23.3%
Italy	56.3%	48.2%	1.05	0.72	12.1%	7.1%	40.3%	14.2%	73.5%	9.8%	10.1%
Latvia	68.1%	59.4%	0.93	0.95	10.1%	4.6%	16.3%	22.4%	51.7%	8.2%	27.6%
Lithuania	67.2%	60.4%	1.01	0.98	9.3%	4.0%	16.3%	26.2%	63.3%	8.6%	26.2%
Luxembourg	66.1%	38.4%	1.11	0.85	6.7%	1.9%	17.3%	8.2%	48.1%	10.0%	11.3%
Malta	63.9%	40.3%	1.05	0.67	5.5%	2.4%	11.8%	7.3%	54.8%	4.7%	13.8%
Netherlands	74.1%	61.7%	0.80	0.88	6.9%	3.0%	11.3%	9.3%	51.7%	5.2%	8.1%
Poland	62.9%	44.3%	0.97	0.82	7.6%	3.0%	20.8%	15.5%	64.7%	10.7%	21.6%
Portugal	63.9%	49.9%	1.07	0.91	12.9%	7.4%	32.0%	13.0%	83.1%	9.6%	19.4%
Romania	61.4%	41.1%	0.90	0.77	7.0%	3.1%	21.7%	7.7%	85.7%	14.7%	25.2%
Slovakia	62.7%	47.0%	0.93	0.80	11.5%	7.6%	26.5%	34.4%	86.5%	5.4%	20.0%
Slovenia	65.2%	36.6%	0.93	0.88	9.1%	4.8%	16.3%	13.6%	59.5%	5.9%	17.0%
Spain	57.8%	46.9%	0.95	0.84	22.2%	11.5%	48.3%	28.9%	90.6%	10.3%	14.6%
Sweden	75.5%	74.5%	0.82	0.96	7.6%	1.6%	20.4%	14.1%	59.0%	6.1%	1.7%
United Kingdom	72.7%	62.2%	0.96	0.88	5.4%	1.7%	14.6%	7.3%	50.4%	5.7%	20.5%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 12D SJI 2016 raw data

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
Austria	7	27.2	6	30.6%	6	9.8%
Belgium	6	26.2	7	39.3%	6	17.5%
Bulgaria	4	37	6	20.4%	3	24.0%
Croatia	4	30.6	5	15.2%	3	24.2%
Cyprus	7	33.6	8	12.5%	4	22.2%
Czech Republic	6	25	6	20.0%	4	10.8%
Denmark	8	27.4	8	37.4%	6	9.3%
Estonia	6	34.8	7	23.8%	7	15.1%
Finland	8	25.2	8	41.5%	7	15.7%
France	7	29.2	6	26.2%	6	18.1%
Germany	7	30.1	8	36.5%	7	9.3%
Greece	3	34.2	6	19.7%	6	26.1%
Hungary	4	28.2	4	10.1%	4	16.5%
Ireland	6	30.8	9	16.3%	7	19.7%
Italy	5	32.4	7	31.0%	6	31.1%
Latvia	5	35.4	7	18.0%	5	16.1%
Lithuania	6	37.9	7	23.4%	7	14.4%
Luxembourg	9	28.5	8	28.3%	8	8.8%
Malta	6	28.1	5	12.9%	3	9.8%
Netherlands	7	26.4	9	37.3%	8	7.2%
Poland	7	30.6	8	27.4%	5	17.6%
Portugal	4	34	7	34.8%	8	17.5%
Romania	4	37.4	5	13.7%	6	24.1%
Slovakia	5	23.7	5	18.7%	4	19.2%
Slovenia	8	24.5	7	36.7%	5	14.0%
Spain	4	34.6	7	41.1%	7	22.2%
Sweden	8	25.2	9	43.6%	7	9.3%
United Kingdom	7	32.4	8	29.4%	7	15.0%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung

TABLE 12E SJI 2016 raw data

COUNTRY	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	7	0.1%	57.70	81.44	75.20
Belgium	7	2.4%	64.09	93.67	79.20
Bulgaria	4	5.6%	64.11	52.00	50.00
Croatia	5	3.3%	59.32	78.56	62.40
Cyprus	6	4.7%	66.20	54.78	70.80
Czech Republic	8	1.1%	64.21	89.00	70.80
Denmark	8	1.4%	60.85	76.67	87.60
Estonia	8	11.3%	55.28	71.56	75.20
Finland	8	3.3%	58.09	81.33	91.60
France	7	2.8%	63.81	77.11	83.20
Germany	8	1.6%	56.45	73.11	91.60
Greece	3	10.9%	64.46	50.78	66.80
Hungary	4	2.5%	59.90	59.11	50.00
Ireland	5	3.7%	66.91	53.56	83.20
Italy	7	7.0%	62.40	60.00	75.20
Latvia	4	12.5%	53.56	50.11	58.40
Lithuania	7	3.7%	59.81	63.89	54.00
Luxembourg	8	0.8%	63.75	86.11	87.60
Malta	7	1.1%	73.30	77.89	54.00
Netherlands	6	0.5%	61.13	92.44	96.00
Poland	5	7.8%	61.30	43.22	58.40
Portugal	6	3.5%	56.78	59.11	75.20
Romania	4	9.3%	59.00	54.33	41.60
Slovakia	4	2.1%	55.04	67.56	54.00
Slovenia	6	0.2%	58.71	63.11	83.20
Spain	7	0.6%	65.00	62.78	79.20
Sweden	7	1.5%	73.60	70.22	91.60
United Kingdom	8	2.1%	63.81	65.89	75.20

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

| BertelsmannStiftung


TABLE 12F SJI 2016 raw data

COUNTRY	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
Austria	7	6	6	8.83	33.1%	3.0%	86.2%	27.5%
Belgium	8	7	6	10.36	8.0%	2.5%	106.3%	27.8%
Bulgaria	6	5	6	6.39	18.0%	0.8%	26.9%	30.2%
Croatia	5	4	5	4.54	27.9%	0.8%	87.7%	28.3%
Cyprus	4	5	4	8.86	9.0%	0.5%	108.7%	21.2%
Czech Republic	6	8	6	11.45	13.4%	2.0%	40.9%	26.6%
Denmark	9	9	9	10.17	29.2%	3.1%	45.6%	28.8%
Estonia	9	7	9	16.22	26.5%	1.4%	10.1%	28.7%
Finland	9	9	8	7.85	38.7%	3.2%	62.4%	31.3%
France	10	6	6	6.76	14.3%	2.3%	96.8%	29.2%
Germany	8	5	8	11.40	13.8%	2.9%	71.0%	32.0%
Greece	5	4	4	9.25	15.3%	0.8%	178.4%	32.4%
Hungary	4	4	6	5.45	9.5%	1.4%	75.5%	26.5%
Ireland	7	6	7	13.64	8.6%	1.5%	95.2%	20.0%
Italy	4	5	4	6.76	17.1%	1.3%	132.6%	33.7%
Latvia	7	4	9	5.32	38.7%	0.7%	34.8%	29.5%
Lithuania	7	7	8	3.36	23.9%	1.0%	42.5%	28.1%
Luxembourg	8	7	7	19.92	4.5%	1.3%	21.8%	20.5%
Malta	6	5	4	6.61	4.7%	0.8%	63.7%	27.6%
Netherlands	8	8	5	12.04	5.5%	2.0%	67.6%	27.2%
Poland	7	7	6	9.39	11.4%	0.9%	51.3%	22.2%
Portugal	7	4	6	5.31	27.0%	1.3%	128.8%	31.1%
Romania	5	4	5	4.30	24.9%	0.4%	39.4%	25.2%
Slovakia	5	5	5	6.61	11.6%	0.9%	52.6%	19.7%
Slovenia	8	7	8	6.52	21.9%	2.4%	83.3%	26.6%
Spain	5	7	5	6.16	16.2%	1.2%	99.0%	27.9%
Sweden	10	8	9	1.49	52.6%	3.2%	44.1%	31.1%
United Kingdom	8	8	7	8.87	7.0%	1.7%	89.3%	27.5%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016.

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
FIGURE 48 EU Social Justice Index (weighted)



Source: Own calculations.

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FIGURE 49 EU Social Justice Index (unweighted)



Source: Own calculations.

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