













**Bernd Marin**



# Welfare in an Idle Society?

## Reinventing Retirement, Work, Wealth, Health, and Welfare



# *Welfare in an Idle Society?*

## **Reinventing Retirement, Work, Wealth, Health, and Welfare**

**A Primer on Re-Designing Social Security  
to Cope with Global Ageing and  
21st Century Pension Future:  
Austria as a Case in Point**

**Bernd Marin**

**ASHGATE**

O ctej 2013

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